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Contrary to nearly all predictions, Ukraine's Communists supported the
Ukrainian declaration of independence in 1991. Closer scrutiny reveals
this should have been no surprise because Communist support for
independence was the result of Marxist-Leninist ideology's failure to
resolve the conflict between nationalism and Communism. Because of this
contradiction, Ukrainian Communists were promised national self-
determination but were forbidden to exercise it. Similarly, Ukraine's
pre-Communist national consciousness survived and was even nurtured by the
Soviet system. These two factors, acting simultaneously, meant the idea
of an independent Ukrainian nation was never far from the thoughts of
Ukraine's Communists. Thus, when the opportunity came to realize self-
determination for the third time this century, Ukraine's Communists, still
retaining national consciousness and marching under the banner of Marxism-
Leninism, joined and even led the move toward independence.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contrary to nearly all predictions, Ukraine's Communists supported the
Ukrainian declaration of independence in 1991. This "revolutionary turn"
was the result of Marxist-Leninist ideology's failure to resolve the
conflict between nationalism and Communism. Because of this
contradiction, Ukrainian Communists were promised national self-
determination but were forbidden to exercise it. Similarly, Ukraine's
pre-Communist national consciousness survived and was even nurtured by the
Soviet system. These two factors, acting simultaneously, meant the idea
of an independent Ukrainian nation was never far from the thoughts of
Ukraine's Communists. Thus, when the opportunity came to realize self-
determination for the third time this century, Ukraine's Communist- still
retaining national consciousness and marching under the banner of Marxism-
Leninism, joined and even led the move toward independence. The Ukrainian
Communist Party alienated this movement from within by vacillating between
coopting the reformist agenda and crushing the movement. As a result, the




On the first of December 1991, Ukrainians achieved in one day, without
firing a single shot, what their forefathers had struggled and died for
from 1917 to 1920, and again in the wake of WWII - independence. How did
Ukraine in 1991 achieve what had twice in this century been struggled for
and lost? How was it that independence came without the violence of
earlier attempts?
The answer lies in the fact that Ukraine's move toward independence
was in part initiated and supported by the very same political actors
Ukraine sought independence from - the Communist Party of Ukraine. This
is not a popular nor widely held view. However, the image of the
Ukrainian opposition forces seizing control of the government anci routing
the Communists does not fit with reality. Had Ukraine's Communists not
supported the initial vote to declare independence in August 1991 hours
after the collapse of the attempted coup d'etat in Moscow, and had
Communists not voted for independence in the I December referendum,
Ukrainian independence would have been tossed back on the trash heap of
modern history. This being the case, why did Ukraine's Communist elites
support a nationalist program of independence which was totally opposed to
the dominance of the Soviet state?
What follows is an attempt to answer this last question and to provide
insight into the process by which Ukraine's Communist elites supported and
eventually merged forces with the pro-independence opposition. The thesis
of this investigation is that support from Ukrainian Communist leadership
1
for independence was more a consequence of the contradictions of the
Soviet state and the national tendencies of Ukrainians than a defeat by
the forces of opposition. In 1990 and 1991 the forces of opposition and
0th Communist Party of Ukraine merged unexpectedly. This was the result
of an historical shortcoming of Marxist-Leninist ideology -namely, that it
fails to resolve the inherent conflict between Communism and nationalism.
The inconsistencies in Soviet ideology led to a contradictory federal
system and policy toward the non-Russians under which Ukrainians were
given the instruments of national-self determination but denied their use.
This contradiction, in an environment of strong national sentiment,
provided fertile ground for the growth of anti-Russian and strongly pro-
autonomy feelings among both Ukrainian nationalists and Communists. In
the past these sentiments had been contained only by strong central force
and brutal repression. Whenever the center loosened its grip, Ukraine,
led by its ruling elites, tried to wriggle away. In 1991, Ukraine, with
the help and complicity of its ruling elites, finally did get away. This
was to be a devastating blow to the continued existence of the Soviet
Union because Ukraine was the territorial and economic key to the Union's
viability. The events of 1991 highlighted not only the importance of
Ukraine to the Union but also Ukraine's political volatility.
A. UKRAINE'S IMPORTANCE - QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC WEALTH AND POLITICAL
STABILITY
Ukraine, known as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) from
1919 to 1991, has been described as "Europe's secret nation." Its
importance to the Soviet Union was captured in the words of the British
historian, Norman Davies, who stated "There is Moscow and the Ukraine -
2
all the rest is window dressing."' Ukraine was important not only because
of its enormous inherent natural resources but because of the volatility
of its strong national character which lay not far below the tranquil,
Soviet imposed, identity.
Ukraine's inherent wealth has always been its population, and its
natural resources. In 1991, Ukraine had a population of 52 million and a
territory the size of France. Yet, with only 3 percent of the territory
and 19 percent of the population of the Soviet Union, Ukraine provided
more than its share of the Soviet Union's national income (17 percent in
1989)2 as well as a number of valuable resources which fueled the Soviet
State for many years.
The most important of these resources is coal located primarily in the
Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine. These coal deposits are second in the
world only to the Appalachian deposits in the United States. Oil and
natural gas are also found in Ukraine in great quantities and Ukraine
produced 30 percent of all the Soviet Union's natural gas prior to 1972
when Siberian deposits began to be developed. Ukrainian iron ore accounts
for more than half the Soviet output, and manganese mined in Ukraine
accounted for 27 percent of the world's total in 1973. In addition,
Ukraine produces large quantities of titanium and uranium. 3
Ukrainian industry, built around these natural resources, is quite
well developed and Ukraine produces more pig iron than any other European
country and more coal and steel than either France or Britain. These
'As quoted in Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, The Hidden Nations: The PeopLe Challenge the
Soviet Union (New York: WitLim Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990), 73.
2David Marptes, Ukraine Under Perestroika (New York: St. martin's Press, 1991), 2.
3Swoboda, "The Ukraine," 262.
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industries account for a disproportionate share of the Soviet Union's
production capability. Ukraine produces 50 percent of the Union's pig
iron and coke, over 40 percent of the steel and almost half the
metallurgical equipment.'
In the area of agriculture, Ukraine has been known as the bread basket
of Europe for centuries because of its very rich chernozem or "black
earth" and moderate climate. In 1970, Ukrainian agricultural enterprises
produced 19 percent of Soviet grain, 59 percent of the Union's sugar
beets, and 28 percent of all vegetables. 5
While this economic dowry was instrumental to the success of the
Soviet Union, it was not unlimited and its exploitation has an unseen
price. The economy has been experiencing a severe decline since the 1970s
due in part to falling agricultural and labor productivity and exhaustion
of Ukraine's mineral resources. Although Ukraine has become a leader in
cybernetics, the vast majority of Ukraine's economic might is based on
outdated equipment and obsolete technology. As a result of the declining
economy, Ukraine's standard of living has also dropped significantly.
Ukraine's leaders found that under the existing Soviet federal system
their ability to solve the republic's growing economic problems was very
restricted. Ukraine's lack of political viability was an intentional
aspect of the Soviet political structure and one of the key destabilizing
factors in the Ukrainian political character.
The UkSSR, according to the Soviet Constitution, was a sovereign
national state which voluntarily joined the Union and was thus accorded a
4Ibid.
5Roman Sporluk, "The Ukraine and the Ukrainians," in Handbook of Maior Soviet Nationalities, ad.
Zev Katz Rosemarie Rogers and Frederic Narned (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 22.
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.m.ber of rights, including secession. Ukraine also became a member of
the United Nations which theoretically allowed the republic to pursue
independent international relations. Domestically, UkSSR's sovereign
power was vested in its Supreme Soviet. However, in reality as a part of
the Union, Ukraine had very limited sovereignty because the republic had
no control over activities within its borders. Central control was
exercised by Union ministries to such an extent that the UkSSR only had
real control over the ministries of roads, road transport, housing,
communal services, and social insurance. This centralization of control
began to increase in the 1980s with a number of joint Ukrainian-Union
ministries coming under control of the center. Centralization progressed
to the point that in 1990 Ukraine controlled only 5 percent of its own
resources and industry. The Ukrainian Republic's sovereignty was further
limited by the "leading" role of the Commu:.-+ Party of Ukraine (CPU)
which was under the direct control of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU). In effect, the CPSU, via the CPU, controlled every aspect
of the Ukrainian government. 6
A second key factor in the instability of the Ukrainian political
character were the historical contradictions of the Ukrainian national
consciousness brought about by periods of political discontinuity.
Ukraine as we know it today has spent a great portion of its modern
history divided into parts. During the 19th century pieces of what we now
call Ukraine were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire while
others were part of the Russian Empire. After WWI, the political
environment changed drastically and most of Ukraine came to be divided
%ictor Swoboda, "The Ukraine," in The Soviet Union and Eastern Euroce, ad. George SchopfIin (New
York: Facts on FiLe Publications, 1986), 261.
5
between Russia and Poland. The Western part of Ukraine, known as Galicia,
only became united with the eastern, Russian part, after WWII when the
Soviet Union gained Galicla as a spoil of war. However this union was
flawed by the differing historical experiences of the Eastern and Western
Ukrainians with the Western regions harboring strong nationalist feelings
which, to the Russified East, appeared fanatical.
The legacy of differing political orientations and systems, as well
as the physical separation of the Ukrainian people was manifested in a
number of different ways. Demographically Ukraine was split between East
and West because Russians, for the most part, tended to settle in the
Eastern or central regions leaving Western Ukraine as a stronghold for
native Ukrainians.
7
Ukraine's two halves were also driven apart by religion since Western
Ukrainians were predominately Catholic or Greek Orthodox while Eastern
Ukrainians were Russian Orthodox. The religious rift was accentuated by
the Soviet's ban on the Catholic Church and their decision to force the
Eastern rites upon Western Ukraine.
These underlying fractures in the UkSSR combined with the frustrations
of economic and political powerlessness, led many of Ukraine's Communist
and info,ial non-political leaders to agitate for increased autonomy.
When this political force combined with Gorbachev's perestroika Ukraine's
move to independence began to accelerate dramatically.
7Throughout its Soviet history, Ukraine was the focus of intense Russification and as a result,
by 1989 Russians comprised 22.2 percent of the popuLation and Ukrainians only 72.2 percent, the
remaining 5.1 percent being minorities (primarily Jews, ByeLorussians, Pokes, Bulgarians, and
Moldavians). Ukrainian Reporter, VoL. 1, No. 18, October 1991, 6.
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B. WHY STUDY COMNMlIST ELITES?
The focus on ruling elites is crucial to understanding the transitions
away from Communism which have occurred both in Eastern Europe and Russia.
Gale Stokes in his study of the 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe stressed
that one of the lessons from the Eastern Europe experience is the
important role of leadership. As he writes,
For a historian.. .there is little question that we all operate within
a historically determined and relatively limited range of creative
possibilities. But 1989 has shown once again.. .how important and
unpredictable is the ability of the individual leader to stretch that
range.$
Why study Ukraine's "former" communist elites? Would it not be better
to study the new political forces in Ukraine? The short answer to the
latter question is that by studying Ukraine's former communist elites, we
are also studying the new political forces in independent Ukraine.
Ukraine's former communist elites have, to a very great extent, retained
their power and to this date they hold the majority of governmental posts
from the Presidency down.
To address the first question; the study of Communist elites in
Ukraine is fundamental to understanding the political future of the
largest new independent state in Europe9 for three main reasons; 1)
Without the study of Ukraire'. Communist elites one cannot understand the
process of nation-building in Ukraine much less the process of achieving
aGate Stokes, "Lessons of the East European Revolutions of 1989," Problems of Communism XL, no.
5 (September-October 1991), 21.
Or perhaps Ukraine is the second largest new independent state if one holds that Russia is a new
European state. In any case, it is obvious that Ukraine considers itself a European state. Take for
example the Ukrainian representative's statement at the Paris Sumit of the CSCE in tate 1990: "Europe
cannot end at the borders of the USSR. The process of creation of independent states from t'e former
rep••lics of the last empire in the world is the most important event in Europe. To welcome the
emerging state formations on the territory of the USSR is a moral and political obligation of
democratic Europe." ("Ukraine, Baltic states and Arloiia send representatives to Paris Sumit," The
Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. LVIII, No. 47, 25 November , p .. )
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independence because these elites were deeply involved from the outset; 2)
The Communist government in Ukraine was caught between the center (Moscow
and the CPSU) and the opposition and was acted on by both. As a result,
a study of Ukraine's Coumunists can provide insight into a broader
spectrum of the political process in Ukraine prior to independence; 3)
Since independence, Ukraine has not faded into the background like the
Baltic states.") Quite to the contrary, the recent dispute over nuclear
weapons and ownership of the Black Sea Fleet make it clear that Ukraine
is, and will continue to be an important factor in European and American
strategic and security calculations; 4) The study of Ukraine's communist
elites is applicable to the study of other republics because the role
played by republican communist elites in the process of nation-building
and independence in the various former republics is similar. In addition,
many former republics of the USSR have been headed by former Communists
just as post-independence Ukraine.
C. THE QUESTION OF ELITE RELIABILITY
Among the popular and academic literature there is an innate tendency
to ascribe the majority of protest in the Soviet Union to nationalist
sentiment. This oversimplification, if not patently wrong for most
republics, is certainly misleading as this study will demonstrate.
Richard Pipes in his article "The Soviet Union Adrift" stresses this
point. He cites economic and political factors as important in Soviet
"
1The continued visibility of Ukraine in the West has been hampered by profound Russo-centrism and
a tack of understanding captured by Robert Conquest's in his Harvest of Sorrow. Conquest describes the
Sovietization of Ukraine, the struggle for independence in the 20th Century, and the human costs
associated with both processes. These were events which "never truly gripped the Western mind" he
writes, because of "a lack of understanding or knowledge of the power of Ukrainian national feeling,
of Ukrainian nationhood., He could be just as weLl be speaking about the contemporary Ukraine. Robert
Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror - Famine (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 25.
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republic unrest. He cites the failure of the center's economic distri-
bution system as a "major reason" for national disunity in the RSFSR as
well as other republics. Additionally, nationalist sentiment is not the
only factor driving decentralization. The inability of the center to
provide adequate regional lEddership is also major factor."'
The behavior of regional leaders in Ukraine and many other republics
was unforeseen by the vast majority of western (and Soviet) experts. As
a result, the analysis of Ukraine's independence movement was often off
the mark. The major unchallenged assumption, that Ukraine's communist
elites would remain loyal to Moscow turned out to be wrong. For example,
one of the leading students of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, Seweryn
Bialer concluded that:
While the failure of will and effectiveness of political elites seems
unlikely in the coming decade, what seems even less likely in the
foreseeable future is a transformation of the Soviet political system
in a democratic direction through a peaceful, "painless" evolution.
The nature of the Soviet political elite, the way in which the Soviet
system was established, and the way it is now run argue forcefully
against the effectiveness of incremental changes in breaking the
vicious circle of elite self-replication, bureaucratization, and
autocratic societal control. 12
Addressing the issue of loyalty of national Communist Party elites,
Bialer points out that since the 1960s there have been growing tendencies
toward increased competence among republican national leadership as well
as a decreased Russian presence "inside" the local government to monitor
the national elites. This tendency, he argues, creates a more stable
situation.
1 Richard Pipes, "The Soviet Union Adrift," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 77.
12Seweryn Biater, Statin's Successors: Leadership. Stability, and Chanae in the Soviet Union
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 285-286.
9
It is the process of the formation of such native elites, of the
political and social mobility that it represents, of the opportunity
and satisfaction of Indigenous cadres that it reflects, which forms
the basis of the probably still strong commitment of these cadres to
the existing system and a key element of the explanilion for the
stability of nationality relations in the past decade.
However, in the same paragraph, Bialer points out the counter thesis that
this process will encourage the national elites to seek their own path.
At the same time, of course, this situation exacerbates the Soviet
dilemma for the future: Once such a plateau of mobility and
competence has been achieved, the prospects that indigenous elites
will press increasingly for greater autonomy from the central
authority may rise sharply.14
He counters this by noting that although republican elites tended to
demand increased autonomy in the at'ea of economics, they compete not with
the center but with other republics for limited resources. This
implicitly means, argues Bialer, "there will seldom be a unity of
interests and views on economic issues among the republican elites...."
which "points...to another strength of the Soviet Federal system.",I But
even more important and key to Bialer's argument is the supposition that
this disunity of republican elite action against the center also occurs
within the republic and "for this reason bureaucratic elites within the
republics do not represent a political danger to the central authorities
and are as manageable as local politics in the Russian region. "16
As an example of republican elite loyalty, Bialer turns his analysis
to the situation of Ukraine. He highlights the special role of Ukraine in






been more equal than the other nationalities in the eyes of Moscow. The
common racial identity, cultural affinity and high level of russ:Fication
have, he writes, formed a Russo-Ukrainian compact, which,
by expanding the opportunities open to Ukrainian elites, enhanced the
prospects for Ukrainian commitment to the federal system as it
exists, the prospect that they will not pursue autonomous aspirat-
ions. By so doing, it provides one of the bases for containment of
the nationality problem in the Soviet Union.
Today this conclusion seems difficult to believe not only in light of what
has happened since Bialer's book was published in 1980 but even before
that with the purge of Shelest in 1972.18 Ultimately, the events of 1989
disproved Bialer's assertion of increased national Party elite loyalty.
Bialer's assessment that national elites will remain loyal to the
center was shared by others. Alexander Motyl in his book Sovietology.
Rationality, Nationality, argues that National Communism is an inevitable
result of the "imperfectly totalitarian Soviet state." The historical
tendency toward National Communism, says Motyl differs from nationalism by
explicitly rejecting political independence although it can be
"contextually nationalist" in "appropriate circumstances." National
Communism emerges from the conflict between the centralized Communist
Party and the idea of the Austro-Marxist state which grants to republican
leaders a measure of authority. 19
17 Ibid., 224.
laBialer's misreading of the situation seems to be enduring. His book , The Soviet Paradox,
published in 1986, stubbornly asserts the same thesis that the stability of the ruling elites will
continue: "The Soviet Union is presently in the throes of a crisis of effectiveness. There is little
reason to believe that the situation will change in the foreseeable future. But it is unlikely that
the state is now, or will be in the late 1980s in danger of social or political disintegration."
Seweryn Dialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion. Internal Decline (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1986), 19.
|Alexander J. motyt, Sovietotoqy. Rationality, Nationality: Comina to Gri•s with Nationalisam in
the USSR (New York: Colombia University Press, 1990), 87-88.
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Unfortunately, Motyl's conclusion after all of this is that the
process of disintegration will be stopped by the center and ultimately the
non-Russians, although they want to rebel, will not.2° Motyl bases his
conclusion on the fact that the conflict between the periphery and the
center will result in full-scale national conflict which may result in a
reforming of the system but not the successful freeing of the
republics. 21  Motyl's key error is that he fails to consider the
possibility that National Communists may go so far in pursuit of their
regional ambitions that they may join forces with the nationalists and
totally reject the center and its Communist ideology.
Not all Soviet analysts were ignorant of the potential for republican
leadership to turn against the center. Recently Biddulph and Breslauer
independently asserted that, given the opportunity, republican Communist
elites would tend to advocate local interests. 22 Brzezinski, writing as
early as 1969 and Rakowska-Harmstone writing in the late 1970s noted that
the non-Russians were led by "Soviet* elites who could press for increased
political autonomy and an increased economic share without appearing as
2This, incidentally, is the same conclusion he reaches in his book titled WiLt the Non-Russians
Rebel, which primarily focused on Ukraine. He concluded his study of the potential for the non-russian
nationalities to revolt as follows:
As long as the public sphere is occupied, and more important, as long as the KGB remains intact,
the deprivatization of antistate attitudes will be problematic, antistate collectivities and
elites will be unlikely to mobilize, alliances between workers and intellectuals will not
materialize, and rebellion, revolt, and insurrection wilt be well-nigh impossible. Because they
cannot rebel, non-Russians wilt not rebel. (Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel?
State. Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR (Ithaca, NY: Cornetl University Press, 187), 170.)
2 1Motyt, Sovietolopv, 185-186.
2George Breslauer, W., "Is There a Generation gap in the Soviet Political Establishment?: Demand
Articulation by RSFSR Provincial Party First Secretaries," Soviet Studies XXXVI, no. 1 (January 1984):
1-25 and Howard Biddulph, L., "Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses," World Politics XXXVI,
no- 1 (October 1983): 28-52.
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secessionists.2 As a result, their demands would continue to grow and
"could impose a major strain on the Soviet constitutional structure." 24
Conquest writing in 1965 about stability in the USSR noted that:
with weakness or schism at the center, it is not improbable that
moves might be made by the leadership of some of the peripheral Union
republics to increase their power, and peruaps even to effect virtual
or even overt secession from the U.S.S.R.' 5
Conquest, drawing on the Hungarian example, postulated that a similar
break with Moscow could occur within the USSR if the same levels of
intellectual ferment were reached among the populace. In such a case, he
writes, there are two relevant points;
First, that a second-rate 'conservative' leadership can make enormous
and provocative miscalculations; and second, that a wing of the
apparat driven into opposition can make common cause with the genuine
progressives among the non-apparatchik youth and intelligentsia. 26
Simon's book on nationalism and Soviet nationality policy also
stresses the potential for the Soviet Union's national elites to
destabilize the system. Simon argues that the Soviet national elites,
whenever presented with the opportunity, will pursue their nationalist
interests against the interests of the center. As a result, he argues,
"the continue6 existence of the state and its social system depends
largely on the loyalty of the new non-Russian elites" and the center must
continually strive to satisfy these demands while still maintaining the
2Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Concluding Reflections," in DiLemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, ed.
Zbignew Brzezinski (New York: Cokuwbia University Press, 1969), 160 and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone,
"Ethnicity and Change in the Soviet Union," in Perspectives for Change in Comfmunist Societies, ed.
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1979), 167-188.
24Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?," inDiltemmas
of Cheane in Soviet Politics, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 29.
2Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 204.
2 bid., 253.
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empire. 27 Simon asserts that the Soviet Union has held together in spite
of these tendencies toward separatism "because the system of repression
prevented the growth of separatist aspirations and because the new elites
were socialized in a Soviet environment, that provided for a certain
loyalty to the Soviet system."* But he also recognizes that the Soviet
Empire is coming to an end primarily because of the contradiction in which
national elites increasingly found themselves; "These elites are looking
for a way to reconcile fundamental loyalty to the Soviet order with the
advancement c: national ambitions."2 When national elites began to
resolve this dilemma in the late 1980s by rejecting loyalty to the center,
the empire promptly crumbled.
In speaking of Ukraine specifically, Simon, like Bialer points to the
composition of the CPU as a critical factor in determining the stability
of Ukraine's Communists. Simon argues that the increase in Party
participation in the 1960s and 1970s was unavoidable and Moscow
reluctantly had to allow it or face large scale unrest among the Ukrainian
elite. By the 1970s the large number of Ukrainians inducted into the
Party apparatus was great enough to raise, for the first time, the level
of Party membership to be in proportion with Ukrainian's percent share of
the population.3 Even Khrushchev's purges in 1959-61, and Brezhnev's re-
russification of the Party leadership could not stop the trend toward
nationals participating in their leadership groups in proportion at least
27Gerhard Simon, Nationatism and PoLicy Towards the NationaLities in the Soviet Union, trans. Karen
Forster and Oswald Forster (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991), 8-9.




equal to, and often more, than their percentage in the total
population. 31  However, as republican participation in the Party grew,
there was a marked decrease in the number of non-Russians among the
central leadership positions under Brezhnev. In fact, by the early 1980s
the level of participation by non-Russians in the central organs had
dropped to the level of the late Stalin era. Although Ukrainians and
Byelorussians were able to maintain their presence in these central
bodies, it was due only to the unspoken desire to form a strong slavic
block in the USSR. 32 Simon concludes from these trends that the Soviets
viewed the increasing role of nationals in republican leadership positions
as a danger:
Apparently, because the Brezhnev leadership was unable to keep
nationals from participating in the governments of the Union
Republics, they were determined to keep them from becoming involved
with governing the whole state. This backwards step of co-opting
non-Russians into the leadership clearly contrasts with Brezhnev's
general style of leadership, which was characterized by increasing
involvement of bureaucratic apparatuses in political decisions. The
Soviets apparently saw increasing the involvement of local nationals
as a considerable risk. This discrimination against non-Russians
also shows that top politicians were very aware of their Russian
heritage and were interested in surrounding themselves primarily with
fellow Russians. This situation heightened the participation
crisis.
In assessing the stability or reliability of the republican Communist
elites it is also necessary to consider their personal motivation for
engaging in "irregular" behavior. Conquest enters into this murky area by
identifying the literaty elite as the key segment of communist society in
which the seeds of revisionist behavior lie. These figures played
predominate roles in Eastern Europe in the late 1950s and the 1960s as




well as in the revolutions of 1989 and their motivation seems to have been
the desire for autonomy or the chance to have a say in a society in which
the ruler rules without the consent of the ruled.3
Within the Party itself, the motivation was not much different.
Drawing experience from Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, Conquest points
out that progressive inputs to the Party came from the intellectual,
student, academic, and journalistic sectors of the Party. The
apparatchik's role was usually very small and although they did abandon
unpopular, centrally-mandated policies, such as collectivization in
response to revisionist pressures, they "have never given up the dynastic
claims of the apparat." 3 This points to the fact that while the
individual may reject his ideologically driven role, he may not be willing
to reject the power which his role has given him.
In fact, a leading scholar of Ukraine, Bohdan Krawchenko, notes that
those members of the Ukrainian elite who came out in opposition to the
centralized regime were motivated by a desire to control their own lives
and to exercise their own power.
A new Ukrainian political elite comprised of individuals with modern
skills had come into being and found itself frustrated politically
and economically by a hyper-centralized systsm which refused to
recognize it as a force or share power with it.6
34Conquest in his Russia After Khrushchev (p. 255) describes this process as it occurred in Nungary
along very similar tines to what happened in Ukraine in 1989-1990.
5Ibid., 257.
3aohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukrain (London:
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985), 249.
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To this end they vigorously pursued a policy of Ukranianizing the Party
and developed their own justifying ideology and legitimization in the ever
present idea of nationality.
37
D. NATIONALISN AND THE STATE-BASED APPROACH
Manifestations and expressions of non-Russian nationality, national
identity or consciousness were suppressed in the Soviet Union and it is
clear that Gorbachev would have preferred to have continued this
tradition. However, it was not possible to bring reform to the economic
and political sphere without effecting processes in the social arena. The
processes unleashed by Gorbachev's perestroika in the area of national-
ities centered on the ideas of nationalism and the concept of state versus
nation.
1. Nationalism
To provide a definition of nationalism we can turn to Alter, who
defines nationalism using Theodor Schnieder's contention that nationalism
is a "specific integrative ideology which 'always makes reference to a
'nation' in one sense or another, and not merely to a social or religious
group."3 From this Alter concludes:
nationalism, such as it has appeared since the American and French
Revolutions, will be understood as both an ideology and a political
movement which holds the nation and the sovereign nation-state to be
crucial indwelling values, and which manages to mobilize the
political will of a people or a large section of a population.
Nationalism is hence taken to be a largely dynamic principle capable
of engendering hopes, emotions and action; it is a vehicle for
37Teresa Rakowska-marmstone, "The Dialectics of NationaLism in the USSR," Probtems of Communisi
XXIII, no. 3 (May-June 1974): 10.
3As quoted in Peter Alter, Nationatism, trans. Stuart NcKinnon-Evans (London: Edward Arnold,
1989), 8.
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activating human beings and creating political iflidarity amongst
them for the purposes of achieving a common good.
Anthony Smith in his study Nationalism in the Twentieth Century pursues a
similar line but describes in more detail what the "common good" is.
Smith defines nationalism as an "ideological movement for the attainment
and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion, and individuality of a social
group, some of whose members conceive it to be an actual or potential
nation. "4° Furthermore:
The supreme goal for a nationalist is 'national identity' or
'nationhood', a visionary state of authentic self-expression and
fraternity in which an historic community realizes its unique
qualities. The search fr nationhood is a long and arduous struggle
for self-regeneration."'
Both these definitions are necessary to get at the key aspects
of nationalism. First, nationalism is stronger than religion or social
affiliations. Second, nationalism seeks autonomy and distinction for a
self-defined unit defined as the nation. Third, it is capable of
mobilizing large masses of people across social boundaries. Fourth,
nationalism is often a struggle to renew a real or invented historic
glory. Nationalism is not synonymous with secession or separatist
sentiment because such sentiment is only a subset of nationalism.
Nationalism is an ideological chameleon capable of both good and
evil; it is, as Alter describes it, "a repository of dangers and
opportunities." (Emphasis added)4 2 The nature of nationalism seems most
3Ibid., 8-9.




precisely to be determined by its goal. The historical example of Ukraine
has certainly proven this to be the case.
2. State-Based Approach
In the case of Ukraine, nationalism has assumed many different
faces. During the revolution of 1917 and during WWII the idea of nation
which fueled the struggle for Ukrainian independence was closely tied with
ethnicity in what is called ethno-nationalism, according to which the
nation is seen as an ethnically pure political grouping. In the 1980s and
1990s the basis of independence was not focused on ethnicity but territory
(i.e., the Ukrainian state). Ukraine now advocates citizenship for
persons ot any ethnic background living within the state boundaries. This
gives the Ukrainian national movement unprecedented strength through a
broader base of support.
In spite of this, Western and Soviet analysts alike color all
nationalisms with the ethnic brush. For example, Aleksandr Tsipko, a
specialist in the history of Marxism and the deputy Director for the
Institute of Economic and Political Research of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, in a July 1990 interview with Solchanyk revealed that
I see no real historical possibility whatsoever for the creation of a
Ukrainian state in Europe at this juncture... [because] ethnically the
population is tied together very strongV, its all mixed together -
Crimea, the southern oblasts, and so on.4
Under Ukraine's concept of national self-determination this does not
matter - all these ethnic groups comprise the Ukrainian state.
Because the focus of Ukrainian nationalism is territorial, this
study proceeds on a state-based as opposed to a political system approach.
This approach is appropriate in studying the non-Russians because the
43Romn Soichanyk, Ukraine: From Chernobyt' to Sovereignty: A Collection of interviews (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1992), 135.
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conflict between Russians and non-Russians is essentially over conflicting
concepts of a State which, in its inherent desire to pursue stability or
survival will seek to maximize its autonomy." This state-based analysis
is useful for two reasons. First, it aids in understanding why Moscow
acts the way it does toward Ukrainian nationalists who threaten the
stability and survival of the Soviet state. Second, it also explains why
Uk;ainian national opposition groups exist and why they act the way they
do as they ergage in state building and seek to gain increased autonomy
for their "states-to-be."
Soviet scholar Frederick Starr, in his update to John Armstrong's
1968 article, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the
Dictatorship," highlights the importance of the state in the nationalities
question in the Soviet Union. He makes two points in this vein. The
first is that the notion of state has changed based on the viability of
small states showing that "what counts in modern life is not size but
intensity." His second point is that the events of 1989 and the emergence
of independent states in Central Europe sent a strong message to the
"Soviet inner empire" highlighting "their lack of full sovereignty and
their international isolation from the international mainstream."4
5
Starr's analysis supports Motyl's point that a state-based approach to the
renegade republics will get zt the important issues.
E. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The study of Ukraine was for many years on the margins of Soviet
studies-and only very recently has the field of Ukrainian studies taken on
"4Alexander Motyl develops this approach in Will the Non-Russians Rebel?, pp. x-xi.
5Frederick, S.Starr, "Soviet Nationalities in Crisis." journal of Soviet Nationalities, 1,
(Spring 1990), 78, 80.
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any wide-spread appreciation." With the notable exception of Armstrong,
Conquest and Brzezinski, the Ukrainian question did not even feature in
Western discussions of the Soviet nationalities question before the
1980s.41 In the 1980s, with the advent of glasnost, interest in Ukraine
began to increase primarily once academics realized, as Motyl did, that:
The major challenge to the Soviet state's ethnic stability.. .comes
from the regional hegemonies of the non-Russians in general and the
Ukrainians in particular.... Their indisputable economic, political,
social, and demographic importance, as well as their frequent
involvement in nationalist movements have combined to ma e.. .the
USSR's second republic the key to the nationality question.N
From today's vantage point, Hotyl was right and the West is now
scrambling to make up for years of neglect.' 9 However, quite under-
standably, there is little literature on independent Ukraine so soon after
1991. However, in order to understand contemporary Ukraine it is
4USee Marples' introduction in Ukraine Under Perestroika. Along with a general disinterest in
Ukrainian studies,there have been some glaring omissions of Ukraine from scholarLy works. For example
Gleason's book published in 1990, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struagte for Republican Rights in
the USSR failed to mention Ukraine at all.
47See Brzezinski, "Concluding Reflections," 160-1; Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev. See also
Kennveth C. Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth Symibols and Ideology in Soviet
Nationalities Policy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980) which although a bit more recent,
was also a significant work in this field.
•MotyL, Will the Non-Russians Rebel?, xi.
4lronically the situation between the West and the Soviet Union is the opposite that which existed
in 1917 between the West and Russia. Kennan describes the 1917 situation as one in which the
successors to the Tsarist Empire were wholly consumed by their ideological struggle to bring socialism
to Russia while the West was aflame with a nationalist frenzy over Germany's threat to democracy and
the Western way of life. As a result "People just talked past each other" and individually the West
and the USSR moved "earnestly forward in the pursuit of its particular goal . . . having no
understanding or respect or tolerance for the issue that preoccupied the other." Today the tables are
turned; the former inhabitants of the "prison of nations" are consumed with the nationalist flame while
the West is concerned with the ideological outcome of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Today as then,
people are talking past each other with tittle understanding of what the other's preoccupations are and
little tolerance or respect for the dilemmas faced by each. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West:
Under Lenin and Stalin (New York: New American Library, 1961), 12, 16.
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necessary to first understand the history of Soviet Ukraine and Ukrainian
nationalism.5
Along this path there are many notable contemporary studies. Recent
studies of Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism have been undertaken in a
number of different ways. For example Krawchenko's book, Social Change
and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine examines Ukraine
in the Soviet environment by arguing that national discontent in Ukraine
is socio-economic. While his study may suffer from a certain rigidity
that does not consider non-economic factors in the development of national
consciousness, his approach is useful to understanding Ukrainian national
consciousness. Krawchenko also edited another recent book Ukraine After
Shelest, which is a valuable study of why Ukraine was considered the
lynch-pin of the Union. In this book, Bohdan Nahaylo's chapter "Ukrainian
Dissident and Opposition" goes a long way toward explaining the basis of
Ukrainian susceptibility to secessionist desires. He develops the theme of
"away from Moscow" and indicates that secession is a constant and
inevitable characteristic of Ukrainian nationalism. David Marple's recent
book, Ukraine Under Perestroika is an excellent counterpart to the above
sources because he develops the role of ecological awareness and its
ability to mobilize Ukrainians and how it emerge as a political force in
the late 1980s. A good portion of the book is also devoted to the 1989
coal miner's strike in Ukraine which is invaluable in examining the roles
of the CPU, Moscow, and the Ukrainian worker in building civil society.
5Ernest Barker in his book on national character, cautions that in studying nations and national
character, one must keep in mind that both nation and national character can change with time and that
it is insufficient and even incorrect to judge the present nation by its past. However, there are, he
adds, "profound and abiding permanencies in a nation's character; and the heaving of the surface must
not blind us to the stillness of the depths." Further more, he also adds the reflection that "the
weight of the past is heavier in the balance then that of the future." Ernest Barker, Mati
Character and the Factors of its Formatio (London: Nethuen and Company, Ltd., 1927), 8, 9.
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However, Marples fails to explain why Ukrainian elites sought and in fact
supported economic independence from early 1991 forward.
While these books provide valuable insight into Ukrainian nationalism
and national consciousness, they do not address, per se, the role of
communist elites, their loyalty, and their motivations. For this Gerhard
Simon's book, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the
Soviet Union is valuable. While not specifically focused on Ukraine, a
large portion of the work uses Ukraine as a study in nationalism. Simon's
treatment of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet federalism and nationality policy
and their effect on the ruling elite in Ukraine is well done and
applicable. Also applicable in this vein, is James Mace's book Communism
and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. While his book is historical, it
is a good foundation for understanding the Soviet Stalinist federal system
which was only dismantled by Gorbachev in the late 1980s. More contem-
porary and theoretical approaches are undertaken in Thinking Theoretically
About Soviet Nationalities edited by Alexander Motyl. The essay "The
Emergence of Nationalist Policies in the USSR: A Comparison of Estonia
and Ukraine" by Charles F. Furtado, Jr. and Michael Hecter provides a
large part of the theoretical approach used in examining the evolution of
the Communist elite in Ukraine in the last section of this paper. Also
included in this collection is an essay, "Center-Periphery Relations in
the Soviet Empire: Some interpretive Observations," by S. N. Eisenstadt
which provides additional theory on the relationship between Ukraine and
the Soviet Empire and the reasons why Ukraine's position in the empire was
inevitably at risk. A final work useful in the theory of elite functions
in the Soivet Empire is the somewhat dated Stalin's Successors:
Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union by Seweryn Bialer.
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While this current study invalidates some of Bialer's conclusions in this
book, his structured approach and theoretical basis is none the less
helpful.
F. THE PLAN
This study is based on both structural and political action arguments
both of which are essential to understanding why Ukraine's Communists
turned against the center in favor of national independence. This paper
is divided into two major parts. The first provides the foundation and
background for the second part which examines, in detail, the behavior of
Ukraine's Communist elites under Gorbachev and their ultimate transforma-
tion into Ukrainian nationalists.
Part one consists of two chapters. Chapter I of this study focuses
on the structural argument which is that Marxist-Leninist ideology forming
the theoretical basis of the Soviet State was unclear and fundamentally
contradictory in its approach to nationalism. As a result, the ensuing
federal structure, and approach to the nationalities question adopted by
Lenin and later modified by Stalin created a contradiction which was
subsequently exploited by Ukrainian nationalists to legitimize nation-
building, national autonomy and ultimately secession from the Union.
Chapter II begins the presentation of the political action argument
by showing that Ukraine's Communist elites were fundamentally influenced
by the structural contradiction mentioned above as well as by Ukrainian
nationalism. As a result their behavior tended toward nationalism or more
precisely, national communism. The first argument is that Ukrainian
nationalism, based on a series of national myths, was fundamentally
opposed to Communism and Soviet domination. The second is that the
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loyalty of Ukraine's ruling elites to the center was undermined by these
forces of nationalism which grew rapidly under Khrushchev as Ukrainian
Communists to begin reviving the Ukrainian nation under the mantle of
national communism. The third political action argument is that the
center's response to "irregular behavior" among Ukraine's ruling elites
was to suppress it without removing the influences which motivated its
development making its re-emergence simply a matter of time.
The final three chapters comprising part two of this paper continue
the political action argument by focusing on Ukrainian elites in the
Gorbachev era and their swing away from the center and toward support for
an independent Ukraine. The focus is on Ukraine's elites and the
interplay between their desire to maintain power, Ukrainian national
opposition to the Communist state, and reforms from the center. The
argument is that Ukraine's Communists, unable to preserve the status quo
first, attempted to retain power and control by any means possible.
However, their position was continually undercut by the opposition's
successes, the center's weakening of the Communist Party, and the elite's
own deep-rooted motivation toward a policy of "away from Moscow" and a
desire to preserve their own power. Ultimately, the shifting balance of
power and conflicts within the party, weakened the Party structure to the
extent that individuals chose the national, rather than Soviet, path to
the future.
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11. CONTRADICTIONS AND CONFLICT
The collision of Communism and Ukrainian nationalism divided the
loyalty of Ukraine's Party elite. Communism, based on the ideas of Marx
and Engels and modified by Lenin to fit the Russian situation, provided
contradictory answers on how to deal with nationalism and as a result, the
Soviet system also failed to adequately address the enduring "national-
ities problem." This meant that, ideologically, national elites had
"wiggle room" with which to pursue national goals and Marxist-Leninist
theory to legitimize them.
The structure of the Soviet state also facilitated such behavior
because Soviet federalism tactfully promised to respect national rights to
self-government but actually prohibited the realization of this promise.
In this sense, Lenin's federal solution to the problem of nationalism
ended up exacerbating it.
This chapter examines the conflict between Communism and nationalism
and the ideological and structural contradictions which contributed to the
swaying of Ukraine's ruling elites to the cause of independence. The
first argument is that the inability of Marxist-Leninist ideology to
adequately address nationalism created room for the non-Russians to
deviate from the internationalist path. The second is that Lenin's
federal structure was fundamentally contradictory which not only raised
expectations for self-government but also provided opportunities and
structures for Communist elites to adopt a national Communist tint.
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A. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MARXISM
The basis of the "nationalities problem" lies in Marxist theory which
had an enormous influence on Lenin and the Soviet federal structure.
Because of this, Marxism must be examined prior to undertaking a study of
Soviet federalism.
1. A Rejection of Nationalism
All in all, Marx and Engels took a negative approach to
nationalism. They argued that nationalism was counter productive because
national loyalties excluded those based on class consciousness and led to
exploitative relationships with the bourgeoisie. Nationalism was also
equivalent to national oppression which was inconsistent with proletar-
ianism. Marx and Engels also shunned nationalism because of its potential
to break large political units into smaller ones which would inhibit the
growth of socialism. Finally, they held that the progressive assimilation
of peoples would eventually eliminate the concept of nationality.
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Robert Conquest and Walker Connor52 among other argue that in rejecting
nationalism, Marxism created fundamental contradictions which ultimately
led to conflict and change in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Marxism, which forms the ideological basis for Communism, is
itself vague -,n issues of nationalism and the nationalities problem.
Connor argues that this stemmed from the fact that Marxist ideology was so
5 MACE83, pp. 9-10.
5S•e CONWN4, C0W065, as welt as SIW491, a BREZ69.
27
opposed to nationalism that nationalism as an ideology was margin-
alized. 53 Marx and Engels regularly confused the terms nation and state
as well as nationality in their writings indicating that the idea of
nationalism received little thought in their predominantly economic
treatises. In the course of their writings, when Marx and Engels did turn
to the nationality question they approached it in three distinct ways
which Connor identifies as "strainso of nationalism.
2. The Strains of Marxism
The first strain is what we recognize as "classical" marxism,
that is, class consciousness and struggle are predominant and nationalism
is irreconcilable with these ideas. In this strand of thought, there is
little room for any serious considerations of nationalisms impact:
Nationalism, like religion, is a temporary phenomenon which,
generated by the Uescendency of the bourgeoisie, is one of the self-
sustaining spiritual weapons against the proletariat. If too often,
it penetrates the masses, it does so as a form of 'false conscious-
ness' which disguises their true condition from them and breeds
illusion that provides them with deceptive comfort in their benighted
state. After the end of the conditions that have given rise to it--
the class war-- nationalism, like religion, will evaporate together
with other politically potent and historically conditioned illusions.
It may acquire a certain independent influence of its own, but it
cannot turvive the destruction of its primary source, the capitalist
system.
The second strain of nationalism which Connor calls "strategic"
Marxism, hinged on the very ambiguous concept of national self-
determination55 which entered into the writings of Marx and Engels
following the 1848 revolutions in Europe. Marx and Engels applied the
5COWN84, p. 6. The basic problem being that Marxism wa focused on socio-economic class which
divides society horizontally while nationalism's divisions are vertical.
5BERL91, p. 249.
Comnor points out the irony of Marx and Engels emrace of this term since it contradicted their
ideas of internationalism with a strong national connotation. (COMN84, p. 11)
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concept of self-determination unevenly to different situations favoring
self-determinations for large groups and denying its applicability to
small groups. This inconsistency leads Connor to conclude,
Quite evidently, the strategy of Marx and Engels called for
ostensible commitment to the principle of self-determination in the
abstract, while concomitantly reserving themselves in each and every
case the decision as to whether a particular movement was to be
supported or opposed.5
This strain still could be reconciled with the "classical" Marxists by
arguing that eventually the need for national self-determination would
wither away with the state.
The final strain is national Marxism which recognizes "the role
of nations as the principle instrumentality of historical forces." 57
This strain was basAd on the tendency of both Marx and Engels to validate
the idea of nations by using the ideas of national character and historic
national roles in their writings. Engels' later writings clearly
identified national traits which tra,,ak•nded and contradicted his
conception of society divided only by class distinctions. Engels also
went a step beyond strategic nationalism by identifying these national
traits as enduring characteristics, not temporal aberrations to be swept
away by economic advancement. Marx's writing was less prone to such
conclusions but he undoubtedly shared Engels' view on nations and
nationalism and even Marx's last writings reflected a perceptible
weakening of the concept of internationalism in the face of national
consciousness. It d-'. . seem to bother either philosopher that national
Marxism, as a strain, was wholly irreconcilable with the ether strains.
UCONN84, p. 13.
5 7CONN84, pp. 19-20.
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Over all, however, Marx and Engels remained steadfast in one
sense - the national question was of secondary importance to classes and
the world revolution. As a result, despite growing awareness of
nationalism late in their lives, they tended to underestimate the
emotional and cultural attractions of nationalism and overestimated the
potential of economics to unite disparate national groups. At the basic
level, they overestimated the willingness of an individual to abandon his
national identity to join a larger, more viable political unit.
Not surprisingly, these oversights and the different strains of
nationalism within Marxism created ambiguities and inconsistences for
Lenin and those after him who attempted to put Marxism into practice.
Russia's early Communists reflected this conflict between interpretations
of the same ideology. 58  While the Bolsheviks adopted the strategic
Marxist point of view (which increasingly tended to national bolshevism
for the Russian nationality), the non-Russians leaned toward the third,
nationalist strand.
B. SOVIET FEDERALISM
When the tsarist trinity of orthodoxy, autocracy, and narodnost was
supplanted by the Soviet version; ideology, dictatorship, and nationalism
with the rise of Communism in 1917, the Soviets began to fashion a new
empire based upon these pillars. In short, the Soviet trinity created a
5For-example, Luxemunrg's theories on national sef-determi notion were equa• to notional nihilism
while, using the sane ideological basis, Lenin protected (initially) the right to national self-
determination. Or for example, the contrast between Stakin's authoritative approach to the
nationalities question and Khrushchev's softer, humanistic approach using the same ideology was
significant. (See HACE83, pp.11-13 for a closer examination of Luxemburg's theories in contrast to
Lenin's)
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idiocratic partocracy,59 which, among many other things, created a social
base for nations which had not existed prior to 1917 and exacerbated non-
Russian nationalism while at the same time suppressing It. In such a
system, it was inevitable that, without drastic changes, the republics
would spar with the center and attempt to gain autonomy which could not be
granted without threatening the collapse of the state.
Soviet federalism was devised as a means for managing the relations
between the peripheral, non-Russian "colonies" and the Empire's center in
Moscow. While the basis of these center-periphery relations was
established under the Tsarist Russian empire, the Russian revolution in
1917 fundamentally altered this relationship and Gorbachev's perestroika
of the 1980's once again, redefined the roles of the periphery and the
center.
This federalist system, which eventually became a federation of 15
republics, was, as declared by the 1918 constitution, "established on the
basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national
republics."6 There were other political subdivisions within the
republic such as the twenty Autonomous Regions and ten Autonomous Areas.
The important point about these federal divisions is that they were
ethnically defined units. 61  Each of these units was provided with a
system of "government" which consisted of a parliamentary body known as
5MAL192, p. 93.
aQuoted in C0wM84, p. 218.
alIt -is interesting to note that 14 of the republics also bear the nine of the predominate
nationality which would make the federalist structure more appealing psychologically. (The 15th
republic the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic when rendered in Russian does not indicate
ethnicity to avoid the natural conclusion that this largest republic was harkening beck to the Great
kussians). Also of note, are the ethnic groups which did not receive any federal body of their ow.
For examiple, the jews.
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the Supreme Soviet consisting of "elected" delegates. Although these
national governing bodies were theoretically designed to provide each
federal unit with the means of self-government, they were in reality
merely symbolic and devoid of any power for the nationalities. This
federalist system was national in form only.
1. System Stability
From the beginning, Lenin stressed that he was opposed to
federations in principle but claimed that his Soviet federation was a
tactical move and it was "a transitional form to the complete unity of the
working people of different nations."62 This tactical move was an
enduring one primarily because, as Connor argues, it meshed very well with
Lenin's idea of allowing Communism to appear national in form but
remaining socialist in content.63  To this end, the Soviet Union
portrayed itself as a voluntary union of sovereign states even though it
was one of the most centralized states in the world."
Despite its appearance of being based on national rights and the
strength of voluntary association, the Soviet federal system was inher-
ently unstable. Eisenstadt, in his examination of center-periphery
relationships in the Russian and Soviet empires, notes that the center-
periphery relationships which existed under the tsarist empire continued
into the Soviet empire but with a few important changes. Under the
02CONW84, pp. 217-218.
a3CONN84, p. 218. Stalin was initially opposed to what he called Leninis "national liberalism"
but when he came to power he maintained the existing federal system in large part. This indicates that
the structure was reasonably effective.
84See articles 3, 15, and 18 of the Soviet Constitution for the promise of sovereignty and 4, 17,
22 for the right to secession. The last draft of this constitution in 1977 down graded these
provisions slightly and removed the earlier right to form republican armies. (See MATTO9 for
presentation and discussion of the Soviet Constitution)
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tsarist system, the center was strong and the periphery weak with no
political engagement save a special segment of society which oversaw the
implementation of central policies on the periphery. This was designed to
maintain stability in governing a vast empire. After the 1917 revolution,
the idea of a strong center was maintained but "the Soviet regime aimed at
a very high extent of political activization of the periphery, but at the
same time, a total control by the center of the channels and expressions
of such activization."' 5  As a result, under the Bolsheviks, the
relations between the periphery and the center became increasingly
unstable.
Instability was induced by the push for industrialization and
political mobilization of the empire necessary to support and nurture the
new state. This process was very powerful and it gave rise to differ-
entiation and specialization among a formerly relatively undifferentiated
body. It also gave rise to large bureaucratic organizations supervised by
the political elite. This mobilization was directed along two paths which
Eisenstadt describe as first, "the occupational and ecological frameworks
generated by the processes of industrialization and urbanization and by
the unprecedented expansion of the educational systems" and second, the
Party and bureaucracy which exercised control over the system.66
Tensions and competition for power and resources developed between these
two arenas but due to the totalitarian nature of the system a pluralistic
system did not result and autonomous centers of power, which could resolve
this conflict, did not and could not develop. This does not mean that
6 6EISE92, p. 216.
WEISE92, p. 216.
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attempts to achieve autonomy on the periphery did not exist and indeed
they did, but strong central control kept the system together.
In order to maintain stability in the Communist system, the
center had to be strong and had to extend elements of this control to the
periphery. In this endeavor the Party remained the source of all
innovation and political support while the Soviet bureaucracy tended to
the administration of the center's policies in the periphery. In order
for the system to work, the interests of groups and movements on the
periphery had to be interwoven with the bureaucracy and the Party. The
more integrated these interests, the greater the stability.
2. The Price of Stability
To integrate interests of the periphery, in the goal of creating
a united federation, the ruling elite in the Soviet system had to
encourage and direct political, social, and economic change in the
periphery while at the same time minimizing the autonomous political
expressions of various social groups and their political reaction to the
actions of the center. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union served as
the cornerstone for this process and in an effort to develop loyalty on
the periphery, the Communist Party recruited members of the periphery to
participate in the central organs of bureaucracy and Party. Certain
enticements, namely power, were offered to the non-Russian nationalities
to encourage their participation in the Soviet system.
The fact that Soviet society was very ethnically diverse, and
that one of the ascriptive entitlements offered to the periphery was the
right to national self-determination meant that tensions along national
lines were sure to develop. However, these tensions were contained by
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strong central pressure exerted through the Party and bureaucracy
structures on the periphery. This strict control of the periphery was
made less offensive by the selection of ethnic (national) elites to serve
along side those sent from the center. But these national elites were
different than the Russians - they owed allegiance both to their
nationality and the Party. Thus the system was build on a shaky alliance
between the non-Russian Party elites and the CPSU. This alliance, argues
Gerhard Simon, is the crucial link between the non-Russians and the
Russians and "the integration of the multinational empire increasingly
depends upon the loyalty of non-Russian elites."67
C. NATIONALITIES POLICY
At this point, it is necessary to examine in detail the relationship
between the Russian center and the non-Russian periphery. This
relationship was manifested in what is called the "nationalities policy."
In the broad perspective, the Soviet nationalities policy is a means
of controlling the interaction of dissenters and loyalists. As the
political-sociologist, Tarrow describes it,
States set the boundaries of this interaction by defining the
boundaries of the permissible and responding to the early salvos by
moving the line in one direction or another; by facilitating one
group of insurgents and repressing another; and sometimes by co-
opting protesters, sometimes jreempting their demands, and - more
rarely - giving up the ghost.
S7S11O91, p. 265. This loyalty became critical after Stalin's death when the process which he's
development of the non-Russian peoples had begun, continued even past his decision to halt it. Stalin
feared that the USSR might begin to experience what he saw in other parts of the world --
decoLonization. Simon argues that the USSR is indeed experiencing an "inconspicuous but probably
irreversible decolonization., He argues quite perceptively that, although this process differs from
other parts of the world it is still a turning point in the nationalities question.
WTARR91, p. 17.
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In the USSR the set of rules which define the boundary of permissiveness
for the national groups was very dynamic. One cannot speak of a single,
monolithic nationalities policy because in fact there have been several;
some repressive, some liberal, and most ineffective or worst.
A great deal of the Communist rhetoric about the nationalities problem
has shown itself, as Professor Omytryshyn argues in his study of Soviet
nationalities policy toward Ukraine, to be "meaningless doubletalk,
concealed in carefully chosen phraseology and intended to confuse, not
clarify, and to arrest, but never solve the problem.*69 Even more
bluntly, although the aims of Moscow's nationality policy have varied from
time to time, they have consistently aimed not to simply submerge the
interests of the minorities for the betterment of the union as a whole
but, in accordance to the first and second strands of Marxist ideology, to
eventually suppress them all together.
1. The Basic Problem
Soviet policy toward the nationalities was influenced by two
major factors outlined by Professor Dmytryshyn. The first is the historic
Russian (as opposed to Soviet) predilection to view the "empire" as
monolithic. Historically Russians have viewed the struggling national-
ities as an annoyance but hardly something significant enough to merit
their concern which was best applied toward more noble endeavors. As
Dmytryshyn sums up the Russian attitude toward the nationalities; "their







The second factor is that of socialist principles which sought
the amalgamation of small nations and peoples into a global community in
the interest of human progress. Nationalism was evil and threatening to
the socialists who, although not above using nationalism to their own
ends, viewed it negatively and tried to ignore it. As a result,
Drnytryshyn argues, legitimate national demands voiced in the latter part
of the 19th century such as the right to use native languages and national
self rule were neglected by the Russians. 71  This inevitably led to
increasing demands which played a role in the collapse of the Tsarist
government, installment of the Communists and even the demise of the
Communists.
As a result of this dangerous mix of Marxist short-sightedness,
strong central control, and Russian nationalism, the Soviet Union built a
federal system on the basis of a contradictory nationalities policy. On
one hand, the center and its policy granted very little autonomy to the
peripheral nationalities while, on the other hand, the center provided
these same groups with all the symbolic manifestations (institutions and
administrative structures) of self-government.
2. The Development of Nationalities Policy
The basis for Soviet nationalities policy was Lenin's attempt to
win the loyalty of the nationalities by concessions to strategic Marxism.
His goal was to win the civil war and secure his power over the new
socialist republic and in the process, Soviet nationality policy developed
with two major goals as outlined by Simon. First, the object of
supporting the non-Russian nationalities was to establish and stabilize
7 1DMYT56, p. 12.
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the Party's rule. Second, the long term goal of nation-building was to
construct a completely unified state with no differentiation between
peoples.
The problem was how to do construct such a state? First, one had
to remove the nationality-based antagonisms which separated people. Since
Lenin's perception of the national question was colored by the Marxist
interpretation of nationalism as "the out growth of past discrimination
and oppression"n, he was led to conclude that the way to rid society of
these evils was to introduce a period of "national equality." This
policy, called the "flourishing of the nations" advocated state-sponsored
nurturing of the more obvious manifestations of a nations's unique
identity such as language, dress, and the like. This period of lessened
hostilities would allow previous nations, even former enemies, to
gradually complete a process of sliianie, "coming together" or
rapprochement. The end goal of this process was the creation of a single
political, social, and economic entity. According to Marxism, this
process stressed absolute equality, was strictly voluntary, and was not
design to force assimilation with the dominant nationality however, under
Leninism these three ground rules were abandoned.
On this basis, the 10th Party Congress in March 1921 adopted a
resolution on the nationalities question which affirmed Stalin's wish that
the regional working masses become active in every aspect of the adminis-
tration of their region. Two years later, in April 1923 the 12th Party
Congress added to this policy the assertion that the nationalities problem
7 2CONNB4, p. 210.
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would be solved only when they achieved political, economic, and social
equality with the more advanced center.
a. From Lenin to Stalin
Enigmatically, Lenin was seeking homogeneity of the non-
Russians by encouraging (and even creating, if needed) cultural diversity
and uniqueness in a process of rastsvet, or the development and 'flour-
ishingn of nations. This process of "flourishing' was to consist of both
form and content. Form, overt manifestations of nation uniqueness such as
language, would be employed to make the idea of sovietization more pala-
table to the outlying regions. Content, on the other hand, was the core
of the process and it was the message put out by the Party. In 1925
Stalin abbreviated two track concept in the phrase "national in form,
socialist in content."
The Soviet state thus embarked on a program of nation-
building for the nationalities. The possibility that this process of
national flourishing might lead away from merging toward increased
national consciousness and eventually the breaking apart of nations was
ignored. This dialectical possibility was to be prevented by the Party's
control of the state which would command all forms of political sociali-
zation. Through agitation and propaganda the intellectual content of
communication would be controlled and a new anti-nationalist education
would take place to ensure the content would remain thoroughly socialist.
However, by the late 1920's it was clear that this process was beginning
to create ideological as well as practical contradictions.
The Party was engaged in a "battle on two fronts," as they
struggled to allow room for nation-building while at the same time tried
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to limit the resultant demands for increased national autonomy. As a
result, rastsvet, was abandoned by the mid-1930s in favor of assim-
ilation.73 One of the first manifestations of this the 1929 All-Union
factory-combine project by which republican control over industries on
their territory was transferred to the center. Next, Party institutions,
such as the Council of nationalities which fought for the interest of the
non-russians, were dissolved in 1930 and control of industrial management
was centralized. 74 The 1933-34 purge was a more visible manifestation of
this centralizing trend as its result was to reduce the participation
level of nationals in their regional Party organizations.75 This
"nationalization of the Party and state apparatus" was aimed at decreasing
the role of the non-Russians and destroying the institutions which had
been constructed in the decades prior with the intent of increasing their
political participation and national autonomy.
7 6
Although Stalin's version of nationality policy took a
different turn in the 1930's and sought to limit national aspirations in
favor of assimilation into the grand, centralized, uniform state, the
contradiction between empowerment and control - inspired by ideology,
empowered in the federal structure, and implemented in the nationalities
73 1t is arguable that the policy of korenizatsiia was never given a true test before it was
abandoned. Perhaps, this was because Stalin had disagreed with Lenin on the path to World Commism
and favored reduced national autonomy and increased assimilation. In any event, by the Ond of the
1930s it was clear that the future was to be invested in a centralized state with no national
differentiation.
74SIM091, pp. 143-145.
75Simon argues that this was accomplished indirectly (although not unintentionally) by
concentrating the purge on rural Party organizations where the percentage of non-russians was greater,
and by requiring new members to be from the technical intelligentsia among which the non-russians were
poorly represented. (SIM091, p. 31)
76 SM091, p. 30, 36.
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policy continued. For example, because efforts to assimilate the non-
Russians were increased during the 1930s via this process of national-
ization, there appeared an unintended side effect. Namely, that *the
integration of non-Russian peoples into Soviet society's upper echelons,
professions, and organizations helped the nations develop independent
national identities."•
b. Post-WiI Nationalities Policy
Stalin's supposed resolution of the nationalities problem
began to unravel in the Post-WWII era when his death in 1953 signaled the
transition from a very repressive policy to more lenient but inconsistent
ones under Khrushchev. Krawchenko identifies four major themes in the
Post-WWII policies which were applied as seen fit at various times. Each
theme seeks a modus operandi between non-Russian nations and the Russian
dominated Union; rastsvet, the development and blooming of nations;
sblizhenie, the unification of nations under one Soviet economic,
cultural, and political umbrella; slifanie, the fusion of all nation-
alities into one; and finally the triumphant concept of the Sovetskii
narod, or a new, undifferentiated Soviet People. Khrushchev stressed
slilanie sometimes simultaneously with rastsvet while Brezhnev stressed
the concept of sovetskii narod and a tighter union of nations.7
Under Brezhnev, assimilation was not a political
priority. The effort was focused on establishing Russians in positions






center. The focus of this policy became language. As Simon argues,
Brezhnev seems to have figured that he could not prevent the participation
of non-Russians but that he could exact a price from them by making them
fluent in Russian as a prerequisite for political participation.a The
Russian language was now more than a lingua franca, it 'was to be the
chief forger of a common supra-national identity, one of the essential
hallmarks of the Soviet People."81 Ukraine and Byelorussia were singled
out during this period for more intensive linguistic assimilation than the
other republics. Language policy was also responsible for a great deal of
protest from the republican literary elites which was to become not only
louder but more successful in the 1980s as Gorbachev began to reform the
Soviet state.
In summary, the Marxist base of the Soviet State complicated
the federal structure which Lenin built (and Stalin modified) because of
its inherent inability to deal with the problem of nationalism. Lenin's
successors inherited an ideology which failed to provide solutions to the
Soviet's greatest dilemma - the nationalities and nationalism. In spite
of this, the centralized state was established and the non-Russians have
been, more or less, kept within the bounds established by Stalin's
nationality policy. However, behind the facade of Soviet federalism, the
construction of national institutions and administrative systems in an
effort to appease the non-Russians merely whetted their appetite. Raised
expectations were continually challenging the limits of autonomy.
SSIM091, p. 323.
81Cited in SIM091, p. 323, ftn 193.
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The solution to the nationalities question - assimilation,
has not proceeded well in most cases. In fact, the whole process actually
stimulated an increase of national consciousness among the non-Russians
and increased the centrifugal forces on the periphery. The brief sketch
of the application of the federal system to Ukraine will illustrate this
point.
D. THE EXAMPLE OF UKRAINE
In practice, Slavic Ukraine, along with Byelorussia was considered as
one of the core nationalities in the Soviet Union and Ukraine was held
particularly closely to Russia and targeted for immediate assimilation
because of Ukraine's common history, culture and great economic value.
However, when the Bolsheviks attempted to extend their power into Ukraine
in 1917, they met with great resistance not only because Ukraine was
reluctant to fall under another Russian dictator, but because Bolshevik
socialism collided directly with Ukrainian socialism. This conflict
formed the basis of Ukrainian-Russian tensions and shaped the later
application of nationalities policy to Ukraine.
1. Ukrainian Socialism
Directly confronting Marxist ideology, whether under Lenin or
Stalin, was Ukrainian socialism. This ideology was based on the theories
of Mykhailo Drahomanov who in the 1870s developed a political theory based
on Ukraine's particular circumstances. Ukraine was unique in terms of
applying Marxist ideology to Ukrainian society because it had no bourgeois
to speak of. The historic preserve of national revival, the petty
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bourgeoisie2 was not Ukrainian, ard the native leadership abdicated
their responsibility under the pressure of russification to the
intelligentsia which was not prepared for the responsibility.6 Thus the
weight of Ukrainian nation-building rested on the peasants. 84
Ukraine was in the awkward position prior to the revolution of
1917 because it has lost its representation in the upper classes which
were overwhelmingly non-Ukrainian. So in order for Ukraine's largely,
non-Ukrainian elites to rally the lower social stratum, they appealed to
the Ukrainian peasantry with a mixture of socialism and nationalism.
Although this mixture lacked the power to attain and maintain political
sovereignty, it was sufficient, as Mace says, "to effectively block the
establishment of any regime that did not take into account their
aspirations for national liberation." 85
In fact, during the struggle between Ukrainians and the
Bolsheviks in 1917, a notable Ukrainian socialist warned Lenin that an
empty promise of self-determination was of no interest to Ukraine and that
Ukrainians were seeking national self-determination as well as socialism
and were ready to fight for self-government.a6 And fight they did, but
as time progressed the Ukrainian government forestalled meeting the
uNirosLav Hroch, Die Vorkhmpfer der nationaten Beweaurg bei den kteinen V6Lkern Europas, as cited
in John-Paut Himka, *Voluntary Artisan Association and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia,"
Harvard Ukrainian Studies, No. 2, 1978, pp. 235-6.
831Krawchenko, p. 43.
84Drahomnov, seeking to exploit this fact, was the first to try to coabine agriculturatly based
socialism with Ukrainian nationalism. Drahmanov's idea was that society would be based on a number of
self-governing, independent peasant communities which would cooperate when needed. His ideas of free
couma•ities within a federation of socialist nations, argues Mace, was basically anarchic and based
more on Proudhon and Bakunin than Marx. (MACE83, p. 15 (see ref. to Drahomanov's article)
%4ACE83, p. 9.
'MACE83, p. 16. FTN32.
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as time progressed the Ukrainian government forestalled meeting the
demands of their rural constituency for land reform and lost support to
the Bolsheviks who were willing to promise land in return for loyalty to
Bolshevik socialism.
2. A Shaping of Ukrainian Nationality Policy
Lenin's early tactical realization was that in Ukraine, the
Bolshevik's fate was to be determined by the Ukrainian peasants and thus
concessions to their national aspirations had to be made. But on the
other hand, such aspirations had to be controlled. Lenin's "national
liberalism" offered such concessions and promised a hands-off policy
(korenizatsiia) which would allow the non-Russians to develop their own
culture and establish their national roots. This philosophy was
manifested in the policy of ukrainianization which came into full bloom
after the 12th Party Congress in an attempt to create stability by placing
Ukrainians in Party positions in the Ukrainian SSR. The intent was to
gain control over Ukraine which meant providing concessions to the
Ukrainian countryside and the countryside was demanding a government which
"would act Ukrainian and foster Ukrainian culture." 87
Ukraine, in particular, benefitted from korenizats/ia because the
Ukrainian Party elite took a special interest in nation-building and under
their interpretation of the 10th Party Congress resolution as a signal to
begin de-russification, Ukraine began to reclaim their language, culture,




who accused the Ukrainians of ignoring the idea of a "uniform federal
state" in favor of a confederatton.8
Clearly under korenizatsuia the Bolsheviks got more than they
expected or wanted. Within three years after the policy was put into
effect the influential Ukrainian Communist Shumskyi was demanding the
removal of Stalin's designee sent to Ukraine to oversee indiginization.
Another influential Ukrainian Communist Party member, Khvylovyl, demanded
a rejection of Russian culture and demanded that Ukraine look westward for
its influences. Others in Ukraine protested that Russia was treating
Ukraine as a colony and exploiting her.
Skrypnyk was dispatched to Kiev to suppress these voices and he
did so but over time came to establish himself as a ruler of an indepen-
dent country and with the ideological support of Ukrainiani-zation, created
an explosion of Ukrainian nation-building. This burst of nation-building
was abruptly checked after 1929 when Ukrainian factories were transferred
to central control and the All-Ukrainian bank was absorbed by the All-
Union bank. Skrypnyk was defeated in 1933 after a prolonged struggle and
history began to be rewritten to justify Russian centralism, chauvinism
and imperialism.9 As the idea of a Ukrainian nationality was forced
into the background from whence it had been, Soviet nationalities policy
hardened into a Russo-centric program of assimilation. However, the basic
contradictions of ideology and federalism always lay not too far beneath




3. The Turn to Assimilation
Of special importance in the history of the nationalities
question in Ukraine is the use of collectivization as a means to speed
assimilation of the Ukrainians by deliberately reducing the population by
starvation. Of the means used to homogenize society and strengthen the
power of the centralized state, collectivization was one of the more
brutal and grandiose schemes. As Simon describes the goals of
collectivization;
The objective was to continue centralizing the economy and state
administration as a counter measure to regionalization and personal
initiative in the peripheries. In this respect the objectives of
collectivizatiov contradicted the policy of nation-building from the
very beginning.
Of all the republics, Ukraine suffered particularly in this
attack on nation-building primarily because the segment of society most
effected by collectivization, the peasants, were predominantly
Ukrainian. 92 There is also significant evidence that Ukraine was singled
out because Stalin went to his grave doubting Ukraine's loyalty to the
center. 93  As Nahaylo and Swoboda describe it, "Stalin saw potential
disloyalty in all Ukrainian Communists as well as the Ukrainian
masses." 9 4 His distrust stemmed from the rural resistance to
collectivization of the early 1930s and the vigor with which the Ukrainian
Party embraced de-russification. Stalin's "Ukrainian problem" was
91S1M091, p. 109.
2For the argument over the firn point that the forced starvation of Ukrainians during
coltectivization in the 1930s was connected with the nationalities issue and that Ukraine was thus
singted out see C0N086.
NS1iM• 91, p. 85.
•NANA89, p. 68.
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exacerbated by the 1932 famine, decreased industrial production, and the
increasing nationalism of the Ukrainian Party elite. He vented his rage
against Ukrainians in his final, 1933 purge to cleanse the Ukrainian party
and to reinstate central control. Stalin was successful in this endeavor
and he temporarily cowed Ukraine and altered the federal structure to
reduce national autonomy.
A comparison of the constitutions of 1923-24 and 1936 confirm the
extent to which Stalin's "vision" was fulfilled. Centralism increased and
autonomy of the periphery decreased and the "constitutional myth" was
complete.9
4. The Foundation is Laid
The unraveling of Stalin's solution to the nationalities problem
began immediately following his death in the thaw introduced by
Khrushchev. Some scholars, such as Soviet dissident analyst, Alexeyeva,
argue that Khrushchev's liberalizing thaw was spawned by his humanist
interpretation of Marx;
along with others, he experienced a natural human urge to tear
himself away from the ghostly, ahistorical worLd created by the
official myth-makers and to enter the real world.
Others such as Armstrong and Krawchenko argue that his policies stemmed
from a strategic goal of immediately assimilating the Ukrainians and
Byelorussians as "younger brothers" in a Eastern Slavic alliance which
would form the core of the Soviet Union. 97  If so, this was not a new
goal, since Russification had been a key aspect of nationality policy even
MSIMo91, p. 147.
"ALEX85, p, 4.
27ARMS90, pp. 34-36, KRAW8S, p. 187.
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in the Tsarist Empire." Regardless of his motivation, Khrushchev's
leadership, based on the unsteady foundation built by Lenin and Stalin,
widened the contradictions in the Soviet system increasing the
opportunities for deviation from the strict Communist path.
Although, the impact of the systems's contradictions are
discussed more fully in the following chapters, it is necessary to mention
here that the tensions between Communism and nationalism and the
contradictions of the system continued into the 1980s. National
opposition groups began to appear in Ukraine in the 1960s and 1970s and
the new liberalism which pervaded the Union gave rise to Petro Shelest and
his overtly national Party apparatus. However, he and his regime met
their ends in 1972-73 when the CPU was heavily purged by Shcherbytsky who
managed to keep the lid on Ukrainian nationalistic tendencies until
September of 1989. The very severe repression of nationalism under
Shcherbytsky seems to indicate that after Shelest, Moscow began to fear
either the resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism or the consequences of such
a resurgence. More than ever, it seemed Ukraine was a key piece of the
Union. Ukraine was important to the Union because of its economic input
into a declining Soviet economy and its contribution to offsetting the
decreasing percentage of Slavs in the Soviet Union.
"•in fact, even before the end of WWII, in the hey-day of national rebirth, the impact of
assimilatic #as already apparent. Nitovnan Djiias, a former founder of Communist Yugoslavia, in
writing of experiences in the USSR during the Winter of 1944-45 made this point clear. He wrote
of Ukraine,
Though Khrushchev (then Secretary of the Ukrainian Comun/ist party and Premier of the
goverrment] left the impression of strength, self-confidence, and realism, and Kiev one of
conscious and cultivated beauty, the Ukraine has remained associated in my memory with a lost
of personality, with weariness and hopelessness. (DJIL62, p. 124)
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As the example of Ukraine shows, Soviet federalism created a
monster and the harder Moscow tried to control it the more dangerous it
became. The basic premise of the Soviet federal system, namely that the
non-Russians would be absorbed into a unified, homogeneous mass, had
failed.9
E. CONCLUSION
In Ukraine, as else where in the Union, national elites were able to
successfully legitimize their nationalist agendas using Marxist ideology
and the Soviet federal structure. It was relatively easy to legitimize
nationalist goals on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideoloay. The theory
is sufficiently vague to allow a wide interpretation :n the issue of
nationalism and in the crucible of the Soviet state, the ideologies of
nationalism and socialism merged and in the Ukrainian case, as in others,
the differences between nationalism and socialism were narrowed to such an
extent that National Communists such as Shelest could come to power.
The constitutional-legal structure of the Soviet state was also
conducive to the growth of national goals. Under the Soviet governmental
system, the republics were "given" the right to secession in theory only
however, the organs of government created to fill out the myth of self-
government did exist and were used, albeit not to their fullest extent, by
the national elites.1' These administrative-governmental structures
"For example, as Richard Pipes pointed out in 1977 the Balts and Ukrainians could not be
assimilated by the Russians; "The chances of that are niL because the demarcation is so sharp now, not
only cutturaty but also territorially." (Richard Pipes, "Reflections of a NationaLity Expert," p. 10,
in LIND77)
'oAs Rakowska-Harmstone notes, the tendency to legitimize national claims via ideology is more
common simply because there is more freedom to act in the sphere of ideology than there is in the
strictly limited federal structure. (RAKO79, p. 180)
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raised elite expectations only to later frustrate them when they realized
what appeared to be means self-government was really little more than
manipulation by the center.
Both Soviet ideology and federal structure by creating room for
deviations from the internationalist path and providing opportunities to
fall into the national communist camp, greatly jeopardized national elite
loyalty to Moscow. But behind this structural argument lies the force
which motivated Ukraine's national elites to exploit the contradictions of
Marxist ideology and weaknesses of the Soviet state. This force was
Ukrainian nationalism and its influence on elite loyalty is examined in
the following chapter.
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III. SOCIETY AND THE COMMUNIST ELITES IN UKRAINE
Opportunities presented by the contradictions of Marxism, the Soviet
federal structure and Soviet nationalities policy exacerbated but did not
create the feeling among Ukrainians that he or she is first a Ukrainian
and then a Soviet. This feeling of national identity was the motor force
behind Russian-Ukrainian and later Soviet-Ukrainian conflict. It provided
the motivation to exploit the contradictions of the system and it was the
force which time and again turned Ukrainian elite loyalty away from
Moscow.
The issues of political environment and their impact on Ukrainian
elite reliability are examined in the following two chapters. This
chapter sets the stage by exploring the issue of Ukrainian nationalism and
how it had a tendency to turn Ukraine's national elites away from the
center and how it developed into political opposition. The following
chapter will examine the issue of loyalty to Moscow in depth and show how
it led to the rapid disengagement of Ukraine from the Union in 1991.
The first step toward understanding Ukrainian nationalism is to define
what national consciousness is and then to trace its development in
Ukraine, concluding with an assessment of the impact national conscious-
ness had on Ukrainian's communist leaders. The focus of this chapter is
national consciousness rather than nationalism and although these two
concepts are very closely related, national consciousness is taken to be
a mental conception of nationalist actions.
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On this premise the chapter is broken into two sections with the first
concentrating on the theory of national consciousness while in the second
section Ukraine is used as an illustration of the development of national
consciousness.
A. PRECURSOR TO NATIONALISN - NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Although there are many theories of nationalism, the approached used
here is that used by Connor, Hayes, Emerson and others 1°' who view
nationalism as national consciousness - a people's widely held conception
of themselves as a nation. Without national consciousness there can be no
nationalism but national consciousness can exist without having fully
manifested itself as nationalism. That is, national consciousness lies in
the realm of ideas while nationalism is a physical manifestation of
consciousness-an action. It is this mental attitude, not necessarily
manifested in physical action, which permeated Ukraine's political elites
and proved to be the unknown factor in their surprising turn toward
support of the Ukrainian opposition forces. For this reason, we must
examine this tertiary concept before proceeding further.
What is national consciousness and how does it develop? Ernest Barker
defines national consciousness along the following lines:
The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth
century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were
already there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is
not the things which are simply "there" that matter in human life.
What really and finally matters is the thing which is apprehended as
an idea, and, as an idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a
cause and a spring of action. In the world of action apprehended
10iSee CONN72, Hayes, Essays an Nationatism (New York, 1926), and EmSrson's From Empire to
Nation.
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ideas are alone electrical; and a nation must be an idea as well as
a fact before it can become a dynamic force.10
In short, the idea or national consciousness is what Connor calls a "sense
of vital uniqueness."10 People develop feelings of uniqueness by
comparing themselves with others and detecting differences in language,
history, ideals, aspirations, memories and the like. The development of
these feelings of uniqueness is a complex process on which Karl Deutsch's
theories can shed some light.
1. Beyond National Consciousness
Deutsch's essay, *The Growth of Nations,O postulated that there
were eight "uniformities" which have been found in the growth of nations.
The first five center on his theory of mobilization and modernization as
the key to nationalism which may have limited utility.' 0' However, the
last three deal with the issue of awareness and how nationalism develops
into a mass movement. Deutsch uses a system which begins with the growth
of individual self-awareness which he describes as "awareness of one's
predispositions to join a particular group united by language and
communications habits." The second step its "the awakening of ethnic
awareness and acceptance of national symbols, intentional or
unintentional." The final step is what Deutsch calls the "merging of
ethnic awareness with attempts at political compulsion."i0
"
1 Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formatio, (London, 1927), p. 173,
as cited in Connor "The Politics of Ethnonationatism," p. 3.
10CONN72, p. 338.
10See David L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conftict, (Berkeley CA: University of Catifornia
Press, 1985), pp. 99-105 and Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" pp. 321-329 for
ivaLuations of the Deutsch-style modernization theories.
'0°KarL W. Oeutsch, Tides Among Nations, (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 17.
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Once this movement toward group or national awareness has begun,
Deutsch says, "there appear also the deliberate pioneers and leaders of
national awakening." This group is composed of grammarians and purifiers
of the language, historians, and poets and writers. Simultaneously there
arise the "first organizers." The first of these groups are usually
literary and language societies which are followed by other benevolent
societies and fraternal organizations for mutual support. The appearance
of national symbols also occurs in these final stages of national
awareness.10
Bohdan Krawchenko building on the logic of Karl Deutsch goes
beyond the mere linking of an idea with a political vehicle to get at the
mechanics of managing national consciousness.
The transition from a people to a nationality (or, in other words,
the acquisition of a national consciousness or national identity) is
a further step in the growth of a people's solidarity. This occurs
when the cultural distinctiveness becomes an important factor in a
people's social, economic and political demands. At this stage of
development a nationality must acquire a measure of effective control
over the behavior of its members' in order to strength and elaborate
the alignments that 'make up the social fabric of nationality'.10
Krawchenko goes on to describe this control as being set up through
informal or formal social, or most effectively, political, organizations.
This control becomes manifested in the ability to compel members of the
nation which completes the process;
once a nationality has added this power to compel to its earlier
cohesiveness and attachment to group symbols, it often considers
itself a nation and is recognized as such by others, even though it




07As cited in Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century
Ukraine, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), p. xvii.
08KR A W 8 5 , p p . x v i i - x v i i i .
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2. The Key Players
Deutsch identifies institutions as the key to transforming the
idea of nation into a political force. He attributes individual awareness
primarily as a result of "personal psychology" but group awareness as "a
matter of social institutions." Institutions are responsible for invoking
and disseminating national symbols which begin a "stream of memories"
which serve to create national awareness. Once begun, this process may
well be irreversible even if the institutions have long since
disappeared.19
Krawchenko goes one step further by specifically identifying the
key actors in this transformation process. The key roles are played by
national elites and "leading social groups who elaborate and politicize
objective cultural markers.""10  If they are to be successful, however,
they must demand and receive "the corporate recognition of the group as a
whole.""' To sum up Krawchenko's theory;
The active intervention of indigenous elites, the existence of a
mobilized population and of infrastructures of national life tolerated
by the central state are, in our view, among the most impgrtant elements
facilitating the emergence of a national consciousness."1
The following section examines these ideas about national
consciousness in the Ukrainian context in two ways. First we explore
those aspects of Ukrainian history which establish the feeling of
uniqueness or which heln form national consciousness. Second, in




112 KRAW85, p. xix.
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development of national consciousness in Ukraine and its impact on the
national elites.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN UKRAINE
Ukrainian national consciousness is a complex phenomenon which has
been a fundamental influence on the history of Ukraine especially under
Communism. In order to provide the basic framework of this consciousness
we will focus on its basic constructs, that is, on the themes of the
national myth and a sketch of the physical development of national
consciousness and nationalism in Ukraine in the 20th century.
1. A National Myth
It is often the self-perception of a people which determines the
paths they choose to follow and it is just as often that this sLf-
oerception is ignored by outside observers attempting to determine why a
people act as they do at important historical crossroads. This self-
perception is embodied in the "national myth" which is an historically
based history of the people which is carried by each individual and forms
a common understanding and direction among all members of the nation.
This myth sets the fundamental beliefs, values, and standards of behavior
which are expected of all members of the nation and allows the nation to
be self-defined which, as Connor emphasizes is an essential step in
nation-building. 11 3  By the use of the word "myth" we do not
necessarily imply fiction but rather seek to illustrate the passion and
pervasiveness of these ideas.
"Com73, p. 3.
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The Ukrainian national myth has remained a continuous thread in
Ukrainian national consciousness since a definable nationalism began in
the 19th century. The accuracy of the myth may be debatable but this is
not important. Real or not, this is what Ukrainians believe has been and
still is the basis of their claim to nationhood and ultimately statehood.
As a result, the contemporary struggle for Ukrainian independence cannot
be understood without at least a brief look at Ukraine's national myth.
This myth contains dominant themes of which we shall examine four.
a. Historic Nation
The first theme in the Ukrainian national myth attempts to
establish a legitimate historical basis for the Ukrainian nation. It does
so by claiming that modern Ukraine descended from the medieval Rus' who
were established in the Kiev area in the 9th century. To Ukrainians, this
distinct historical origin sets them apart from Russians and validates
their claim to nationhood. However, Russian and the majority of western
historians adhere to the view that the modern Russian nation and state was
also derived from Rus' which undermines Ukrainian claims to distinctive
national origins and legitimate Russian claims to Ukrainian territory.
Ivan Rudnytsky, a prominent scholar of Ukrainian history,
argues that while Ukraine's exclusive claims on Rus' ancestry are without
a doubt exaggerated and that Russians and Byelorussians legitimately share
this ancestry there is no reason why this should deny Ukrainians a
historical basis for their nation. Medieval Rus' was, he points out,
geographically centered in what we now know as Ukraine and
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by its political institutions, social structure, and cultural make-up
the Kievian state is closer to the mainstream of the Ukrainian rather
than the Russian historical tradition. 14
Rudnytsky's balanced view does not deny Ukrainian national distinctiveness
and in fact supports long-held nationalist views such as that espoused by
the Ukrainian publicist, Mykola Kostomarov (1817-85) that Russia and
Ukraine are fundamentally different because Ukraine upholds the basic
concepts of individua-ism and federalism while Russia stresses
collectivism and centralism.
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b. Struggle Against Oppression
The second theme in the national myth provides a proud
tradition of struggle counterpoised with victimization. This theme
centers on the great warrior Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich who
struggled with both the Poles and the Russians to establish an independent
Ukrainian state and the Tsar's violation of the rights of the free
Cossacks. Particular emphasis is place on the how Ukraine came under
Russian domination in 1654 when Cossack hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi traded
independence for Moscow's protection from the Polish. From this flows the
"Ukrainian national constitutive myth" in which Ukraine was forced to form
a union with the Russians. 16
This second theme, writes Armstrong, was one which received
the most attention from Ukraine's nationalists in the 20th century because
they were aware that memories of the Cossacks, still existent among the
"






common people, were a valuable means of political mobilization."" The
division of Ukraine in 1663 between Russia and Poland and the subsequent
partitions of Poland in the 18th century which left only Gal;cia outside
the Russian empire helped perpetuate the Ukrainian's sense of Russian
oppression.
The violence, pain, loss, and frustration of attempting to
carve out a nation and state with the Hetman's sword would not be repeated
until the first four decades of the 20th Century during which Ukraine was
to experience these powerful forces twice. These experiences, both
because of their intensity and ultimate failure, became powerful additions
to the national myth. The first addition to the myth came after WWI and
centered on the idea of a glorious and bloody, yet almost divinely
justified struggle for the Ukrainian nation. This element of the
collective national myth was drawn upon by both Eastern and Western
Ukrainian nationalists when the opportunity for national independence
arose during WWII. Armstrong argues that at this time an additional
element was added to the national myth. This addition is that of the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which fought both German Fascism and Soviet
Communism.
This myth, says Armstrong, largely superseded (without
displacing) the earlier myths. 118  Although this may be somewhat
exaggerated, it was true that the UPA was a very powerful and attractive
element which glorified nationalism and had the unique honor of being a




effectively from 1944-1950. In fact, Armstrong claims that the UPA was
"very probably the most important example of forceful resistance to an
established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan
resistance beginning in 1979."119
It is important to note that because post-WWII UPA
operations in Eastern Ukraine were very limited, Eastern Ukraine does not
share in this most recent and powerful addition to the national myth.
Although this merely aggravates the East-West differences in Ukraine, the
myth of the UPA was most worrisome to the Communists after the unification
of East and West Ukraine because of its incredible attraction and
popularity in the West which threatened to spread to the East. As a
result, a great deal of Soviet effort was devoted to debunking this latest
addition to the Ukrainian national myth.
c. Intellectual leadership
The previous two themes combined to create a feeling of
uniqueness which directly conflicted with Russian contentions that
Ukrainians, like the Byelorussians, were nothing more than Russians with
a dialect. But if there was to be political action to accompany this
independence-minded ideology then there would have to be leaders who would
assume this important role of linking thought with action. The legendary
cossacks who embody the idea of physical struggle against oppressors,
serve as premier leadership figures, however, the more recent (18th, 19th
and early 20th century) leaders have been intellectual, literary
"'A•RM, p. 223.
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elites. 12 This is not surprising because as Alter notes, nation
building is most often a process 'engineered by the intellectual elites
but directed at the social group as a whole.' 12 1
The role of writers, poets, and translators is very
important in the history of Ukraine and much more so than in Russia or
Poland because as Harvard's George Grabowicz explains;
in the absence of 'normal' political development, and particularly in
the absence of political institutions, cultural expression, of which
literature is but the most manifest, and by virtue of being the most
multi-levelled and multi-functional also the most priviliped form and
vehicle, becomes a natural and inevitable replacement.'
In such cases the writer himself becomes an institution, a 'shadow
government."
Grabowicz explains literature as a paradigm of national
revival on three levels. First, writers and poets became political
figures because there was a "functional equivalence between literary and
political life." Political figures either turned to literature to further
their programs (i.e., Franko) or as was usually the case, it simply turned
out that "literature and the political ideology and activity were fused in
a programme of national and explicitly national analyses and
prescriptions."'123 In fact, under both the Tsarist and Communist
1 This may be in part due to the quite severe repression of the Cossack theme in Soviet
Ukraine.





regimes, it was not possible to be a Ukrainian literary figure without
being labeled a nationalist.' 24
Grabowlcz's second level of literature as a paradigm for
national revival is that literary periods correspond to stages of national
development. That is
literary consciousness-both as the values, stances, and modalities
that generate literature and those that are involved in its reception
... apparentlyhannel led the way national consciousness developed and
For Ukrainians, the first phase of this literary consciousness was
Romanticism which authenticated Ukrainian national consciousness by
discovering the past and glorifying the folk traditions, history, and most
importantly, revitalizing the foremost symbol of nation identity, the
language.1 26  The second phase was narodnyctvo or popularism which
defined the individuality of things Ukrainian and differentiated them from
things Russian. While this was in itself an important step, even more
important was that in so defining the borders of the Ukrainian self, the
movement revived the older idea that the Ukrainian-Russian relationship
was one of opposition. The negative side of Ukrainian Popularism was that
it tended to precipitate isolationalism and provincialism, as well as a
mistrust of institutions.127  Popularism gave way to the era of
Positivism which covered the last third of the 19th century. During this
124The role of Literature was such that even the act of moving the editorial offices of the
Literaturno-naukoyov visnyk in 1907 from Lviv in Galicia to Kiev in Ukraine was not a simple
editorial decision but "a symbolic act signalling the goal of sobornist', or the in-gathering of
Ukrainian lands, and anticipating the political and revolutionary moves of a decade Later."
(GRA889, p. 120)




era Ukrainian literature was identified with "civic duty, with the
national cause, with lifting up hearts and educating minds ... ,.2 As
Grabowicz notes, while this sense of duty undoubtedly undermined the
quality of literature during this period, its contribution to the
Ukrainian national movement was great. The slaving of literature to
national duty was only reversed in the early 20th century.' 2'
The third level of literature as a paradigm of national
revival is that of "deep structures" or unconscious collective action.
Since literature is taken as an expression of national will, or, at
the very least, unconscious collective feelings - while synergisti-
cally also shaping and transforming that will - thea1 3rd, inevitably
is identified with social or even political action.
The Ukrainian national identity came to be defined by language, historical
memory, and ethnicity and the literature, especially during the Romantic
era, highlighted a "sense of victimization." This identification then led
to a nativist pattern of thought which was a particularly fragile
foundation for national revival because of its susceptibility to
distortion and upsets in its course of renewal. As well, literature
tended to define Ukrainian nationalism in a closed, isolated way concerned
most with the preservation of the old rather than the discovery of the
new. 131
In this combined preservation and search for history it was
only natural that historians would rise to the pinnacle of the nationalist
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historians of the 19th century, Michael Hrushevs'kyi deserves to be called
the father of Ukrainian nationalism. Historians and writers complemented
each other in the parthenon of nationalism because historians could
provide the material which writers then wove into a national myth with
which to inspire loyalty to the nation word by word and page by page.12
The fact that Ukrainian nationalism was led by intellectials
(namely men of letters) since its inception is one of the themes which is
carried forward to the Ukrainian national movement today and obviously a
connection which was not unnoticed by the Communists who ruthlessly
persecuted these members of Ukrainian society until very recently. For
example, in the late 1920s during the attack on the Ukrainian
"nationalists" 80 percent of the Ukraine's writers and poets became
victim's of the terror. 1 33
d. The Wealth of Ukraine
The final, enduring national myth is that of Ukraine as an
inherently wealthy country both culturally and economically. Culturally
speaking, Ukrainians were proud of their cultural heritage. Ukrainian
culture hit a peak in the 18th century when Ukrainian authors, summoned by
Peter I to serve in top posts in ecclesiastical and education institu-
tions, began to glorify Ukraine, going so far as to call Kiev the "second
Jerusalem" and creating works of Ukrainian history known as the "Cossack
Chronicles." Music and architecture also bloomed at this time. The
foundation of Russian and Ukrainian choral traditions were begun.
13ARNS90, p. 4. The poet Taras Shevchenko (0814-61) created a Literary Ukrainian Language,
the preservation of which has been a consistent rallying cry for Ukrainian nationalists since the
19th century.
13Nadia D•uk and Adrian Karatnycky, The Hidden Nations: The People Chatlenge the Soviet
Union, (New York: WiLLiam Morrow and Company, Ic, 1990), p. 74.
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Architectural marvels such as the Kievian Cave Monastery, or the
cathedrals of St. George and St. Andrew were erected and stand to this day
as a symbol of cultural greatness.1'3  In the 1840's, Taras Shevchenko
emerged and transformed Ukrainian literature from a one-dimensional,
limited literary role, into a literature of international excellence. The
fact that Shevchenko's pictures appear, even today, along side holy icons
in Ukrainian homes, indicates how much his contribution to Ukraine is
valued.
From the perspective of economic wealth, the Ukrainians
throughout modern history have felt that Ukraine could be an important
European power if only it was not dominated by malevolent powers. At the
time of the Russian revolution Ukraine was considered the bread basket of
Europe. Under the Communists it was considered the Bread basket of the
USSR and yet through all of this was the idea that there was much more
which could be if only Ukrainians could be free to rule themselves.
Ukraine's economic wealth lay in the resources as well as
the people. In addition to agriculture, Ukraine's mineral wealth was
vast. The coal and iron ore under Ukrainian soil fueled Stalin's
industrialization of the 1930s and beyond. The difference between the
independent-mindedness and hard working attitude of the Ukrainian peasant
and the communally oriented, ill-motivated Russian was often drawn. It
was also stressed under the Communists that Ukrainian workers were more
productive than Russian. In fact, this productivity was highlighted by
Aleksei Stakhanov who in 1935 hewed 102 tons of coal in a single shift.
He quickly became a symbol of what Marples calls "the ruthless and quasi-
134SUBT90, pp. 19-7.
66
colonial exploitation of nonrenewable resources for the all-Union
economy. .135
This exploitation under the centralized Soviet economy
inevitably led to feelings that economic autonomy was needed to prevent
Ukraine's wealth being plundered by the center. These sentiments have
existed throughout Ukraine's history under the Communists and in the
1920s, 1940s, and 1960s led to outspoken protest against central
reallocation of Ukraine's resources. This issue, not surprisingly, also
began to be raised vocally during the late 1980s.
In summarizing the national myth it can be said that the
development of Ukrainian nationalism and nation from the very early years
to the present was characterized by a number of themes. The predominant
ideas of Ukraine as a historic (yet incomplete) nation in a continual
struggle against oppressors serves as the foundation of Ukrainian
nationalism. The theme of literary elite acting in the capacity of
preserve! of the Ukrainian culture and the vanguard of nation-builders
influences strongly influences even the contemporary form of the national
movement and pulls at the Communist elites loyalties. The final theme;
the conceptualization of Ukraine as a potentially wealthy nation provides
the motivation to self-determination by holding a promise of something
better in the future.
These themes were constructs of varying intensity at
different points in the history of Ukraine and they spun various threads
among other aspects of Ukraine's culture to create a rich cultural-
political background based on self-determination and nation-building. The
13 NARP91, p. 1.
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19th century in Ukraine was dominated by the themes of historical
nationhood, struggle and literary leadership. Interwoven amongst these
themes were a number of others: a confusion as to whether Ukraine is
rightly a Western nation or a Eastern one; an incomplete and unrealized
struggle to achieve nationhood; and the creation of a national myth to
glorify the ideas of distinctiveness and independence through struggle.
The sense of victimization runs heavily through all these themes.
The period of 1914 to 1950 saw a reinforcement of previous
themes supplemented by the growing awareness that Ukraine's wealth was
being plundered. To these were added the ideas of the internal divisions
within the Ukrainian nation and the lack of international, and thus
national, viability both of which added to the previous identity crisis
and the idea of the incomplete nation.
During WWII and to a limited extent during WWI, some
dominant aspects of Ukrainian nationalism such as leadership by literary
figures were lessened as the pen and word were replaced by the rifle and
bullet. There also emerged a new sub-theme, namely the use of violence
to achieve national goals. These themes merged and intertwined creating
new aspects of the national myth and shaping the development of Ukrainian
nationalism.
2. Physical Manifestations of National Consciousness
This section which traces the actual development of national
consciousness in Ukraine is divided into two parts. The first concerns
the development of national consciousness up to WWII when the basic ideas
were established. The second, follows the development of national
consciousness from WWII forward in more detail because these developments
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impinged more heavily on contemporary Ukrainian than those prior to WWII.
a. Pre-WII Developments
The discussion of Ukrainian national consciousness can, for
our purposes begin at the turn of the 20th century when the level of
national consciousness in Ukraine was quite low. In spite of the illegal
General Ukrainian Democratic Organization founded in 1897 to coordinate
cultural and social groups which were keeping alive the memories of the
Hetmanate and the Sich, there was no mass movement to speak of in turn of
the century Ukraine. In fact, Conquest argues that a true mass movement
in Ukraine appeared only in 1912.136 At this juncture, what national
concepts there were among Ukrainians resided with the peasants and the
workers, dominated by Russians, were not interested in Ukrainian
nationalism. The historic preserve of national revival, the petty
bourgeoisie1 37 was not Ukrainian, and the native leadership abdicated
their responsibility, under the pressure of russification, to the
intelligentsia which was not prepared for the responsibility. 13 In
essence, Ukraine was a peasant nation with Russian, Polish and Jewish
urban centers. In spite of this, there were indications that national
consciousness was on the rise; there were peasant uprisings in 1902 which
were repeated six years later, the first Ukrainian political party formed
13 6CON086, p. 30. Although by no means a mass movement, the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and
Methodius, organized in 1847 by cuttural elites such as Kostomarov and (more distantly) Shevchenko, was
one of the very first attempts by Ukraine's elites to move from cultural to political phases of
national development. (See SUBT9O, pp. 235-237) The Brotherhood eventual discovery and persecution
alerted Moscow to the dangers of Ukrainian nationalism on the rise and was responsible for a new wave
of suppression which inhibited mass mobilization of Ukrainians through the remainder of the century.
137MirosLav Hroch, Die Vorkbimfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen V6lkern Eurocas, as cited
in John-Paul Himka, "Voluntary Artisan Association and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia,"
Harvard Ukrainian Studies, No. 2, 1978, pp. 235-6.
138Krawchenko, p. 43.
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in 1900, and in 1905 the first Ukrainian newspaper, Kh0lorob was being
printed, in the same year Ukrainian representatives to the Second Duma 1)9
demanded independence for Ukraine.
However, these beginnings were not to last. In 1910,
Stolypin, the economically progressive but imperialist Russian Prime
Minister, closed down Ukrainian cultural organizations, printing houses,
and banned use of Ukrainian in public. The birth of Ukrainian national
spirit was further crushed by the arrival of WWI. Hosking describes
Ukraine of this period as "a potential nation which had failed to achieve
full nationhood.... "140 Not surprisingly, when the revolution came to
Ukraine in 1917, in the "springtime of her development", also called the
"fusilladed renaissance,"141 she was unprepared to achieve self-
determination." 2
Despite the establishment of WWI-era institutions such as
the Ukrainian Rada and other institutions of independent Ukraine in
accordance with the Deutsch model and the establishment of incipient
statehood, attempts to reach the final stage of nation failed. The
explanations for this are many but most boil down to a combination of four
factors; a consistent repression of the Ukrainian nation under the Tsar,
'3The legislative body introduced after the revolts of 1905 which were supposed to allow for
pIb.lic particination in state policy making.
14OGeoffry Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union, (London: Neinemann, 1990), p. 95.
141Ivan Dzyuba, "A Time to Gather Stones," Moscow News Weekly, No, 3, 1989.
142Krawchenko, p. 85.
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lack of national consciousness, poor national organization, and lack of
external assistance."
3
During the remaining years of the 1920's Ukraine thrived on
the short experience of independence and entered the golden era of
Ukrainianization. This was a crucial period of nation building because
"What was at stake was whether the new social weight of the Ukrainian fact
would be able to place on the agenda further measures for the self-
emancipation of the Ukrainian nation."" The purge trials of 1928 were
the first sign that this was not to be ,jssible and the 1930's saw the
"entry of the Ukrainian nation into modernity... [accompanied] by the
unleashing of terror on a mass scale during which millions died and the
nation's cultural and political elite was eliminated.""'s As the Soviet
diplomat Butenko noted about this period "every sign of Ukrainian national
consciousness, 'even when it did not venture beyond the established norm
of Soviet life, was rooted out and destroyed.'"146 This was apparent in
the attack on the Ukrainian national heart, the writers and poets, 80
percent of which became victim's of the terror.147  The great famine of
143YIrostIv *itinsky, The Second Soviet Republic, The Ukraine after World War 11, (New Bsrunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 2-3; Jarosiaw Silocerkowycz, Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A
Study of Political Alienation, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 16 citing Reshetar, The
Ukrainian RevoLutio , pp. 319-331, and Zev Katz, Rosmrie Rodgers, and Frederic .4arned, Handbook of
Major Soviet NationaLities, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 24. See Lub•omyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan
S, Kordan, Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Ouestion 1938-1951; A Docu~entary Cotlection,(Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1987), p. 1. and Notyl. Sovietology. Rationality.
Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR, pp. 116-117 for the Lack of intervention
argument. Notyl goes so far as to even discount the role of national consciousness and popular support
(p. 117).
I"Krawchenko, p. 112.
1 ]bid., p. 113.
16Giornale d'ttgLiR, 16 February 1938 cited by Tryz , 27 February 1938, p. 4 as cited in
Krawchenko, p.152.
147Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, The Hidden Nations: The Peowle Challenge the Soviet Union,
(New York: Witiem Morrow and Company, Inc, 1990), p. 74.
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1932-33 and the continual suppression of Ukrainian culture further
submerged the sense of nation.
These massive attacks on the young nation left only the
question of "what of the Ukrainian nation survived that decade?"'"
Krawchenko stresses that social institutions survived and a new
intelligentsia was put in place."*9 Both these elements, essential to
the development of national consciousness as discussed above, held hope
for a future revival.
Any hope for revival in the confusion of WWII when Nazi
forces swept through Ukraine were dished by the cruelty of the Germans and
their suppression of Ukrainian national aspirations. 150  Stalin manipu-
lated the rise of Ukrainian patriotism during the war in order to assure
the loyalty of the 4.5 million Ukrainian members of the Soviet military.
To this end, Stalin permitted the establishment of things Ukrainian, entry
into the United Nations, and a revival of the Ukrainian culture. He hoped
to rally support behind the call to defend the Ukrainian State, the
Ukrainian language, and Ukrainian lands. While Stalin's concession were
largely symbolic, propaganda ploys, they did to an extent legitimize
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Zhdanov's crack down on liberalization began in 1946 in Ukraine, what few
gains had been made were lost.
152
b. Post WI1 Developments
In terms of the revolution of 1989, the post WWII period is
most important because not only did the status of the "Ukrainian nation"
reach new lows but in the 1950s and 1960s national consciousness was
converted into a different, but closely related phenomenon of political
opposition which has continued up to this day. This evolution from
national consciousness to physical manifestations of organized opposition
which rejected ethno-nationalistic ideas was to be critical in the events
of 1989-1991 because the struggle was no longer cast in terms of ethnicity
but in terms of the Ukrainian state (inclusive of all ethnic groups).
This development was also critical because it drew a line between the
152An interesting sidelight to the idea of the Ukrainian nation is the external perception of her
national status at this point in history. In a Top Secret, 18 August 1948 note S. W. Souers, Executive
secretary to the National Security Council speLLed out US post-war objectives with respect to Russia.
His treatment of Ukraine is of special interest because it shows the perceived Lack of "nation" in
Ukraine at this tow time in history:
It is true that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rute and that something should
be done to protect their position in the future. But there are certain basic facts which must
not be Lost sight of. While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the
Russian Ewrire they have shown no signs of being a "nation" capable of bearing successfuLly the
responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition. The Ukraine is not
a cLearly defined ethnical or geographic concept, in general, the Ukrainian population made up
originally in Large measure out of refugees from Russian or PoLish despotism shades off
imperceptibly into the Russian and Polish nationalities. There is no clear dividing Line
between Russian and the Ukraine and it would be impossible to establish one.... The real basis
of "Ukrainianism" is the feeling of "difference" produced by a specific peasant dialect and by
minor differences of custom and folklores throughout the country districts. The political
agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little
concept of the responsibiLities of government.
... The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their (Russian] national heritage as the Ki"t'le
West is of ours, and they (Russians] are aware of that fact .... [Ukrainians] are too close to
the Russians to be able to set themelves up successfully as something wholly different. For
better of [sic] worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special
relationship to the Great Russian people.
Souers goes on to propose a solution which would not encourage Ukrainian separatism and would toe the
line of neutrality toward both Ukrainians and Russians. He was, however, adamant about ensuring that
the Baltic States "not be compelled to remain under any comwunist authority in the aftermath of another
war." Thus the fate of Ukraine was seated until the question arose again in 1989. (LUCIa7, pp. 210 -
211)
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establishment and the opposition and polarized the political environment
in which Ukrainian Communist elites circulated. The pressures of this
polarization combined with national cultural influences proved critical in
defining the role of these elites as power began to flow from the center
to the periphery in the late 1980s.
At the root of these important changes lay the decline of
the Ukrainian nation which pressured Ukrainian nationalists to act and
Ukrainian ruling elites to press for national concessions from the center.
The post-war period was a study in dialectical materialism; Soviet
policies were repressive and stressed assimilation of Ukrainians, however,
in so doing, they encouraged a reactive nationalism which, in turn,
encouraged the Ukrainian elite to become even more Ukrainian.153
(1) The Changing Social Structure of Ukraine. The gradual
rise of national consciousness in Ukraine since WWII has been due, in
part, to continued russification but, more importantly, to a important
changes in the social structure of Ukraine. For the first time, we saw
the growth of a Ukrainian dominated proletariate which began to raise
national demands15 4 and an intelligentsia, although subjected to intense
russification, which did not grow indifferent to the issue of Ukrainian
national existence. 15 Increasing urbanization, education, and
mobilization fulfilled Connor's promise' 56 that national consciousness
would grow as a result of the self awareness induced by the increased
13KRAW85, p. 253.
154 K A 5, p. 212.
"KRAW85, pp. 214-216.
5C ONN 3, p. 4.
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interaction of differing groups of people such as happens in cities,
schools, and travel.
(a) Demographic changes. Social changes in Ukraine
following the war were significant and while nature and the drought of
1946-7, which decimated the steppe regions, played a role in changing the
demographics of post-war Ukraine, man-made factors were also at play. Not
only were boxcars of Ukrainian deportees leaving Western Ukraine bound for
Siberia but over half of the male and one quarter of the female population
of newly reunited Ukraine had perished during the war years. These
factors alone were to have a telling effect on the socio-economic
structure of post-war Ukraine.
While Ukraine shrank in human terms it expanded in
geographical terms with the addition of Western Ukraine (Transcarpathia in
1944) and the Crimea (1954).157 Expansion also occurred among the
Russian population in Ukraine with an unprecedented 1 million Russians
migrating to the republic between 1959 and 1970.158 One consequence of
this was that during the 1960s, Ukrainian plurality decreased by 2 percent
and by 1970 Russians comprised 20 percent of the population as opposed to
13 percent in 1939.159 By 1989 Russians comprised 22.2 percent of the
population and Ukrainians only 72.2 percent with the remaining 5.1 percent
being minorities (primarily Jews, Byelorussians, Poles, Bulgarians, and




160Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 18, October 1991, p.6.
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of Russians was 4.1% as opposed to 2.6% for Ukrainians.161  The
percentage rise of Russians was not due solely to the immigration of
Russians but also due impart to a declining Ukrainian birth rate and
increasing death rate, assimilation of Ukrainians into the Russian
culture, and the out-migration of Ukrainians from the Republic. This
massive shift in nationality posed a particularly difficult problem for
Ukrainians since it threatened the preservation of their national
identity, their ability to achieve social dominance within their own
country and led to a crisis of social mobilization.1 2
(b) Cultural Changes. Culturally, Ukraine's national
status declined under the onslaught of russification which sought to
submerge (and eventually eliminate) manifestations of a separate Ukrainian
identity. The key aspect of identity, in the case of Ukraine, was
language. Language was a sensitive topic because traditionally, at least
since the 1950s, the Ukrainian national opposition had been formed from
literary elites and they were very attuned to the importance of language.
Ivan Dzyuba, a prominent member of the literary national opposition,
decries the loss of language which he feels is a most important part of a
people's national consciousness; "There is little understanding of the
language as the greatest spiritual treasure-trove, the carrier of
historical memory, and a condition of the people's full fledged
existence."163 Ukraine's intelligentsia rallied around the idea that the
loss of language was the primary threat to Ukrainian nationhood. Language




had a secondary purpose in the struggle for national concessions. As
Krawchenko notes, lThe language question is of course important for a
nation in its struggle for continued viability. But the language issue
also plays the role of a symbol in the important conflict between
competing social groups, in particular, elites."•
The issue of the Ukrainian language became a
surrogate for national revival and the rallying call for those in Ukraine
who wished to protest russification. The issue of language was fought on
two fronts. One was the lack of Ukrainian-language publications and the
other was the lack of education opportunities for Ukrainian students.
In 1979, Simon indicates that although the
percentage of Ukrainians in the USSR was 16.2 percent, the number of
Ukrainian language publications was only 2.7 percent. In fact,
Ukrainians and Byelorussians have the dubious honor of being the two
nationalities whose percentage of native language publications has
decreased the most since 1958.165
In addition to the problem of inadequate
publications in Ukrainian there was the issue of education in Ukrainian.
The education issue centered on the issues of the right of parents to
decide in which language their children will be educated and the number of
Ukrainian-language schools available. The right of parents to decide in




voluntary in the UkSSR for the last 27 years.'" The domination of
Russian which extends from kindergarten to graduate school, was such that
parents who elected the option of sending their children to Ukrainian
schools were accused of subjecting them to hardship because Russian
predominates in everyday life. The problem of inadequate numbers of
Ukrainian-language schools was also raised. According to Ukrainian
sources, despite the fact that Ukrainians are the majority nationality in
all but the Crimean Oblast, only 28V. of oblast center schools are
Ukrainian. 167  Simon cites statistics showing that the percentage of
children in Ukraine taught in Ukrainian decreased from 73 percent in 1955
to 51 percent in 1987.168
(c) Economic Changes. In addition to the changing
demographics and loss of cultural markers, the surge of industrial growth
in Ukraine following WWII significantly altered the class structure of
society. This, in combination with the restructuring which occurred as a
result of Soviet economic policy structure on the internal colonialism
model, provided much of the impetus to the national revival of the 1960s.
Economic development in Ukraine was extensive and
unequal with Ukrainian agriculture especially prone to unequal policies.
In 1970, Ukraine's collective farmers ranked lowest among all republics
'"The reference is to statute 26 of the Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Nationat Education which
states "Parents or guardians have the right to choose according to their wishes the Language of
instruction for their chitdren.11 The taw, although adopted as a union-wide requirement (known as
thesis 19), was not put into practice in aLL repubtics. Ukraine, the BaLtics, and transcaucus
repubLics, because of subordinate taws, made both Russian and the native language mandatory for alt
students. GraduaLty the native Language requirement was eroded by the fact that Russian was the
"officiale Language. See SIM091.
107See Soviet Ukrainian Affairs, Vot. 1, No. 3, p. 15.
10 Sl091, p. 327.
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for earned income and yet by 1975, they supplied over 25 percent of the
all-union agricultural income.169
Industrialization in Ukraine was also large scale
and unequal in comparison with the RSFSR. By 1970, in Ukraine the working
class had eclipsed the collective farmer as the predominate class but in
comparison with the RSFSR, Ukraine had 25 percent more collective farmers,
13 percent less workers, and 9 percent less white-collar workers.
Furthermore, Ukrainians, although proportionally represented in the
working class, were consistently under represented in the white collar
class. Clearly Russians in Ukraine had moved out of the working class and
Ukrainians had replaced them.170
This large scale industrialization would be
expected to produce a positive economic effect in Ukraine-but by 1970 one
half the total capital formed in Ukraine was being reinvested outside
republican boundaries and knowledge of this fact did much to aggravate
both workers and farmers.171  Food shortages and poor working conditions
prevailed and maddened the working classes who saw their situation as the
result of Moscow's exploitation. This perception was increased by raised
expectations among the workers brought on by the influx of youth into the
labor force and the increasing education levels of workers.'
(d) Mobilization of the Population. It was rapidly





17 1KRAW85, p. 209.
1NRAWS5, p. 209.
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peasant, was being replaced by the worker. Armstrong's argument that the
peasantry posed the principle obstacle in the path Russian assimilation
because, unlike the heavily russified urban Ukrainians, they retained a
stronger national identity'73 is challenged by Krawchenko.
He argues that the increasing national homogeneity
of the working force was a major factor in making the worker the fulcrum
of nationalism. As Russians moved up into the white-collar class, the
working class, by 1970, was 74 percent Ukrainian. 17' This preserved
national identity among workers and made social and linguistic divisions
coincide which ultimately led to casting worker unrest in a nationalist
light. It was also important that the major part of post-WWII
industrialization was occurring in the central-western and western parts
of Ukraine where national identification was historically strong. The
increasing national identity of workers in Ukraine became evident as early
as 1956 when on numerous occasions in which workers actively protested
against russification under nationalist banners. In 1960, Ukraine became
the center for labor unrest as Ukrainian workers went on strike to protest
low wages and poor working conditions. By 1970 the first structures of
trade unions could be seen.' 7
Although it was not apparent to many, the
increasing Russian population and the unfavorable economic situation was
leading toward an explosion of national sentiment. Moscow's policies
toward the nationalities which formed the center's reaction to an
"
1
•ARMS90, p. 28 - 32.
174 K 85, p. 211.
I'NKRAWS5, p. 20.
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increasingly troublesome periphery did little to calm the situation and in
fact, exacerbated it in many cases.
The 1970s and early 1980s saw a worsening of the
All-Union and Ukrainian economy which came to exacerbate resentment
against the center. As Krawchenko notes, in the 1970's the "avenues of
social mobility...narrowed still further."176  This was linked in great
part to the stagnating economy in which Ukraine found itself in 1971. The
extensive mode of economic development which had carried Ukraine through
the 1960's was no longer viable. The national reserves were drained, the
labor force was no longer expanding at the previous rates and the influx
of capital had slowed to a trickle.1' 77 The rising expectations of
Ukrainian consumers were greatly out of sync with the ability of Ukrainian
planners to influence central economic planning to meet their particular
needs. The efficiency of the ukrainian economy was, despite the reforms
of 1965, was still very poor and the quantity of consumer goods in the
1970s failed to keep up with demand which then lowered labor productivity
because there was no reason to work harder if there was nothing to buy
with increased wages. The structure of national consciousness was rapidly
becoming less cultural and more economic.'178
(2) The Ukrainian Reaction to Post WII Developments. In
the environment described above, the struggle for national sovereignty was
very much cast as a conflict between two competing nationalisms; Russian
and Ukrainian. This struggle is best described using Anthony Smith's
"




delineation of nationalism into two forms which describe the causal
relationship between the Soviet center and its colonial periphery. Smith
describes what he calls "preservation nationalism" which aptly describes
the policies of the Soviets (Russians) through the Brezhnev years.
Preservation nationalism exists when
a culturally demarcated ruling group aims by a mixture of discrimi-
nating and homogenizing measures to perpetuate its caste-like rule,
while posing aiF the champion of the whole unit in opposition to the
outside world.
In reaction to this variant of nationalism which came
to be embodied in the idea of the "Soviet People [Narod]" and executed via
the series of nationalities policies, there can appear what Smith calls
"renewal nationalism." This form of nationalism, like Ukrainian
nationalism, is in opposition to "preservation nationalism" and it usually
starts "outside the main centers of power, and if allied to social
discontents, [is] directed against the incumbent ruler or regime.... 180
Clearly this form of nationalism is somewhat limited in environment and as
Smith is careful to note, renewal nationalisms "operate in settings of, at
least, nominal, independence from ancient times, and in (almost)
homogenous groups.""la One should also note that an historic legacy of
former nationhood and independence need not be historically valid but
simply believed to be a fact by the majority of the population. Smith's
typology of preservation and renewal nationalism approximates the
interplay of Soviet and Ukrainian goals during the post-war period and
17 SMIT71, p. 224.




Smith's supposition that renewal nationalism can only occur in homogenous
groups has significant implications for the Ukrainian case. This lack of
homogeneity became a major stumbling block for the widening of the
opposition movement in the 1960s as in the 1980s which then forced renewal
nationalism to be rejected by the opposition in favor of a widely-based
movement of non-ethnically defined nation-building.
This new structure of Ukrainian nationalism was being
built at the time when the death of Stalin and the thaw brought on by
Khrushchev ushered in a period of tremendous growth for the Ukrainian
opposition. Thanks to Khrushchev's tendency to try to leap over an abyss
by making two leaps one after the other'8, he increased suppressive
measures which heightened concern among Ukrainian intellectuals while at
the same time creating an environment favorable for growth of nationalism
to offset the suppression. There was an explosion of civic activity in
what can only be called a rebirth of pre-Stalin national movements.
Ukraine was the first in the union to demonstrate the up swell of
nationalism which this period was to bring.1' The Ukrainian Communist
Party was swept up in this wave of rising nationalism and even became a
part of it. By the early 1960's under the leadership of Petro Shelest,
the nationally minded Ukrainian First Secretary, protest movements
appeared under the banners of anti-russification, equal rights, and
democratization of the republic.1'8  The growth and maturation of
12HELL86, p. 602.
13'In 1956, the Crimean Tatars and Neskhetians were the first nationalities to protest but unlike
Ukraine, they did not appear as potent since they were not a people with a recognized status such as
a republic. (See ALEX85, p. 7)
'"ALEX85, p. 7.
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Ukrainian opposition and complicity of the CPU elites was cut short by the
ouster of Khrushchev and the entrance of Brezhnev and his idea of true
socialism in which there was no room for a Ukraine for Ukrainians even
Communist ones.
The first overt expression of post-war nationalist
feelings came in the 1950's revival of Ukrainian culture which was in part
precipitated by the more open and liberal cultural environments in Eastern
Europe during this period. Western ideas were brought back to Soviet
Ukraine by Ukrainians who traveled abroad at this time as well as by the
increasingly large amount of literature by emigre Ukrainians making its
way into the republic.' 85 The revived interest in Ukrainian folk art and
music and the rehabilitation of 1920-30 era nationalist writers appeared
especially threatening in the wake of the Hungarian uprising."' The
role of the CPU in these affairs was minimal and when Moscow directed a
crackdown in Ukraine in 1965 there was not much resistance.
(3) A New Nationalism. The crackdown of 1965 which was
all-Union in its scope, proved to be crucial in defining the future
national movement in Ukraine and the role intellectual elites would play
in it. The 1965 arrests led many to the conclusion that Moscow was
singling out Ukrainians for the most severe punishment. Chornovil pointed
out at the time that not only did Ukrainians receive stiffer sentences but
that the trials of Russian dissidents (namely Daniel and Sinyavsky) were
public while those of Ukrainians were secret.187 This added yet another
185FAAMBO, p. 82.
ISOFARM , pp. 81-83.
187CH0R68, p. 2.
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layer of disenchantment to the Ukrainian opposition which made it
impossible for them to sit on the fence any longer.
Prior to 1965, Farmer argues that the dividing line
between the "establishment" and the "opposition" in Ukraine was unclear.
The mass arrests of the Brezhnev era changed this by forcing intellectuals
in Ukraine to take a clear stand on one side or the other. After 1965 the
opposition was defined either by the regime (those arrested, jailed, or
black listed) or by the individuals themselves (writing in samvydav and
expressing anti-state views).laa
The first clear indications of this "establishment" -
"opposition" cleavage appeared at this time among younger intellectuals
who were very important because as Farmer writes, "they represent the
first kernel of a deliberate, committed, and self-identified nucleus of
opposition among the mobilized and Soviet-educated generation." 1" They
demonstrated that opposition to Communism could exist in a form of what
their chief representative, the poet Vasyl Symonenko, called "moral
courage."190 Moral courage was first and foremost an individual
sentiment and secondly primarily a sentiment of the intellectual and
cultural elites.
Ukrainian nationalists of the 1960s and 1970s, were
societal elites who, although sharing the same essential motivation as
their WWII era counterparts, namely "the instinct of national survival, or
1WFARNSO, p. 95.
18FARNSO, p. 100.
"10 FARNSO, p. 101 (Symonenko was replaced as symbolic head of the 1960s movement by Noroz in the
late 1960s).
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national preservation," 191  found the battle field to be somewhat
different. The struggle was foremost survival within the existing system;
"National survival, defined in the light of the harsh realities of the
present [1970s], means the preservation of Ukrainian language, culture,
customs, arts, literature, historical ties, religious traditions."1
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These nationalists also imbued the movement with a new set of goals.
Krawchenko's study of dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s
indicates that the majority of claims made were for democratization
(freedoms of thought, expression and the like), followed by protests
against those arrested, and protests against russification.193 Submerged
in these demands was the idea of independence from the binding embrace of
the Soviet State which was in may ways a continuation of the old struggle
against the imperialism of Russia but with a different cast of players and
different strategies. As a result of this "soft" nationalism, the CPU
found itself also attracted to the ideas of increased autonomy and the
opportunity to rule in their own region.
From the 1950s through the early 1970s this struggle
between Russians trying to preserve the empire via assimilation of the
nationalities and Ukrainians renewing their nation was characterized by
two important and consistent themes; a turn away from integral nationalism
and a lack of separatism. These themes were picked up by the Communist as
well as the literary elites in Ukraine. These themes not only defined the




strategies of the movement but also differentiated it from previous
nationalism and set the stage for the revolution of 1990.
In January 1972 the fundamental nature of Ukrainian
opposition began to change as the KGB began arresting Ukrainian political
dissidents. This in itself was not unusual, however, by the time the last
arrest was made this purge had become the largest since Stalin and the CPU
was the target. In May 1972, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian
Communist Party, Shelest, was removed from office and in May 1973 was made
to resign his position in the CPSU Politburo. Accused of fostering
nationalism and a nationalist movement in Ukraine, he was replaced by V.
V. Shcherbitsky and a large purge of local party officials labeled
"nationalists" began. Surveillance and eavesdropping reached new highs
and the ranks of the KGB, especially in Western Ukraine, swelled as they
executed what became known as the "general pogrom Vyacheslav
Chornovil, one of those arrested in Lvov, related the words of a KGB
investigator about the attitudes of the higher KGB officials toward the
purge;
Formerly, we were not getting the right people; we should have been
arresting not those who circulate things, but cut off the head, that
is, those who write things and organize. Now we have done the right
thing--and we shall have peace for a decade or so.
The immediate effect of this decapitation of Ukrainian
opposition was to create a familiar feeling among Ukrainians;
the atmosphere resembled in many respects that of the Stalinist
terror: physical extermination was no longer used and there were far
fewer arrests. Nonetheless, everyone fell under suspicion and the
16Cited in ARRET7n, quoting Vyachestav Chornovii, "My Trial," Index on Censorshi , Vol 5, No. 1,
Spring 1976, p. 76.
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threat of reprisals for a careless word or pcpression of sympathy
toward the wrong people hung over everybody.'
Thus the anticipated revival of Ukraine culture was overnight transformed
into what Dzyuba calls a "strangulated renaissance"'l which signaled the
end to the symbiosis of a nationalist, anti-Stalinist intelligentsia and
a nationally-oriented Communist Party in Ukraine. Not only did the
"general Pogrom" transform an entire generation of young Ukrainian
intelligentsia into "a generation of political prisoners" and inflict
"irreparable damage to the Ukrainian nation and its culture"197 but most
importantly, as Nahaylo argues, it "ended the patriotic protest phase in
Ukrainian dissent." The year 1973 was a turning point at which, as
Krawchenko describes it, Ukrainian "patriotic protest" was transformed in
to a much more powerful "Ukrainian national opposition." 198 From this
point forward dissenters imprisoned as a result of the "general pogrom"
defined themselves as part of a Ukrainian national movement in opposition
to Moscow. 199 The comments of V. Stus who was imprisoned and exiled for
dissent in 1972 reflect this transformation;
Until January 1972 I was a Ukrainophile (I think most of my friends
were of the same hue). Mordovia [KGB prison camp] made me a
Ukrainian. Now I am unperturbed how they label me: a nationalist,
a spy or traitor. I know that my spiritual life and that of my




197V. Stus quoted in NAHA83.
198KRAW83, p. 38.
19NAHA83, p. 38.
2°°V. Stus, "Lyst do pryiatetiv", 29 October 1977, Pohrom b Ukraini, 50 as cited in MANAA, p. 38.
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(4) The Church. Simultaneous with the appearance of
national opposition was the strengthening of church activities which were,
especially ir Ukraine, closely linked with ardent Ukrainian
nationalism.2°1 Armstrong argues that religion was "the most persistent
manifestation of Ukrainian national traditions" during even the difficult
years between 1912 and 1985.z In part, this was due to the continuing
pressure of urbanization which was driving increasing numbers of rural
families to the suburbs and they brought with them their non-Russian
Orthodox beliefs. 2 °3  The significance of this rising adherence to
religion which is so closely linked with the idea of the Ukrainian nation
leads Armstrong to conclude that for the first time eastern Ukraine may
actually be committed to a national movement through the church. 20'
Going even further, Armstrong hints that this may be the key to a future
successful mass movement in Ukraine:
201Religion in the Soviet Union became Linked with nationalism for a variety of reasons but
primarily, because religion was considered hostile to the Soviet regime. As Pedro Ramat portrays it;
"religion is not merely a set of beliefs about a 'world beyond' but also, and perhaps more importantly,
a set of beliefs about how the present world - its law, its authority, its hierarchical relations -
should be organized." (RAIIE89S, p.1) ReLigion's threatening role is manifested in two ways. First,
theocracy as one of the very first forms of government has remained a highly institutionalized threat
to other forms of government. Although this political role has been greatly curbed over time it is
undeniable that churches have retained political power by "adopting a new countance as the guardians
of discrete interests .... " Because the church claim absolute interests it either compels or
discourages the Loyalty of the flock toward the goverrnent. (RAINE89S, p. 4) Second, because of
religion's historical development which has tied the fate of the church to the nation and sometimes the
other way round, there is a link between the church and the nation. Churches have tended to become
national institutions and ethnicity and religion have merged to such a point that one cannot be
eliminated without threatening the other. (RANE89B, pp. 4-5) This merger confronts authorities with
the unpleasant situation of having to deal with the church as a spokesman for the ethnic group.
(RAME89, p. 8) As a result, the Communists have had to approach religion very carefully as they have
attempted the "substitution of a secular religion for a revealed one." (MARK89, p. 138) The sheer
number of religious believers in this atheist state make the task of eliminating religion difficult
enough but when this is combined with nationalism the whole issue threatens to blow up into passionate,
broad-based opposition to the Comunmist regime.
20This trend is not restricted to Ukraine alone. OveraLl, the non-Russians adhere to religions
beliefs more strongly than do Russians which creates the potential for churches to play a national
role. Various sources have placed the percentage of religious believers in the USSR at between 35 for




As an elite manifestation of adherence to Ukrainian traditions,
however, the dissidence of the 1960s and 1970s resembles the
nationalism movement of the Second World War, apart from the West
Ukraine. The small bits of evidence of religious revival, on the
other hand, suggest the persistence of a mass phenomenon which may
perpetuate the tradition of thL5peasant mass as the unconquerable
custodian of national identity.
His prediction was validated out when in the late 1980s and early 1990s as
the Ukrainian churches emerged from the cellars, the Russian church in
Ukraine quickly came under attack.
In response to the rising sentiments associated with
the Millennium of Christianity a number of articles appeared in the
Ukrainian and Soviet Press decrying what they called the "'alarming
phenonomena' of God-seeking and 'God-building'" among youth. First
Secretary Shcherbytsky on 25 March 1987 spoke out against the rise of
religion and called for increased efforts in atheist work and warned of
the linkage between religion and nationalism. 20
Specialists in atheism pointed out that the profile of
the religious believer had changed in an unexpected direction.
Urbanization, instead of creating a totally atheist of society had "simply
replaced the semi-illiterate rural believer with the relatively well-
educated urban believer." This unexpected development was further
supported by the confessions of Ukraine's atheist propaganda group Znannya
[Knowledge] Society which held a meeting in March 1987 during which they
admitted that they were loosing the battle against the rising tide of
religion in Ukraine. Despite the groups 400,000 lectures, 20,500 primary




"restructuring of the peoples' consciousness" was not occurring as
desired. The group's presidium and methodological departments were
reprimanded as were the Society's regional organizations in Kiev, Ivano-
Frankivsk and Sumy. Several members of the leadership were also replaced
at this time.
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To the Communist Party elite in Ukraine at this time,
the revival of the church was simply another indication of the growing
threat to their already shaky post-purge existence. The CPU suffered from
this purge as well as the opposition. The CPU was strongly punished for
looking too Ukrainian and not being sufficiently loyal to the center.
Perhaps more importantly, suddenly Moscow saw that Ukrainian nationalism
was on the rise not only among the population but, certainly more
seriously, among the Party elite themselves.
C. CONCLUSION
Ukrainian nationalism, in addition to the ideological and structural
factors of the Soviet State, served as a very important influence on
Ukrainian elite loyalty to the center. At the root of Ukrainian
nationalism is the myth that Ukraine is a wealth, historic nation which
has been plundered and oppressed by outside invaders - first Russians then
Soviets. Since contemporary Ukrainian nationalism is opposition to what
Moroz calls the "mincing-machine of Russification" 208 and the destruction
of the nation, Ukrainians have a strong call to protest which unavoidably
impacts the reliability of Ukrainians holding leadership positions in
207 SOR87, p. 4.
SJ0NE77, p. 6.
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Ukraine. The worsening of the cultural and economic situation in Ukraine
in the post-WWII era exacerbated the tensions which divided the
consciousness of Ukrainian elites between Communist internationalism and
Ukrainian nationalism.
The following chapter examines the issue of elite reliability in this
nationally charged environment and traces the influence of the powerful
force of the "Ukrainian fact."
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IV. THE LOYALTY PROBLEM
As the extension of Moscow's power in the periphery, the Communist
Party of Ukraine has had a checkered DaSt. Loyalty to Moscow has not been
a great virtue of Ukraine's Communists, and yet since 1918 (with the
exception of the WWII years), Ukraine remained under the shadow of Moscow
without serious deviations or attempts to escape. Although there were
calls for increased autonomy and freedom to pursue national goals, the
demands never went so far as to demand secession from the Soviet state.
In the late 1980's this position came into question as Ukraine's
opposition leaders attempted to ascertain the way which Ukraine's
Communists would lean in the upcoming battle for national independence.
Ivan Drach, speaking at the 1987 Writers Plenum addressed this issue and
placed significant blame for Ukraine's last 15-20 years of stagnation on
the "spineless snob" or the Ukrainian bureaucrat. He argued that, this
unique Ukrainian creation created the repressive atmosphere under which
Ukraine struggled for so many decades. Brach quoted the Turkish poet and
Communist, Nazym Khikmet, who he said accurately described the Ukrainian
bureaucrat's capabilities and success in his remark that "When fingernails
are being trimmed in Moscow, they chop off fingers in Kiev" and Drach
adds, "and we, whose fingers are still aching today might add - 'due to
zealousness' to that statement. So glory to the Ukrainian bureaucrat, our
best production of the last twenty years!.....209
'tuKRA7, pp. 20-21.
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This chapter examines the issue of CPU loyalty in the light of the
previous chapter which detailed the influence of Ukrainian national
consciousness on Ukraine's elites. The argument being that Ukraine's
Communists were fundamentally influenced by the anational fact" as well as
the ideological and structural aspects of the Soviet state and as a result
their loyalty was divided between Kiev and Moscow. This division of
allegiance facilitated the events of 1991 in which Ukraine's ruling elites
came out in support of Ukrainian independence.
To understand how this "taintingn of the CPU happened it is necessary
to go back to the post-WWII era when the CPU was being rebuilt after the
war and Ukrainian Communists were coming to power within the Party.
A. A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM - THE UKRAINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
While the macroscopic view of the Communist elite in the midst of
Ukrainian society provides clear indications of instability within the
Communist Party at the level of theory as well as practice, it seems to be
more difficult to transfer these ideas to the microscopic, or individual
level. However, if we take as a fundamental assumption that the basic
indication of what Berg calls "irregular elite behavior" is the failure of
the Communist elite to act in accordance with the currently accepted
guidelines (usually determined by the current definition of the Marxist
ideology), then we can begin to look for its manifestations.
Berg gives us a starting point by citing the two fundamental sources
of such irregular behavior. 210  The first source is the structural
argument which was outlined in chapter two; namely that elites are moved
2 1 %ERG90, p.2 5 .
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to act "irregularly" because of the conflicting political demands placed
upon them by the system. This conflict provides not only the opportunity
for alternative behavior but also the motivation. The second source is
the declining performance of the decision making bodies within the system.
In the Communist state, as the organs of power were increasingly disabled
by increasingly centralized control, national elites found their avenues
of action further reduced forcing them to act outside the system.
To study this phenomenon of elite behavior it is first necessary to
examine how these elites came to occupy positions of power and how they
acted in those positions in terms of reliability to the central mandates.
Only then can we progress to examining the manifestations of elite
behavior among the Communist Party elite in Ukraine.
1. Ukrainian Communists Come To Power
The primary precondition for Ukrainian ruling elites to take
advantage of a conflicting nationalities policy and federalist structure
came soon after WWII. At this time, Ukrainians achieved domination of the
CPU and Russian control over the day to day operation of the Party began
to slacken.
Khrushchev, seemingly unaware of its potential to backfire,
offered Ukrainians an increased role for national elites in the high
echelons of republican leadership. Simon documents that beginning in the
1950s this resulted in a large number of non-Russians being represented in
211local republic executive Party positions. It appears that Khrushchev
2 1 1In spite of the changes under Khrushchev the non-Russian nations generally had low party
participation and in the 1960s md 1970s the Ukrainians, Syelorussians and Salts experienced pronounced
decreases in mewber-ship. Only by the early 1980s had non-Russian participation increased and
Ukrainians holding party meabership were for the first time in proportion with their population.
(SIM9, pp. 273-4)
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was forced toward this direction by the necessity to replenish Party
membership which hic plummeted during and right after the war. His
ukrainianizati.,, of the local Party rolls was successful; by 1949 almost
half of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was composed of those who had
joined after 1945.212
This shift in the Party rolls gave Ukrainians unheard of
opportunities to rise to higher positions in the Party and after the June
1953 CC CPU plenum, the doors were opened to even the highest posts. Very
quickly the first and second secretary posts were filled by Ukrainians
(Kirichenko and Pidhornyi) and by 1954, Ukrainian presence in the CPU CC
leapt from 62 to 72 percent. 213 In a stunning, reversal of past policy,
from 1955 to 1972, 93 percent of the Ukrainian Politburo was Ukrainian.
Overall, during this period, republican Party members in Ukraine managed
to maintain 75-89 percent of the Party jobs. 21' Even more significantly,
the majority of these new Ukrainian party elites were from the less
russified oblasts of Ukraine and thus were "far more influenced by the
Ukrainian fact." 215 A surprising 13 percent of the CPU total membership
was composed of Western Ukrainians. 216
2. The CPU Is Reigned In
The sporadic concessions and permissiveness of the Khrushchev
administration came to an abrupt end when Brezhnev came to power and
212KRAWS5, p. 243 see also DMYT56, pp. 239-242 for more details on party cowposition during this
time.
213KRAW85, p. 2".




refused to concede any more authority to the republican leadership and
purged Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest in May 1972. During subsequent
purges, Shelest and his administration were decried for their
"unprincipled tolerant attitude on the part of individual leading cadres
toward manifestations of national limitedness and localism."
217
The purge of Shelest and the CPU slowed, but did not stop, the
turn toward increased autonomy for the CPU. As Krawchenko writes,
with the fall of Shelest, autonomism as a movement within the CPU
suffered a major setback. But since conditions that gave rise to it
have not changed, its re-emergence within the CPU remains part of the
historical agenda.
In this atmosphere, Shcherbytsky, who replaced Shelest as First
Secretary, proved a reliable representative of the CPSU in Ukraine.
However, the transition from Shelest to Shcherbytsky was a drawn out
process which has led some scholars such as Yaroslav Bilinsky to speculate
that Shcherbytsky experienced difficulties in consolidating his power over
Ukraine. 219  Another conclusion drawn from this lengthy transition is
that of Grey Hodnett who suggests that the problem which the CPSU was
attempting to root out was bigger than Shelest and his network. This
process of purging may in fact have included other campaigns, or may have
reflected difficulties implementing new policies or even factiunalism in
the CPU. 220  These theories are supported not only by the prolonged
21?New Ukrainian first secretary Shcherbytsky's speech during the ApriL 1975 CPU CC PLenum as
quoted in KRAW85, p. 249.
216KRAW85, p. 250.
21See Y. Bitinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine after 1966," in Ukraine in the Seventies, pp.
239-266.
220Hodnett quoted in SOLC83, pp. 8-9.
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series of purges after Shelest but by the subsequent purging of some
officials who conducted the original purge.Z2
B. A POLITICAL ACTION PROBLEM -IRREGULAR BEHAVIOR
Ukrainian elites, under the pressures of the structural problem
addressed above began, with increasing strength, to display irregular
behavior. This behavior was centered on issues of culture, economics, and
ecology and in each, there were manifested demands for increased autonomy.
1. Culture
Frustrations with the structural conflicts of the Soviet system
and Ukrainian desires for autonomy first appeared as a growing gap between
the intellectual elite and the Party, as well as between Ukrainian Party
elites and their Moscow counterparts on the issue of culture and language.
In fact, overall, the role of the CPU in cultural matters in Ukraine did
much to alienate the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1960s and 1970s. For
example, Krawchenko shows in great detail that the desires of the
U~rainian public were deliberately ignored as Moscow deliberately
attempted to elimindte Ukrainian language publications. He cites the
publication of newspapers as a good example that Moscow deliberately
disregarded the desires of Ukrainians. In 1971, 70 percent of all
newspaper titles and 68 percent of the circulation was claimed by
Ukrainian language papers. In Kharkiv and Dniperpetrovs'k the evening
papers were published only in Ukrainian up until 1972 which demonstrates
that even in the Russified regions the demand for Ukrainian publications
was quite well established. The all-union agency soiuspechat' was accused
21See S0LC83, pp. 8-9.
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of systematically suppressing the publication and distribution of
Ukrainian language newspapers and readers continually complained of short
supply. 2
22
Ukrainians and an increasingly Ukrainianized republican elite
fought to reverse the centralized policies toward literature and language
and until the purge of Shelest in 1972, they were remarkably successful.
Their efforts to preserve Ukrainian literature and language were part of
a more global strategy of preserving the Ukrainian nation. To the
intellectuals, it was rapidly become apparent that Soviet policy toward
Ukraine during this era was threatening the very existence of their
nation. As Jones and Yasen summarize this policy;
The harsh treatment of Ukrainian writers and artists must be
interpreted as nothing less than an expedient Stalinist approach to
liquidating the leading Ukrainian c,*eative intellig¶otsia and thereby
accelerating the destruction of Ukrainian culture.
In this way, language functioned as a symbol of a larger struggle
and not the key struggle itself and as Krawchenko argues, the Ukrainian
political, as well as intellectual elites selected language as a symbol to
gain access and control over society. 24 This is easily obscured because
this elite competition and struggle for control is often less tangible
than is the status of language. Connor supports this view by observing
that economics, language, religion are often not primary factors in a
nationalist struggle although they are often presented as the causes since
they are more tangible than national consciousness.22 Language was in





many ways a cover for other underlying sentiments which were more
dangerous to the state.
2. Economics
More so than the visible issue of language, however, the issue
of economics seemed to elicit 'irregular" behavior among regional elites
in Ukraine. 226 For those in power in Ukraine, economics were a source
of much frustration and growing alienation from the center. The problem
was simply that in the field of economics, the powerlessness of the CPU
and the Kiev government was impossible to hide. Political leaders, as
well as followers came to the same conclusion that Gordijew and Koropeckij
reach, namely that Ukraine's economic deficiencies
could have been eliminated or at least ameliorated if the Kiev
government had a freer hand in pursuing economic policies of its own
choosing. As it is, that government has continuously had to
subordinate the interests of the Ukrainian economy to those of the
USSR.
This subordination created a lever by which the Ukrainian Party
elite could begin to access popular support and through which they began
to exhibit increasingly "irregular" behavior.
220hAile the connection between economics and nationatism is hotly contested, the example of
Ukraine seems to indicate that there is a relationship between the two. Namely, along the Lines of
Greene, who in his study of comparative revolution, is careful to point out that nationalism's role in
revolution or social movements is not necessarily that of a precipitator but mr're that of a sustaining
force. He notes that even where the potential for nationalist appeal is strong, the revolution or the
movement itself is usually triggered by less noble concerns such as unemployment, Lack of social
mobility, education and the like. Thus he concludes that the role of ideology in revolutionary
movements is to reinforce rather than to create the conditions which facilitate cross-ctass alliances
and mobilization. (GREES4, pp. 102-103) This seems to apply to Ukraine where issues of russificstion
(and economic results of it) seemed to be the key concerns about which nationalism coalesced. It is
also interesting to note that cross-class alliances in Ukraine (to include cross-nationality alliances
between Russians in Ukraine and Ukrainians) were formed, certainty not by nationalism, but by common
economic aid environmental concerns. Nationalism was important in that it initially established the
boundaries of the problem as an anti-center issue which had a welt rooted treditional appeal to
Ukrainians of many classes. It transcended this appeal however, and cme to attract even those
Russians who lived in Eastern Ukraine's Donbas.
rGRMD81, p. 291.
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a. Exploitation as a Focal Point
To Ukrainians, both in the government and outside it, the
idea of economic exploitation was powerful because it struck a resonance
with a long standing aspect of the national myth, namely, that Ukraine is
inherently a rich country and if only it could throw off their oppressor
Ukrainians could prosper. As a result, the issue of economic exploitation
has played a long and important role in the history of Ukrainian attitudes
toward the center under the Tsar and under Communists.
Ukrainian claims that they have paid considerable
opportunity costs for their present institutional arrangement, have been
denied by Soviet sources who point to the unparalleled economic benefits
of being a member of the USSR. Some Western sources have also tended to
discredit the notion that Ukraine has sufft P oconomic ill as a result of
its membership in the USSR. For example, Richard Pipes, writes;
Statistical computations purporting to show that Russia withdraws
more wealth from the national republics than it puts into them are
not convincing, because they usually do not take into account the
cost of administration and defense which these republics would have
to bear if they were independent. They are indeed no more realistic
than Marxist statistics adduced to show imperialistic exploitation of
colonies by capitalist countries.
228
However, Gordijew and Koropeckyj, both economists specializing in the USSR
and Eastern Europe, conclude that Ukraine's claims of exploitation are in
fact justified. 2z Schroeder's economic statistics also prove this
228Richard Pipes, quoted in GORD81, p. 295, footnote 71. Pipes ignores the fact that most
countries do not expend such a large percentage of GNP on defense and that in the case of Ukraine, this
heavy burden was compounded by a central planing system not found in most other countries.
22See GORD81.
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thesis of disproportional extraction of national wealth and investment in
Ukraine.
2 30
Ukraine's contributions to industrialization under both the
Tsar and the Communists has been significant and Ukraine has for a long
time supported a great portion of the USSR defense capability.23'
Furthermore, Gordijew and Koropeckyj argue that "there is no doubt that
the Ukraine experienced continuous and significant loss of its national
income to other parts of the USSR."0- Gordijew and Koropeckyj conclude
that "there is no doubt that the Ukraine experienced continuous and
significant loss of its national income to other parts of the USSR." The
post-war economic policies placed Ukraine in what Solovei called the
"scissors of colonialism" in which "in every significant sector of
industry, Ukraine's share of all-Union production declined, whereas
Russia's share increased." 2 33
This loss of national income reduced both consumption and
investment in Ukraine. These unfavorable trends, combined with Moscow's
refusal to compensate Ukraine for its higher than average labor
productivity, meant a continual downward slide for the Ukrainian
econk';,y. 234 Economic growth was fueled primarily by growth of the labor
230SCHR90, pp. 43-71.
2 1 GORD81, p. 295.
232GORD81, p. 296. According to various sources cited in Gordijew and Koropeckyj, the difference
between the national income which Ukraine produced annually and that which was utilized in Ukraine
annuaLly vary between 10 and 20 percent of Ukraine's NNP. A 1977 study conducted by University of
Cincinnati professor of finance Zenon L. Metnyk showed that 20 percent of Ukraine's national income was
transferred to other regions of the USSR. (Study cited in DIUK90, p. 50) For comparison; the transfer
of industrial profits from Lithuania to a combination of the ALL-Union budget and the ALL-Union
ministries in 1988 were put at 55%. (BELK90, p. 638)
233As quoted in KRAW85, p. 248 (Ftn 364).
ZMGORD81, p. 297.
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force rather than by the influx of capital which has made the Ukrainian
economy labor intensive and thus, less able to introduce and adapt to new
technology. Gordijew and Koropeckyj conclude their study of Ukraine's
economic role in the USSR by saying that Ukraine has indeed suffered as a
result of the last 70 years of centralized, socialist economic direction:
There is little doubt that the present political status of the
Ukraine makes it the object of planning objectives that subordinate,
and therefore sacrifice, the interest of its residents for the
achievement of aims of a much larger agglomeration. This much has
been recognized-however grudgingly, even by Soviet economists.23
Even if feelings of economic exploitation by the center were not
justified, the mere fact that they exist among such a wide spectrum of
society in Ukraine make these feelings significant in defining relations
between Ukraine and the center.
The importance of having local control of Ukraine's economy
became evident in the post-1965 era when the centralization of economic
corntrol was strengthened. In the 1950s and early 1960s the power of
Ukrainian authorities to make their own economic policy was great and the
economy was very efficiently managed. From 1965 on, especially after the
new Soviet Constitution was introduced in 1978, efficiency plummeted as a
direct result of the "virtual elimination of any lingering elements of
separateness of the national economies of individual Union republics." 2M
This problem was highlighted by a growing fuel shortage in Ukraine in the
1970s and 1980s despite the fact that Ukraine exports coal and natural gas
to other republics. The shortages could have been eliminated by
decreasing Ukraine's energy exports but Moscow, instead, ordered Ukraine
25GORD81, p. 298.
2 3 6 0RD81, p. 291.
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to import oil from the RSFSR to make up the deficits. Not only was this
inadequate to eliminate the shortages but when the Ukrainian leadership
demanded increased energy development in Ukraine their requests were
denied.2 7
As it was, the republican leadership presided over an
increasingly ailing economy suffering from severe structural and regional
economic imbalances. Under such circumstances it is not difficult to see
how the ruling political elite came to resent central control and strive
for national autonomy.
b. The Economic Status of Ukraine in the Gorbachev Era
With Gorbachev in the Kremlin it appeared that economically
there was hope for Ukraine. Gorbachev was advocating increased
productivity and local economic authority but progress was slow,
especially in Ukraine. There is, as Seweryn Bialer notes, a particular
social rule in the Soviet system that requires that economic reform not
begin with the economic system but with the political systemm in which
ironically, the root of the problem lay.
Despite symbolic economic reform at the "Frunze" machine-
tool factory which began in 19852 9 , reform came slowly to Ukraine. The
economic reforms under Gorbachev were tentative and half-measures which
encouraged various regions and republics to seek out new economic methods
and strategies. In this economic free for all, as Donna Bahry points out,
2 7 GORD81, p. 292.
23As Quoted in KRAW89, p. 7.
23See MARP9, p. 2.
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"the geography of reform has been uneven." 2 0  The unevenness was a
function, Bahry argues, of "differences in regional leaders' commitment
and political capacity" to execute such reforms. In Ukraine, the delay of
reform was a function of Soviet desire to keep a tight reign on Ukraine.
Under Shcherbytsky, economic reform occurred slowly and only in accord
with the center's desires. After Shcherbytsky's ouster in 1989, economic
reforms began to take on a more republican nature in Ukraine.
However, as regional leaders began to demand their share of
all-Union funds and resources from the various ministries in order to fuel
their local economic enterprises they began to realize that they had
little capability to act. The loss of alcohol tax revenue and the
transfer of control over coal mines, geological services, and metallurgy
industries to the center in 1987 had greatly reduced the amount of lecal
funds for local industry.241 Marples claims that prior to the republican
declaration of sovereignty, Ukraine, in spite of supposed reforms,
controlled only 5 percent of its own industry and resources.242 Economic
progress was dismal under perestroika; by 1988 less than 50 percent of
Ukrainian industry had even started to move toward self-financing and
accounting which was to have been completed by 1989, agricultural
production was plummeting, coal output was suffering from lack of capital
inflow and thus self-financing was producing no effect; the construction
industry was in shambles with shortages and unbelievably long completion




times as a result.2' 3  In 1991 the Ukrainian journal Demokratychna
Ukraina (30 October) announced that the GNP of Ukraine had fallen by 8
percentZ2, industrial productivity had decreased by 4.7 percent, only
80% of last years gain yield had been collected and prices were continuing
to rise. 24
5
The central system of allocation of goods soon came under
criticism as the economic situation worsened and Moscow's control over the
direction of economic transactions was quickly challenged and
subverted. The cries for territorial economic autonomy increased rapidly
and Gorbachev's foot-dragging in this area in 1989 encouraged local
republican Party leaders further and further toward localism or
republicanism with their goals set on the welfare of their republic rather
than on the Union itself. Moscow's demands and directives were now
routinely being ignored with no reprisals.
As a result of the general failure of the economy, the
average citizen's economic well-being was increasingly jeopardized which
rapidly politicized him in a way no amount of lecturing by intellectuals
on the need to revitalize the Ukrainian language and culture had been able
to do. Due to declining agricultural production, food consumption levels
fell, and continued to fall, below recommended norms. 2" Wages in
Ukraine were "considerably" lower than in the RSFSR, Byelorussia, or the
243MARP91, p. 7.
24Radio Kiev on 4 November reported a decrease of 7 percent. (See Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1,
No. 20, November 1991, p. 4.
24Jkrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 20, november 1991, p. 6.
24 ARP91, p. 5.
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Baltics. 2 47 Approximately 14 percent of the population was in "extreme"
need of housing a,,d general housing shortages increased in spite of
programs to ameliorate the demand as the number of newly constructed
apartments in Ukraine actually decreased by 5 percent in 1990.24" In
1991 the number of Ukrainians waiting for State-owned apartments reached
2.6 million and today one out of every four urban families in Ukraine is
waiting for an apartment.249  Power production stagnated in 1990 and
rationing and outages began in 1990.250 As Ukrainian sources indicated
for the period 1986-1987, 45 percent of the Ukrainian population was
living below the poverty line (125 R/month) primarily due to inflation
outstripping wage increases. 25 1
Under these circumstances, Marples classifies Ukrainian
society into three economic groups: the fairly well-off who have nothing
on which to spend their salaries; the middle group (31 percent of the
population); and a much larger poor stratum whose standard of living was
continually decreasing. 22
c. Economic Issues and CPU Aspirations
In the area of economics, the CPU was especially iulnerable
to "irregular behavior." Rukh candidate Pohribnyi, campaigning in March
1990 as a member of the opposition while still a Party member stressed the
247 ARP91, p. 9.
24AaARP9I, p.9, and Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 15, August 1991, p. 6.
24WUkrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 15, August 1991, p. 6.
'M°ARP91, p. 10.
2510. Noskvin, Anatiz tendentsii zminy riva zhYtta nasetelnya USSR, Ekonomika Radyans'koi
Ukrainy, No. 2, 1990, pp. 13-21 cited in MARP91, p. 11.
2Wt1RP91, pp. 10-11.
107
fact that not only does a large sector of the CPU want sovereignty for
Ukraine but that the key issue in the struggle for Ukraine's future is
first and foremost an issue of economic control.
The Ukrainian SSR should have jurisdiction over its natural,
economic, culturaland other resources. This is a question of
sovereignty.... We are totally dependent in all areas. We live in
a monopolized state. I don't know of any analogies that one could
draw where everything is so centralized. We would like this to be a
Ukrainian Republic,...aAI rainian state that would have jurisdiction
over all its resources."•
He goes on to provide an example of the ridiculous proportions centralized
planing has reached in Ukraine;
You know that in our country sugar is rationed. When there is not
enough sugar we get it from abroad.... Last year the per capita
production of sugar in Ukraine was 160 kilograms. This is a great
deal of sugar; one could get buried under all that sugar. 2
He calls for the right to be able to cover domestic need and sell the rest
to whom and at what price the producers see fit. He concludes,
What do we need sovereignty for? Not to be up to our necks in sugar
but to have normal relations, contractual relations. At present
there is only draining, drainins, and draining, and as a result some
terribly unjust things happen.
Pohribnyi reflects the idea that Ukraine could be rich if
it were not for the exploitation and plundering by the Soviet system - a
historic legend which some argue is just that - a legend. But none the
less, Ukraine's political elites were greatly influenced by this idea of




2it was not only the elites which began to be influenced by the ideas of economic
exploitation and deprivation. A survey of public opinion printed in the 31 October 1991, issue of
Vechirnyi Kiev noted that the min reason for the mss support of the declaration of sovereignty was
economic and ecological. Mearty 79 percent of respondents indicated that their reason for
supporting independence was "quicker to cLi.b out of the economic crisis.0 At 62 and 60 percent
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Dissatisfaction with the declining economic status of
Ukraine made the CPU a target for opposition forces while the
disadvantageous central economic policies inevitably drew additional lines
of battle between the center and the periphery. As the CPU came under
attack it was unavoidable that Moscow would become the target of Kiev's
dissatisfaction as was evident during a 15 September 1991 mass meeting in
Kiev at which a banner appeared next to St. Sophia's cathedral reading
"Kiev versus Moscow!"2 7 This pitting of Ukrainians against the CPU and
against the center was no longer an elite phenomenon. Tragedies such as
the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station (AES) in April 1986
served as a powerful symbol of CPU and central incompetence and
callousness and was an early catalyst for the process of political
mobilization among all Ukrainians.
3. Ecology
When the impossible happened at Chornobyl and an explosion spread
radioactive material over a large portion of Ukraine and Byelorussia in
1986, the Party was faced with more than an ecological crises. The most
critical problem was how to handle the accident in an increasingly open
society. The Kremlin decided absolute secrecy was the best approach but
unlike in earlier years, Chornobyl's impact was international and soon
Gorbachev was faced with having to tell the truth. Not only did this
respectively the issues of increased standard of Living and improved ecological status of the cities
were the next most common reasons. Among Ukraine's youth dissatisfaction with the economy is even
greater. A poll of youth prior to the coup pubilished in Zelenyi Svit (September 1991) revealed that
after the April 1991 price rises, 80% of youth were living below the 260-290 RubLe/mo minimum
allowance. When asked how Long they would be witting to wait for change, only 3% said over 10
years, 201 are witting to wait 2-3 years, and 70% said they cannot wait any Longer. (Ukrainian
Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 17, September 1991, p. 6).
7 Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 18, October 1991, p. 8.
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expand the limits of glasnost'" but it fueled an ecological movement
which quickly became a focus for political activism.
a. The Chornobyl Fallout
Although the real story about Chornobyl may yet to be
revealed, when the basic facts about Chornobyl began to come to light in
Ukraine in 1987, it suddenly became, as the Byelorussian Chornobyl relief
worker Olga Korbut described it, *a 20th Century Calvary" for those
effected by the accident.29 The Chornobyl incident had a tremendous and
multiform impact on Ukrainian society.
The incident provided a focus for opposition groups and
turned their sights directly toward Moscow at whose feet they lay the
responsibility for the accident and its subsequent mishandling. The
accident broadened the range of opposition from cultural to ecological,
economic, and social issues and greatly expanded the base of support from
a small group of intellectual elites to the whole of Ukrainian society
(including Russians and other minorities). The incident also highlighted
the ineffectiveness and complete subordination of the CPU to the center
and undermined the credibility of the Party among Ukrainians.
To the opposition forces, Chornobyl was a major turning
point and previously "middle of the road" elites were radicalized and
pushed toward the opposition platform. As an example of this process,
less than one and a half months after Chernobyl, the Writers' Union of
Ukraine at their 9th Congress tied ecology to more general problems in the




Oles' Honchar, set the tone by identifying the Chernobyl incident as a
mandate for Ukraine's writers to show increased civic action and live up
to the needs of the country. He talked not only about the need to protect
the environment but leapt into the controversial topic of preserving the
Ukrainian Language and culture.
26
These themes were echoed a month later at the Soviet
Writers' Congress in Moscow during which participants expressed an anti-
russification sentiment and demanded more say in the running of their own
republican governments. The explosion of sentiment was, in the words of
Nahaylo and Swoboda, "the most forthright and comprehensive expression of
grievances and demands voiced at any official forum since the 1920s."261
In 1990 an informal ecological association called Green
World (Zelenyi Svit) was formed and in 1991 the Ukrainian Green Party
(Partiya Zelnykh) arose from this group under the leadership of the writer
and physician Yuriy Shcherbak who later became Ukraine's Minister of the
Environment. Their mission as described by Dr. Preobrazhenska, is "to
defend the innate right of the individual, the right to life [because] in
my country, the Soviet government does not adhere to this principle." 26
This group in conjunction with the parliamentary Chornobyl Committee, has
effectively led protests against the Chornobyl coverup and more generally,
the Soviet Energy Program in Ukraine. In June 1991 they claimed a
membership of 500,000 in Ukraine. A number of smaller, less well
organized groups also sprang up around the issue of nuclear energy. For
2W°NAHA89, p. 2"4.
2 1 NANA89, p. 245.
2W LEW91A, p. 9.
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example, at Kiev University in the Winter of 1987 a group calling
themselves "The Perestroika Club" called for Ukraine to be declared a
nuclear free zone. 20
b. The Widening of Protest
Although the immediate reaction of Chornobyl was
ecologically oriented, its impact rapidly began to be felt in other parts
of Ukrainian society. By early 1987 it was becoming popular in the
Ukrainian press to write of an "ecology of the spirit" and the similar-
ities between the linguistic and the environmental situation.
2
"
Ecological damage was equated to moral rot internal to Ukraine and was an
issue which Iurii Mushketyk, the head of the Union, used to illustrate how
Ukraine's writers contributed to Ukraine's downfall by writing nothing but
praise for the construction of new dams, factories, and power plants. "It
was we," he said, "who glorified the construction of the Chornobyl'
nuclear power plant." 265  Such complicity led to media coverage which
ignored the problems of Chernobyl and the explosion there in 1986 and
actually encouraged people to engage in activities which exposed them to
great harm. Mushketyk continues,
We, naturally, knew nothing about this, because the period to the
breakdown of radioactive iodine was also the period of the downfall
of the morality of some of our top leaders. The press, television,
and radio are all within our domain. We did not know, have not
learned and still do not know how to live in a way that is
consistent with a policy of hlasnist' [glasnost]. 266
2e•UPA, No. 4, 22 January 1988.
2This is a revival of Honchar's analogy made in his 1968 Sobor and one which he, himseltf revived
during the 9th Congress of the Writer's Union of Ukraine in June 1986. (PAVL87, p. 7)
2 60ne critical article was written on the subject by Liubov Kivatevs'ka, editor of the Local
Prypitat' paper, and which was published in Literaturna Ukroina on 27 March 1986.
2aSUKRA87, p. 13.
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Chernobyl also widened the scope of opposition demands by
turning Ukrainian opposition forces on the center. Chernobyl became a
powerful emotional and political issue not so much because of the 7-10,000
casualties and unknown others suffering the effects of the accident, but
because it was cast in the light of Ukraine suffering due to the
incompetence of Moscow. For example Dr. Marples in his analysis of the
Green Party mentions and slipports the allegation that then Ukrainian First
Secretary, Shcherbytsky, wanted on 10 May 1986 to evacuate the city of
Kiev which is less than 70 miles from Chornobyl and was stopped from doing
so by Gorbachev who called him "panicker." 267 Under Moscow's directive,
the three Chornobyl reactors continued to operate until 1991 when the
Ukrainian parliament ordered them stopped. 26"
All in all, the Chernobyl incident highlighted the fact that
Ukrainians were pawns of Moscow and a growing number of Ukrainians began
to draw the conclusion that, as one opposition leader put it; "The people
of Ukraine have been the victims of a totalitarian system where all of us
are ecological prisoners."
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The scope of opposition demands was widened still further
by the Green Party's successful linkage of Moscow's economic program to
the powerful political and moral issue of Chornobyl. Dr. Shcherbak has
tied the impact of Chornobyl to the industrial pollution in Ukraine by
27 MARP91D, p. 2.
saaUkraine managed to secure an agreement with Moscow to take over nuclear plants on its territory
in July 1991 and voted in August to shut down the AES by 1995. However, the Green Movement achieved
a great vitctory on 29 October 1991 when the Ukrainian parliament voted to shut down the AES no Later
than 1993. In doing so the Partiment issued an appeal to the UN citing its "responsibility to the
world coumunity" for help in shutting down the plant and dealing with the failed reactor problem and
dealing with the Linger problems of 1986.
MPRE091, p. 8.
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declaring Ukraine a "zone of ecological catastrophe," a claim which the
Ukrainian government itself adopted in 1991 as it began to separate itself
from Moscow. 270  Chernobyl and the lingering 'nroblems of 1986 were seen
as a symbol of what the opposition referred to as "the greatest
techogenetic global catastrophe in human history, which revealed to the
whole world to what fatal limits we have approached as a result of an
unprecedented growth in the capacity of industry, generated by the
mil itary-industrial complex." 27
The Chornobyl accident not only focused and magnified
opposition efforts and exposed the powerlessness of the CPU, it undermined
the credibility of the entire Soviet system which allowed this accident to
happen and then bungled the cleanup and impeded aid to the suffering.
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The complicity of the government and Communist Party leadership was
supported by the belated realization that while Soviet officials were
encouraging residents of Kiev to come out into the streets to celebrate
the annual May Day holiday despite the radioactive cloud from Chornobyl
which hung over the city, their own children and wives were being
hurriedly evacuated from the fall-out zone. 27
In summary, the roots of Ukrainian Party elite disaffection
with the center were founded on a structural contradiction between the
"
270MARP91D, p. 2.
271LAPY91B, p. 12. There are many areas of vast ecological destruction in Ukraine. The majority
of them are in Eastern Ukraine in the most heavily industrialized and russified parts of Ukraine. In
the Oniprodzerzhynske region, for example, not only are there Large chemical plants but also a uranium





promise of power and the subsequent denial of that power. The Ukrainian
elite were in a position to voice their frustrations because of the
important role they play in the CPSU as well as their large ethnic share
in the CPU. The question of reliability, often incorrectly analyzed,
clearly indicates that the tendency for these elites is to pursue their
local interests with the desire to rule themselves over their republic.
These factors result in 'irregular* behavior most clearly manifested in
continuing cultural conflict but more strongly in protest of economic
policies of the center which robbed the republican elites of any real
control in Ukraine. Feelings of exploitation grew stronger as the economy
in the USSR slowed further and the myth that Ukraine could be a great and
wealthy land continued to operate in the background promising to the CPU
elite an even more powerful position if they could just get control of the
Ukrainian economy. In such a polarized environment the struggle was
clearly between Ukraine's Party and governmental elites and those in
Moscow. Chernobyl and its political fallout added to these other
pressures and magnified and intensified opposition demands and
simultaneously undermined the CPU and drove a wedge between Ukraine and
Moscow.
C. CONCLUSION
The elite loyalty problem was one of the main aspects of the Soviet
nationality problem throughout the history of the state. Loyalty in the
Soviet periphery has been most fundamentally swayed by the rise of
national consciousness which divided the loyalty of peripheral elites
between their national group and the Soviet State.
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As Ukrainian history shows, the level and intensity of national
consciousness and thus degradation of loyalty to the center, varies with
time. For example, although Ukraine entered the 20th century with low
levels of consciousness it rose sharply, although insufficiently, in 1917.
National consciousness began to rise again in the 1930s but there simply
wasn't time to mobilize and develop national consciousness sufficiently to
overcome the integral and external hurdles to nation-building. After
WWII, however, the development of national consciousness developed in a
fundamentally different way and civic consciousness replaced ethic
consciousness. This change of direction quickly became manifested in
political opposition and in individual dissent.
National consciousness impinged upon every Ukrainian in some way or
another and it was clear by the 1960s that not even the Communist elites
were exempt from such influences. In reaction to Shelest's overt leaning
toward the path which national consciousness indicated, Moscow reinstated
severe repression in an attempt to stem the growth of Ukrainian national
consciousness. Like before, this worked for a while but irregular
behavior was not totally eliminated.
The tendency for Ukrainian Party elites to pursue republican over all-
Union interests was as much a result of their cultural-political heritage
as it was the contradicc'as of the Communism system. This "irregular"
behavior was manifested primarily in the area of economics. There was a
concerted and continuous effort on behalf of Ukraine's Communist elites to
achieve economic autonomy under Shelest and even after his replacement
this tendency was difficult to stop. It seemed, more than anything to be
motivated by feelings of exploitation by the center and these feelings
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continued to grow in the 1970s and 1980s as the Soviet economy stagnated
and began to decline. Increased demands for resources and the shift from
distribution to redistribution led to sharpened conflicts between Moscow
and Kiev. Gorbachev's arrival to the Kremlin in 1985 did little to
resolve these underlying causes of increasingly "irregular" behavior among
Ukraine's Party leadership.
The future of relations between the center and the periphery were
increasingly being shaped by what Moscow saw as non-acceptable behavior
both by opposition forces within and outside the Party. The Ukrainian
Party was severely reigned in under the leadership of Shcherbytsky and
ironically was thus less prepared to survive in a world of opposition.
Clearly, being aligned closely to the center, as Shcherbytsky's mandate
demanded, was neither good for Ukraine nor the Ukrainian Communist Party
which was increasingly driven apart from its supposed constituency which
began to oppose the center with increasing voracity.
Underlying the CPU's "irregular" behavior was a motivation for
autonomy and to be rulers in their own kingdom without central
interference. This motivation resurfaced in 1989 and came to be a
fundamental influence on the course of the CPU leadership from 1989
forward. This course of events is the focus of the following chapters.
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V. PRELUDE TO TRANSITION - AN INTRODUCTION TO PART II
This chapter introduces the second half of this paper which focuses
on what happened when the ideological and structural contradictions of the
Soviet state mixed with increasing Ukrainian national consciousness in an
atmosphere of social, political, and economic tension in the late 1980s.
When these tensions began to reach a critical climax, Gorbachev's reform-
minded administration adopted radical policies to meet these crises and in
so doing, began a process of deconstruction which eventually destroyed the
Soviet Union. The rapid pace of events and the weakening of the Party in
the rarified atmosphere of impending collapse in the late 1980s make this
an excellent era for studying the ideological and structural
contradictions of the Communist systems and the influences of non-Russian
nationalism on elite loyalty.
The roots of the crisis which the USSR faced in the 1980s lay in the
social, political, and economic collapse of the state. There is a Polish
joke which aptly summarizes the crisis in which the Soviet Union found
itself in 1989; namely without ideological or forceful means to prevent
its own collapse from within.
An older man ventures to buy meat. A long line has already formed,
people waiting for the meat to arrive. The delivery is not coming;
the people are getting impatient. The man begins to swear: at the
leader, at the party, at the system. Another man approaches him and
remarks pointing to his head: 'You know comrade, if you said things
like this in the old days, we would just go "paf" and it would be all
over.' The old man returns home empty handed. His wife asks: 'They
have no more meat?' 't 1is worse than that,' the man replies, they
have no more bullets.'th
27 PRZE91, p. 22.
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This was a crisis of vast proportions - economic, social, moral, and
ideological. The key question became how could these problems be fixed,
or more precisely, how can Communism be reformed?
As it turned out, Communism could not be reformed, it could only be
destroyed. Communism, and the Party were destroyed from the outside but
not before the Party was weakened on the inside. While Gorbachev played
a fundamental, leading role in this weakening process, republican elites
accelerated and maintained the process by reverting to "irregular" or
nationally-based behavior.
The purpose of this second half of this study is to apply the
theoretical and practical background from the preceeding chapters to the
nationalization of the CPU from 1988-1991. The argument flows from the
preceding chapters, namely that Ukraine's communist elites chose the
national path rather than the Soviet one because of the pull of their
national consciousness and their desire to maintain power. The changes in
the CPU, were in part initiated in the CPU by members more influenced by
their national consciousness. Pressures from above and below contributed
to the decline of Party power and legitimacy forcing even those not
nationally inclined to find the Ukraine path more promising than the one
laid out by Moscow.
To begin this final part of this paper it is necessary to set out the
situation facing the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev's response
to it, and the resulting environment in Ukraine prior to 1988.
A. THE SOVIET DILEMMA
In many senses, the situation facing the Kremlin in 1985 was one
driven by external pressures. For example, Mikhail Heller cites the
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revolutionary transformation of the 20th century world from industrial to
information societies as responsible for this collapse of the Soviet
Empire. The USSR was unable to make this transition without destroying
itself because the free access to information would *break the magic
circle which imprisons the Soviet people.027 And yet if the
transformation could not be made, the USSR's superpower status would begin
to rapidly erode and without the legitimacy of this status as a protector
of the people, the masses would see that their years of deprivation in the
name of national pride were no longer required. 27'
On the other hand, the situation in which Gorbachev found himself in
as he took power in 1985 was nothing new. Gorbachev, argues Vera Tolz, in
announcing in 1986 that Soviet society must be changed was merely
acknowledging a fait accompli. As she argues, Gorbachev was merely
acknowledging a process of change begun from below in the 1960s.2"
This process of change was to eventually lead to destruction of the
Communist system because of both internal and external factors. Leon Aron
summarizes the collapse of the Soviet Union by identifying three
contributing influences, which he calls "bunt factors" after the Russian
word for rebellion. These three factors have been active in every major
revolution in the Soviet (Russian) empire since 1861 are at work




"TOLZ9O, p. 6-7. In Ukraine this process from below began in the 1960s
under Khrushchev and continued into Brezhnev's era. Thus the saying




which is today manifested in the banishment of the Communist Party and
mass rejection of communist symbols as well as institutions. The second
is "impoverishment of the population" which is manifested both in terms of
food shortages and in a larger way the utter collapse of the central
economy. The final factor is "military defeat" which at the time Aron was
writing, appeared to be the defeat in Afghanistan but now seems to have
been the loss of the cold war.
However, this approach is inadequate by itself; as Gale Stokes points
out, the unpredictable events were the result of "moral rot as least as
much as of economic or political failure." 27 What happened in Eastern
Europe an the USSR was a moral revolution; an outright rejection of the
humiliation and moral disgust which characterized the ruling regimes.
This unanticipated and unpredictable moral aspect of the revolutions of
1989 and 1990 provided the emerging national movements with a much needed
vitality.
While the debate over what it was which actually failed in 1991 will
no doubt continue for many years, it is sufficient to say that what
happened in 1992 was an implosion of what Malia calls the "idiocratic
partocracy." 28 By this he implies that 1991 was the end of both an
ideology and a system of political power.
This implosion was swift and bloodless because as Przeworski noted
about Eastern Europe,
Party bureaucrats had nothing to say to defend their power. They
were simply mute: they did not speak about socialism, progress,
future, prosperity, rationality, equality, the working class. They
2 7 STOK91, p. 20.
2%°4ALI92, p. 93.
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only calculated how many thousands of people they could beat up if
they persevered, how many ministerial posts they would have to yield
if they conpromised, how many jobs they could retain if they
surrendered.'
In addition to this, the bureaucrats did not use the Army to rescue
themselves. Even the actions in Lithuania were half-measures and poorly
executed perhaps because 'when those who hold the trigger have absolutely
nothing to say, they have no force to pull lt."A2 The coimon Soviet
soldier found himself in agreement with the rebels more than he did with
his Communist bosses.
The roots of the collapse lay in a failed ideology - Communism, or
perhaps even more broadly, socialism.20 Przeworski in describing the
internal collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe captured also the nexus
of the crisis in the Soviet Union;
Socialism--the project for a new future--was no longer the end; it
became an instrument of traditional values. And by the seventies,
repression had subsided: as the communist leadership became
bourgeoisified, it could no longer muster the self-discipline
required to crush all dissent. Party Bureaucrats were no longer able
to spend their nights at meetings, to wear working class uniforms, to
march and shout slogans, to abstain from ostentatious consumption.
What had developed was 'goulash communism,' 'Kadarism,'
'Brezhnevism': an implicit social pact in which elites offered the
prospect of material welfare in exchange for silence. And the tacit
premise of this pact was that socialism was n longer a model of a
new future but an undeveloped something else.
28PRZE91, p. 22.
;28PRZE91, p. 22.
263Przeworski defines socialism as "the idea of rationally administering things to satisfy
human needs--the very feasibility of impLementing public ownership of productive resources through
centralized cond, the project of basing a society on disinterested cooperation -- the very
possibility of disassociating social contribution from individuat rewards." (PRZE91, p. 22)
264PRZE91, p. 20.
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Under Communism, speech was empty; the speaker did not believe what
he spoke and the audience did not believe what they heard. This quiet
emptiness is captured in a Soviet joke:
A man is distributing leaflets at the Red Square. He is stopped by
a policeman who confiscates them, only to discover they are blank.
'What are you spreading? Nothing is written!' the surprised guardian
of order agBxclaims. 'Why write?' is the answer. 'Everybody
knows ....
No matter what the cause, the Soviet system found itself rapidly
loosing legitimacy among the Soviet people and this forced Gorbachev to
act. But how? As Seymour Martin Lapset described the Soviet situation in
1990,
Systems low on legitimacy can only improve their position through
prolonged efficacy. Gorbachev clearly has no reservoir of regime
legitimacy to draw on. Where legitimacy is weak and there is little
pay-off, governments have repeatedly been forced to resort to force,
to dictatorship, or break down.
As it turned out, by the time Gorbachev was to step down in December 1991,
he had already resorted to all three.
As the USSR embarked on a path to reform it found itself confronting
conflict in two dimensions; vertically, that is between the center and the
republics and horizontally between conservative and liberal forces in the
Party. This two dimensional conflict occurred at both the Union-wide and
republican levels and was the background against which this last part of




B. GORBACHEV AND PERESTROIKA
Gorbachev's uneven approach to reform alternated between hard-line
Communist ideas and reformist initiatives and this vacillation had a great
effect on the periphery because it put contradictory pressures on the
Republican governments and exacerbated tensions between hard-liners and
reformers at the republican level. This varying nature of reform was a
result of the transition Gorbachev was forcing on the system which
fragmented the political system. Along these lines, O'Donnell and
Schmitter assert that
there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence -
direct or indirect - of important divisions within the authoritarian
regime itself, principally glong the fluctuating cleavage between
hard-liners and soft-liners. 7
Hard-liners are those
who, contrary to the consensus of this period of world history,
believe that the perpetration of authoritarian rule is possible and
desirable, if not by rejecting outright all democratic forms, then by
erecting some facade behind which they can maintain inviolate the
hierarchical and authoritarian nature of their power.28M
The soft-liners are, for the most part, former hard-liners or hard-line
sympathizers who realize that the regime which they help support must
liberalize in order to gain legitimacy.
Peter Frank, writing on the deconstruction of Communist systems points
to this conflict between hard and soft-liners over the issue of
liberalization as the crux of the crisis in the USSR. He writes that
Gorbachev's liberalizing program of perestroika was a dynamic concept
which would inevitably
277 Oow6, p. 19.
2 D0•W, p. 16.
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run up against the rigid, immovable supports of the system (the Party
apparatus and its associate institutions) .... Then, either the
forward rush would be stemmed and turned back, or the obstacles would
be overwhelmed and swept away, allowjg the process of reform to
undergo a qualitative transformation.gs
Frank observed, in 1991, that this point of stolknovenie, or collision,
has been reached and the Party is unwilling to give, Gorbachev has gone as
far as he wants to go, and yet the radical forces are demanding a
qualitative change in Soviet society.
When liberalization begins to occur it is usually minimal and tightly
controlled by the regime initially. The soft-liners begin to diverge and
form different factions while the hard-liners exploit their initial power
advantage in the chaos of reform when the instruments of repression remain
under their control. Eventually, the soft-liners create a political
opening by which excluded actors can enter the political system as
resources for the soft-liners. Thus, even while repression continues and
the regime still appears monolithic, there are subtle changes occurring
which create cracks in the structure and opportunities for political
participation.2g Przeworski amplifies this point when he describes the
breakdown of authoritarian regimes as occurring when members of the
dominant group break rank and seek support from those sectors of society
previously shunned.2 1  In this way, the regime itself takes the first
step down the path of its own destruction and unconsciously provides
210FRAN91, p. 82.
2N0S6, p. 17. Take for example, the federat structure of the Soviet State which created
the institutions and even the taws guaranteeing pubtic participation which were not actuated until
1989-90. These institutions were utitized by the opposition to legitimate and structure their
assault on first the repubthican goverrunent then the center.
21AS cited in BJCNS8, p. 1021.
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subtle signals to potential protesters that opportunities for increased
action are available.
Gorbachev encouraged this process as a way to gain charge, however,
he was unable to limit the extent of this process and it ended up
accelerating out of his control. In addition to this self-initiated
process of growing proportions, Gorbachev found himself constrained by an
obsolete ideology.
Przeworski in describing the collapse of Communism from within
caqptures the ideological nexus of the crisis in the Soviet Union;
Socialism--the project for a new future--was no longer the end; it
became an instrument of traditional values. And by the seventies,
repression had subsided: as the communist leadership became
bourgeoisified, it could no longer muster the self-discipline
required to crush all dissent. Party bureaucrats were no longer able
to spend their nights at meetings, to wear working class uniforms, to
march and shout slogans, to abstain from ostentatious consumption.
What had developed was 'goulash communism,' 'Kadarism',
'Brezhnevism': an implicit social pact in which elites offered the
prospect of material welfare in exchange for silence. And the tacit
premise of this pact was that socialism was n%9longer a model of a
new future but an undeveloped something else."
Gorbachev's task was to reform a system which had declined to the
point of crisis. In attempting to reform Communism, Gorbachev introduced
a program of perestroika, or reform, which initially focused on regaining
economic vitality but which eventually spread to other aspects of society
to include politics and culture. There were two major aspects of
perestroika; glasnost and demokratizatsiia. Glasnost worked from the
bottom up while demokratizatsiia worked from the top down to reform, but
not destroy, Communism.
2m2PRZE 9 1, p. 20.
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1. Glasnost
Glasnost, or "openness' was one of the major underpinnings of
Gorbachev's initial reform platform. It was a powerful idea that
initially led to a limited amount of free expression in the press.
Glasnost was necessary because a key aspect of Gorbachev's reforms was the
establishment of an objective history, a "fuller exposure of the harsh
realities, brutalities, and mistakes of Stalin and the corruption and
stagnation of Brezhnev."23 The hope was that glasnost would help expose
corruption and put pressure on the system to become more accountable to
the people and encourage revival of self-initiative.
By late 1985 glasnost was beginning to have an effect as the
presses became more open. Gorbachev increasingly catered to the Soviet
Union's intelligentsia (especially those who had access to the press) in
the hopes that they would support him and his policies and thus also
elicit popular support for him.294 But as time went on, glasnost began
to have an unintended side effect - criticism was beginning to be directed
at Gorbachev and his policies. Glasnost became very much a part of
center-periphery relations as it allowed the republics to voice their
discontent with the system and, as such, it became a conduit for
increasing national consciousness. 2"
2MNILL89A, p. xxiv.
24 AHAS89, p. 237.
20Unforturstety, atesnos was still scarce in issues of nationality. OnLy in the middle of
1987 a number of candid articles began to appear in the press about the nationalities issue. On 7
May Prvd printed a critique of Soviet nationalities policy by a non-Russian. The article by the
Armenian nationalist, Silva Kaputikian demanded a return to Laninist nationality policy and
increased autonomy for the non-Russians. Her article was only one of many significant articles that
summer which demnded a new approach to the nationalities issue. (See NAHA89, pp. 266-7 for
additional citations)
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Perhaps even more threatening to Party bureaucrats than the
introduction of glasnost was Gorbachev's widening of it's scope at the
27th Party congress (February 1986) to include political affairs. This
meant, Gorbachev explained, that institutional and attitudinal changes
would have to take place, namely; broader citizen rights and their legal
protection, increased popular participation in the political process, and
checks on political-administrative workers.
These suggestions were ignored by Gorbachev's fellow politburo
members Ligachev (ideology), Chebrikov (KGB), Solomentsev, and
Shcherbitskii (first Secretary of Ukraine). This one of the first
indications that political reform was meeting with resistance at the very
top levels. This resistance prevented Gorbachev from convening a CC
plenum in the second half of 1986 in order to discuss political reforms
further.29
2. Demokratizatsiia
In January 1987 Gorbachev began stressing demokratfzatsffa (part
of perestroika) as essential to solving the crisis of public alienation
from the system. Demokratizatsfia stressed increased public participation
by establishing some routine form of exercising popular control over the
political-administrative workers, by establishing public forums for
expressing diverse views and alternate opinions, and the development of a
process to allow regular (but indirect) public participation in leadership
selection and decision-making processes. These ideas were tested in a
limited way at the local level in the spring and summer of 1987.
2"EAST89, pp. 64-66.
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Another CC plenum was convened in June 1987 and Gorbachev took
the offensive again and held Party organizations responsible for the
second phase of perestroika; namely, achieving results. This plenum
revealed a possible split in the politburo on the timetable for reform and
soon after the plenum articles comparing unsuccessful Chinese political
reforms with Gorbachev's political perestroika appeared. 2 Gorbachev's
ideology secretary, Ligachev, warned the non-Russians about the dangers of
pushing too hard and too fast in a 3 June speech in Tblisi which appeared
on Soviet TV and in Pravda:
nationalist and religious ideas are being kindled and attempts are
being made to exploit the deepening of democracy and openness for
spreading irres2nsible demagogy hostile to the interests of the
working people.
It was clear that the conservatives preferred to keep perestroika within
the realms of its initial program, uskorenie, or acceleration of
scientific and technical progress rather than see its spread to
democratization of Soviet society.
In mid 1987 Party elites feared a coming purge and increased
social disorder and in October 1987 the conservative forces in the top
leadership made their move against Gorbachev's program. 2W The
conservatives wanted 2-3 years to enact the second phase of perestroika as
opposed to Gorbachev's immediate time table. The conservatives also
wished to make political reform a secondary aspect of the program after
economic restructuring. In late 1987, the conservatives managed to
297 EAST89, pp. 63-66.
MAs quoted in NAKA89, p. 271.
raThe incident which sparked the confrontation was B. YeLtsin's reve•ation about his ongoing
argument with Ligachev over the reform movement. As a resuLt of discussion foiLowing this incident
Gorbachev was forced to back down an the agenda of reform.
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consolidate their demands and managed to officially place limits on
Gorbachev's reforms.
This momentary defeat was insufficient however to halt the
process which had already begun. Gorbachev's opening of society provided
the opportunity for opposition forces to emerge from below once again. As
opposition strength and boldness grew, the regime was increasingly
delegitimized and the process began to snowball. As the regime anxiously
watched, reform broadened and began to take on a life of its own.
For Ukraine's elites, an important consequence of Gorbachev's
reforms was the reconstruction of civil society which had, in its limited
form, been destroyed in 1917. Civil society is one in which the
government is responsible to the people and society controls the state and
not the other way around. Although the construction of a civil society
was not first on his agenda, Gorbachev quickly realized that it was
necessary if he was to achieve perestroika in economics. The connection
between the individual, society and the economic problems was apparent to
Gorbachev and his reformers. Aleksandr Yakovlev, a pro-reform Politburo
member, for example pointed out the connection in saying that "the
administrative command system created under Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s
allowed the State to swallow up civil society. The result led to economic
stagnation." 300
Early in 1987 a group of scientists meeting in Ukraine to discuss
plans to continue to build units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl, voted almost
unanimously not to do so and by the end of May 1987 it was announced that
"Qoted in TOLZ90o p. 2.
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the project was being abandoned.301  This placing of societal good over
state mandates was a first step toward a civil society in Ukraine. Civil
society was certainly beginning to form in Ukraine as a result of
perestroika but this was only one of many perestroika spin-offs.
C. PERESTROIKA AND UKRAINE
Perestroika came late to Ukraine with significant political, economic,
and social changes occurring only in 1989. The reason for retardation of
reforms in Ukraine has been explained by many analysts as stemming from
the important role Ukraine plays in the Union. The argument is that
Ukraine's share of the all-Union budget is the single largest for any
republic other than Russia and because of this there is no way Moscow
would permit the secession of Ukraine. Marples argues that the reason for
the delay of perestroika in Ukraine was not because the Union needed
Ukraine but because of the ruling hierarchy - the CPU, the Ukrainian KGB,
and the Moscow-based ministries which even by the summer of 1990 still
controlled 95 percent of Ukraine's industrial output.302 "One might say
that Ukraine has one of the strongest anti-democratic movements in the
Soviet Union and that it was directed from above, against the popular
wi 11..303
1. Reform From Within The CPU
Change came in Ukraine only because the ruling apparat changed






When Shcherbytsky took control of the CPU in 1972, he made clear his
intent to follow Moscow's guidance closely even to the detriment of
Ukraine. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, despite expectations,
Shcherbytsky remained in his post due to his connections to the anti-
reformers in the Kremlin. However, by the late 1980s, he and his
determinedly anti-democratic apparat were now being subjected to increased
pressure from above. Most threatening were Gorbachev's reforms in the
Party which began to nibble away at the communist monopoly on power. The
most significant change came when Gorbachev forced an opening into the
Party by restructuring the central organs of government in 1988 to include
the popularly elected Congress of People's Deputies which allowed the
forces from below to enter the government. The pressure from above for
reform within the Party grew too great for even Ukraine's First Secretary
to hold it back - in September 1989, Shcherbytsky stepped down at Moscow's
insistence.
2. Reform From Below
Reform from below in Ukraine was closely linked to the progress
of reform within the CPU. Without change in the Party, there was likely
to be little change outside it. Union-wide it was true that some Party
acquiescence was necessary for the development of the opposition and one
is forced to agree that without at least implicit support from the local
party apparatus the forces of opposition would have failed to reach the
levels they did in 1989-90. This was no where more visible than in
Ukraine where the opposition forces failed to form a national movement
until 1989 nearly a half year behind the Baltic states. The resistance of
Shcherbytsky to acquiesce even the slightest to opposition forces (i.e.,
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Baltic-style cooperation between the opposition and the Party) seems to
be the primary factor in causing this delay. As long as the Party and the
CPU had control over political, economic, and social aspects of life, real
reform was doomed to failure. 3°
While the CPU preached stability and the status quo, the
opposition promised change. The CPU began to realized that they were no
longer able to provide the economic or social goods which the people
demanded and the opposition promised to change the system so that these
goods would be provided. The growth of this opposition was directly
linked to the political mobilization of the Ukrainian population and this
came from an unexpected source - ecology.
a. The Beginning of Mass Mobilization
The image of Stakanov, a Ukrainian coal miner who achieved
fame in 1935 for exceeding a miner's daily production by 14 times, was
invoked by Gorbachev in 1985 to support his push for increased produc-
tivity and this reference epitomized the situation in which Ukraine found
itself in the 1980s. As Marples documents in his book Ukraine Under
Perestroika, the idea of massive production simply for the sake of
production had taken a great environmental toll on Ukraine. Even before
Chernobyl, Ukrainians at all levels of society were cognizant that Soviet
industrialization was causing irreparable harm to Ukraine's environment.
Communist Party leaders increasingly found themselves having to fend off
34Motyl argues that Shcherbytsky's resistance to cooperation with the opposition was illogical
since national comaniim was in his best interest and he concludes that it was Shcherbytsky's Lack
of "republican roots" which mde him resist collaboration with the opposition forces to the and.
(NOTY90, p. 183.) More Likely, Shcherbytsky, being ideologically a loyal Communit, either rejected
the idea of national commuiim on his own or took the cue from Gorbachev who continuad to suqpport
him and his anti-nationalist campaign in Ukraine because it preserved the status quo. Nis down fael
probably stamIed from his misreading of the situation in Moscow mnd failure to keep pace with
Gorbachev's altering hardline and reform mindsets.
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demands for expensive clean-up operations and protests against the
locating of new "environmentally hazardous* industries in their local
regions. The 1986 Chernobyl incident did much to raise the level of
ecological activism in Ukraine and local CPU leaders came under increasing
pressure to divert some resources to this new area of Republic
expenditure.
Ecological leaders such as Shcherbak and Grodzinsky
harnessed the widespread public anger and organized ecological groups such
as Zelenyi svit (Green World). These ecological groups, argues Marples,
arose because the CPU refused to even acknowledge Ukraine's environmental
problems. The belated release of information about the Chernobyl incident
epitomized the government's attitude and added momentum to the ecological
movement. The Chernobyl cover-up also did much to discredit the CPU
elites not only in the eyes of the opposition leaders but in the eyes of
the masses who by 1989 were very sensitive to the issues of ecology. By
the late 1980s ecology had become a very powerful and broad based
instrument of popular politics because it was something that everyone
could relate to no matter what their socio-economic class, their party
affiliation, their nationality, or their political activity level.
The ecological movement was the first movement for reform
in Ukraine to attract both mass public support and elite participation.
The radicalization of the masses in Ukraine had begun and the target of
their discontent went beyond the CPU to Moscow. 30 5
•'WARP91, pp. 17-174.
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b. The CPU Response
The ecological movement in Ukraine caught the CPU off guard
because they did not comprehend (nor perhaps did the ecological leaders)
the potential emotions these issues were capable of engendering among the
population. This was well illustrated by a ecological rally held in Kiev
on 13 November 198. Prior to the event, the organizers had received
approval from the local authorities for an ecological demonstration
because the authorities faiied to see any danger in this non-political
issue. However, as Marples notes, this demonstration of 10,000 or more
was a critical mistake for the CPU because, it was "one of the first
occasions when the transition from ecological to political questions
presented itself."306
During the course 0f the demonstration, the CPU and
primarily Shcherbytsky, came under attack for keeping Chernobyl secret,
for exploiting the environment for marginal economic gain, and for
approving industrial and power-generating projects without consulting the
people or considering the environmental impact of these outlandish plans.
To make matters worst, a representative of the State Committee for the
Protection of Nature, representing the government's position, assured the
disbelieving crowd that the ecological situation was stabilizing.•T The
rally ended with a speech by Ivan Makar from the Ukrainian Helsinki Union
who explicitly linked environmental and socio-political issues. He called




right to Ukrainian sovereignty." The resolutions which followed the
rally were political and ecological and in Marples words, pointed out that
"the party apparatus in the Ukrainian SSR did not represent the interests
of the Ukrainian people.... 3W
The large scale of this rally and the mass popular support
demonstrated indicated that Ukrainian society was rapidly becoming
mobilized and politicized. The success of this rally served as a powerful
impetus for the formation of Rukh, Ukraine's popular movement for
perestroika, later in 1989310 and gave a hint of the public interest
which would accompany the upcoming elections to the Congress of People's
Deputies in March 1990 and even sooner, the 19th Party Congress in Moscow.
3. The 19th Party Congress
The first major showdown between CPSU reformers and conservatives
was scheduled to occur at the 19th Party Congress which Gorbachev called
in order to circumvent the Central Committee where he had little support.
The congress opened on 28 June 1988 and turned out to be an unparalleled
media event featuring open discussions and debates about reform. The
congress carried with it an air of expectation because although the
majority of the delegates were known to be conservatives, the non-
Russians, buoyed by the Baltic republics' recent successes in achieving






During the Party Congress a long-awaited resolution on glasnost
was published and glasnost was linked with the "right to know.0 However,
it was limited: the resolution was adamant that glasnost could not be
used to promote selfish or ethnonational interests. Free expression was
to be tolerated only as long as it did not impede on the interest of the
State. As such, glasnost was a strong centrally mandated policy which
pressured Ukrainian political elites. As never before, the press could
make these officials accountable to the public. It also gave rise to a
political culture which was anti-establishment.
In a reversal of past practice at such gatherings, among the
conservatives one also saw a number of Party leaders demanding national
rights. Among these were the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the
Baltic states. The CPU representative Kachura stressed the vanguard role
of the Party and attacked the well-worn "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists"
while the writer's Union representative, Oliinyk raised the issues of
language, ecology, and the desire for truth about the 1933 famine. He
also told Gorbachev that Ukraine's creative intelligentsia supported his
reforms and stressed the national aspects of perestroika which must be
addressed. 311  This overt split between Ukraine's Party and its
intellectual elites (also for the most part, Party members) was a hint of
what was yet to come.
The net effect of the Congress was to support reform but
postpone its immediate implementation. For Ukraine, it appeared that
311PLYUS8, p. 4. Ptyushch, writing about the CPU and Opposition positions at the conference
also points out, quite accurately, that Gorbachev's only support is among the republican
intelligentsia who he is increasingly alienating by his stubborn refusal to relinquish the rigid
controls of the CPSU. (PLYUMS, p. 5)
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reform was still a distant hope. However, in spite of this, the Congress
marked a watershed in Ukrainian politics between external challenge and
the break down of the Party because of the after effects.
Following the congress, the primary issues of electoral reform,
internal Party restructuring, and the reform of the Supreme Soviet (SS)
and its presidential structure were undertaken by a special group, the
Supreme Council, organized by Gorbachev to circumvent the normal channels
through the Central Committee (CC) and the politburo. In September,
Gorbachev, preempting CC and SS meetings to discuss the implementation of
these ideas, implemented them himself with success. The central Party
organs were cut by one-third and the republican governments found that
they were also reduced in size but more importantly, they had lost control
over economic ministries and other large public organizations in the
interest of achieving the strategic goals of developing the Soviet economy
and society.
Thus attacks on the central Party apparatus were felt even in the
Republican Party structures and this weakened them at a time when they
needed to muster all their strength to fend off the increasingly strong
forces from below.
D. THE PLAN OF ATTACK FOR PART TWO
The process of state decline and opposition growth as described
briefly above is necessary to understand the more detailed study of
Ukraine's Communist elites in the year 1987-1991 presented in the
following section of this paper. The first chapter of Section II examines
the crucial events between 1988 and the Fall of 1989 which weakened the
CPU and allowed the opposition forces to make their first gains. The
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transition of Ukraine's ruling elites from a position of strength to a
position of growing vulnerability is analyzed. The second chapter focuses
on the events of 1990 which placed the CPU under increasing pressure from
the center. This pressure alienated and fragmented the CPU making
concessions to and joining with the opposition even more attractive. The
third chapter which brings the study to the end of 1991, focuses on the
final merging of party and opposition forces against the center and for an
independent Ukraine.
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VI. THE TIDE TURNS
Forced to respond to Gorbachev's convening of the 19th Party Congress,
the Ukrainian Party First Secretary, Shcherbytsky, convened a Plenum of
the CPU on 10-11 October in Kiev In order to begin implementing the
results of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the CC Plenums of the
CPSU in July and September. Little implementation was carried out and
instead Shcherbytsky and his subordinates accused the rising forces of
national opposition including the Writers' Union, the Uniate church, and
the numerous new youth organizations of being "demagogues", "extremists",
"nationalists", and referred to them as "politically immature."
Shcherbytsky complained that concessions made in the area of language
31 2
were not being accepted and that the debate was continuing unabated.
313
It was clear that as Plyushch wrote after the 19th Party conference
that "The Communist Party 'in the provinces' is, opposed, by and large, to
the programme of reform as this would then mean relinquishing power."
31 4
Whiat wasn't clear was how long this approach and Shcherbytsky's
312The reference here is to the August 1987 announlcement of CPU measures "to more fully satisfy the
population's requests for social and cuLtural services in proportion to their composition in the popuLs-
tion .... "(UTSK87. p. 25) The announcement of CPU intent to increase publications in the Ukrainian Language,
raise the Level of Ukrainian language education in the schools, and use of Ukrainian Language in public
settings. The Ukrainian Language pubtlications mentioned included a smaLl number of Ukrainian language
dictionaries, reviews of Ukrainian Literature and history, and the 50 VoLumes of Marx and Engels, the 12
voltme Soviet Ukrainian Encyclopedia, and the 55 volume set of Lenin's works aLL in Ukrainian. The CPU
announcement also included a strong denunccistion of nationalism and called for strict adherence to Leninist
nationalities policies, Soviet patriotism and internationalism. The Politburo Included in their
annou•cement that "Counter-propeganda work, aimed at uncovering the sabotage activities of Ukrainian
bourgeois nationalists beyond our borders [i.e., the emigre community), zionists, and clerical centers
[i.e., the Vatican] that speculate on the problem of nationality relations and attempts to sow hostility
between the peoples of our country, was recognized as being essential .... " (UTSK87, p. 27)
"
3 NAHA8, pp. 2-3.
3 14PLYU88, p. 4.
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Brezhnevian apparat could continue. In 1988 and 1989 the political tides
began to turn not so much from pressure from below but from pressure from
above. Gorbachev's declarations at tie 19th Party conference opened the
political arena to popular elections legitimizing the forces of opposition
and weakening the Party.
This chapter explores this first crucial step which would clear the
way for the forces from below to begin to work in Ukraine. The approach
is to examine three key events which occurred between the Fall of 1988 and
the Fall of 1989 and analyze their impact on CPU elites and how these
events helped sway these cadres to the cause of nationalism. The three
key events are the elections to the Congress of Peoples Deputies, the 1989
miners' strikes, and the founding of the Ukrainian popular movement Rukh.
To the extent possible while maintaining a topical approach, these
events are presented in chronological order so as to preserve the
cumulative effect these events had on Ukraine's ruling elites. In the
case of Rukh, the process of building the popular movement was one which
continued from late 1988 into late 1989 but the discussion of these events
is placed chronologically late in 1989 when Rukh gained prominence in
Ukraine.
The ultimate outcome of every one of these events depended greatly on
the social mobilization of Ukrainians which by late 1988 was well underway
but not yet charged with political ambitions. Therefore, it is
appropriate to begin our discussion with the transition to political
mobilization of Ukrainians and their testing of the changing political
system.
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A. THE PEOPLE ENTER THE SYSTEM
On 26 March 1989, the Union-wide elections to the Congress of People's
Deputies occurred. These popular elections, the first since November
1917,515 had been proposed by Gorbachev at the 19th Party Congress as
part of his plan to restructure the government and to instill popular
confidence in the state. Although it is difficult to known what Gorbachev
expected from the elections, he could hardly have anticipated the impact
they were to have on both the Party and the forces of opposition. One
suspects Shcherbytsky realized the impact these elections would have on
his Party but there was little even he could do to stop this particular
top-down reform.
1. The Structure Of The Congress Of People's Deputies
As described at the 19th Party Conference, the Congress of
People's deputies was created to perform as an all-Union active assembly
from which a new, smaller Supreme Soviet would be formed. The Congress
would meet once a year and would be responsible for selecting the newly
created office of President of the Supreme Soviet. Its 2250 deputies
would be salaried and would serve a 5 year term. A similar structure was
to be implemented at the republican level after September elections.
316
During the March 1989 elections, for the first time in 70 years,
Soviet voters actually had a choice between multiple candidates for most
of the deputy positions. Of the 2250 deputies all but 750 which the CPSU
maintained control over, were to be elected by popular vote. In order to
win the turnout had to be 50 percent and the candidate had to receive at
3 15In Late 1917 the elections to the Constituent assembly took ptace.
3 1WThese elections were postponed tater wtit March 1990.
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least 50 percent of the ballots cast. This led to a number of unresolved
contests which were subsequently settled in run-off elections in May.
2. Election Results
As the election and run-off results poured in, it was clear that
although the majority of the 2,250 candidates were conservative, the
election indicated a "psychological turning point."317 Large numbers of
protest votes were registered throughout the Union and in the Baltics,
Ukraine, Byelorussia and Moldavia the forces of opposition achieved some
success against the old order. 318  Although, Shcherbytsky won easily in
Dnieperopetrovsk, some 63 of 240 thousand voters crossed his name off the
ballot and two of his aides were not reelected. In addition, five Obkom
first secretaries failed to be voted in, including one from the K*',:
Obkom. 319
3. The Congress Meets
In May and June of 1989 when the Congress of People's Deputies
convened in Moscow the impact of the March elections was severely muted by
the still predominant CPU. In such an atmosphere, Ukraine's representa-
tives, Shcherbytsky, Masol, and Shevchenko managed to ignore the issues of
language, economic deprivation, Chernobyl', and the rising discontent of
the Donetsk Basin (Donbas) miners. The non-Party deputies, untrained in
parliamentary procedures, were either denied permission to speak by the
317 MNAHA89, p. 322.
31t See BERE89 for a an interesting and comprehensive geography-oriented discussion of the 1969 election
results. Overall voter turn-out in March was reported to be 89.9 percent, sow 10 points below the Soviet
average. In Ukraine, the turnout was 93.4 percent. In Azerbaijan it was 98.5 percent while in Lithuania it
was 82.5 percent. (HARA89B, p. 2)
31SHARA893, the four ObkIo were in LVviv, Chernihiv, Transcarpathia, and Voroshylograd.
143
Presidium or were not sufficiently aggressive enough to gain the floor.
As a result, the opposition deputy Borys Oliinyk described Ukraine as *the
most peaceful and most loyal republic" at the Congress.3n At first
glance the Congress appeared as victory for Shcherbytsky and a
disappointment for all those struggling against him. However, this was
not really the case.
The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies had signifi-
cance for the opposition as well as the Party. For the opposition it was
a positive step for a number of reasons. First, the elections effectively
increased the potential influence of the opposition qroups by granting
them access to the political process. Second, by being able to run their
own candidates, the opposition's ability to distribute their message
increased and the level of their discourse was raised to that of the Party
candidates in terms of legitimacy. Third, as a result of their elections
and participation at the Congress, the opposition was now able to carry on
their struggle from inside the system. 32
1
With opposition members now operating from within the system, the
Communist Party found that its monopoly over what Furtado and Hecter call
"an important private good- access to political power" was gone. 32 2 That
is, suddenly they no longer had the monopoly on providing access to power.
This was a severe blow to the nomenklatura process which allowed the
Party, by controlling who could fill certain posts, to maintain control
32itraturn Ukrain, 6 Jurw 1989.
1 FUR- '2, p. 175.
3FMt92, p. 175.
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over most aspects of political, social, economic, and military activities
in the country.
As Furtado and Hecter point out, it was rapidly becoming the case
that the Party wasn't the only game in town for those who aspired to
political ambitions. For the first time, as evidenced by the defeat of
-several Obkom first secretaries in Ukraine, the Party couldn't guarantee
that if you kept your nose clean you had a life-time career. Clearly for
these two reasons, loyalty to the Party would become less compelling.
With the Party's control over the political environment slipping, a
defector from the Party could not only find a new job, but he could very
likely avoid punishment for his "disloyalty."
Although these changes didn't all take place instantly after the
elections to the Congress of People's deputies, the process of change was
begun and it didn't take a lot of foresight to see where they would lead.
It is easy to see that defections from the Party as well as non-Party-
sanctioned behavior would begin to increase. It could also be expected
that dissension in the Party ranks would increase as Party members
struggled to maintain their power in competition with the opposition.
B. THE MINER'S STRIKE
On 10 July 1989, fast on the heels of the Congress of People's
Deputies, the Soviet Union witnessed the first large scale strike in its
history. Although the coal miners' strike originated in the typically
n-activist Western Siberian Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas), the unrest began to
spread to other regions which were also not known for their active
questioning of state policies. By late July the unrest spread to the
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Donbas in Ukraine, the arctic city of Vorkuta, and other mining regions
and involved a half million miners.
1. The Roots Of Niner Discontent
The strikes in Donbas were encouraged by central policies such
as glasnost, demokratizatsiia and economic reforms which, although
.resisted by the CPU, were not under Ukrainian control. The actual
motivation for the strikes was economic hardship which had been increasing
since 1988 when reforms had resulted in reduced supplies, increased
prices, and a faltering distribution system. 34 In Ukraine, several
months prior to the strikes, prices had increased, the production of
necessities and essential goods had fallen and their supply was
intermittent. An example of this was soap something of importance to coal
miners. Soap was already in shortage and rumors began to spread in the
summer of 1989 that soap prices were going to increase. This led to
increased demand, panic buying, and shortages. 3
The strikes were also prompted by problems in the sphere of
production. New cost accounting measures, in conjunction with
transportation difficulties, sometimes meant miners would loose wages or
bonuses. This situation was exacerbated by the transfer of the USSR's
mining basins to self financing in January 1988. The Donbas was most
severely impacted by this transfer because the Union's oldest and least
WSee especialty COOK91 and MARP91 (Chapter 6) for insightfut anatysis of the strikes.
34See TEAG90 for the argismnt that the strikes were not economicaLLy but poLitically motivated. There
is LittLe evidence to probe Teague's and Hanson's thesis that this is the case. Economics Seemed to be the
motivating factor but necessarily, the strikes became poLiticaL because in the Soviet Union economics are
political. It Is certainly arguLbte that in 1990 the strikes became much more politicaLLy motivated since
the econoic damends put forth in 1969 were unfuLfiLLed and the struggle to hold Noscou to the 1969
agreements became politicaLly charged.
325COOK91, p. 1.
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productive mines are located here and years of exploitation have left
little margin for improvement in output or efficiency. Many mines were
threatened with closure. Local officials expressed frustration over their
inability to control the export of coal from Ukraine and the under-pricing
of these exports which in 1989 were undervalued by 300 thousand rubles.
In addition, the centrally mandated 1989 price of 45 rubles per ton of
coal was reportedly less than the cost to bring it to the surface.U6
Efforts to raise coal prices to equalize the situation were stymied by old
price restraints which had not yet been removed by the State.
2. The Miners Begin To Mobilize
The miners had begun to mobilize under the canopy of glasnost and
as early as the Fall of 1988, articles began to appear in the press
describing the poor living and working conditions of the miners. In
Spring 1989, an official report on the status of the miners was printed
using statistics from the Special Collegium of the USSR Prosecutor's
Office which showed high levels of occupational hazards and violations of
safety rules. 327 Soon after, ecological issues came to light as well.
A significant process had begun as described by Cook,
All this discussion and attention no doubt contributed to the common
consciousness of grievances in the mining communities, and more
importantly, defined these grievances for the first time as
legitimate political issues. 328
326Robitnycha hazets, 18 April 1989 and 16 August 1989.
SVee C0oK91, p. 2 and v. S. shataLov in Ekonomikcheskaia Gazets, No. 7, 1989, pp. 17-18. Narpias
cites the fotlowing statistics to piace the miners' work and living situations in perspective: Ukrainian
coal miners can retire at age 50 but their average life span is 47 years and for every million tons of coat
mined 3-4 miners are kille due to unsafe conditions in the mines. (MARP90T, p. 14)
3nC00191, p. 2.
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Also significant to the growth of politics in the mines were the
recently concluded March 1989 elections to the Congress of People's
Deputies. In many of the mining regions Obkom secretaries were
defeated329 and the miners elected their own deputies. These limited
electoral successes indicated that Gorbachev was willing to tolerate
political change and that the miners now had a voice in the political
system.
To make matters worse, the CPU's hands were tied in dealing with
the miners.330 Moscow was to blame for the factors which stimulated
discontent in the Donbas and when the first localized strikes broke out in
March and April 1989, Moscow intervened directly by sending Coal Industry
Minister Durasov, Nonferrous Metallurgy Minister Durasov, and Chair of the
State Committee on Labor and Social Questions Gladkiy, to handle the
negotiations. 331 This merely exacerbated the miners' growing contempt
for local officials at the Party, Soviet, and industrial levels. In May,
the Central government even went so far as to draft a Law on the Rights of
Trade Unions which included a tentative right to strike. 332  The miners
began to negotiate directly with Moscow and in June, the Kuzbas miners
sent a petition of grievances to Moscow which went unanswered. The strike
deadline was set and when Moscow did not respond the strike was called.
32see Jerry Hough, "The Potitics of Successfut Economic Reform,N Soviet Econom, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan-Nar
1989, pp. 14-15.
32 The Ukrainian Ministry responsible for the coal industry was abolished in 1987 and replaced with the
Donetsk and Voroshilovgrad Production which were circumvented by the strikes.
31FUIS: Soviet Union, 10 April, 1969, pp. 53-54.
"Trud, 29 April, 1989, pp. 2-3 published the draft.
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3. Demands and Concessions
The breadth of the work stoppages during the strikes caused a
national crisis alleviated only by concessions from Gorbachev. The
central government was unprepared to deal with the strikers and so they
did so through an ad hoc system for arbitrating labor disputes. The
USSR's first law on labor disputes was submitted to the Supreme Soviet
during the crisis. The negotiations were carried out between the miners
and the central ministries and local government, Party and trade unions
were not involved at all. In fact, the central authorities criticized the
local officials for ignoring the miners grievances and letting them build
to the breaking point. The miners demanded that local authorities be
replaced at all levels and in the end, the miner's own grassroots
organizations were legitimized because they were the only ones capable of
controlling (i.e., bringing to an end) the strikes. 333
The center's concessions to the miners broadly included more
autonomy for the miners, decreased production demands, higher prices, and
more subsidies. The total estimated cost of this package exceeded two
billion rubles which would not only lead to inflation but would extend the
already large deficit. 33 4 For Moscow, this was a high price to pay for
a tenuous amount of control over a crisis which was still very explosive.
After the strikes were ended in August, the miners retained the
right to strike again to enforce the agreement between miners and the
central government. This power was formalized in the Council of Ministers
333COO(91, p. 4., See also N. Odinets, "At Life's Front Line,w Pravda, 2nd ad., 27 Novmber 1990, pp.
1-2, transt. in "Gurenko Revive* Politicat Situation," FBIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 Deceber 1990, pp. 27-28 for
the Party perspective on what went wrong during the strike.
3UCOOK91, p. 5.
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Resolution Number 608 which was signed on 3 August 1989. Periodic strikes
continued throughout the rest of 1989 but for the most part the situation
seemed to have been diffused for the time being at the further expense of
local Ukrainian apparat.3
35
4. The CPU And The Niners' Strikes
From the CPU perspective, the strikes were significant for two
reasons:
a. The strikes were particularly disturbing because the
Ukrainian Party counted on russified eastern Ukrainians to help offset
very nationally conscious western Ukraine. 33 The CPU expected, and were
prepared for, attacks against their anti-democratic crusade from Western
Ukraine, but who expected that such sentiments would arise in the East?
The CPU, like most Western analysts, 337 were counting on the Donbas
miners to act as a conservative bulwark against the increasing barrage of
reforms from Moscow. The fact that few of the miners appeared to be
members or advocates of Rukhm was of little consolation to the CPU
because this meant that a new, totally independent, distinctly hostile,
335 Amniversary strikes occurred in the Summer of 1990 as well.
3 sThe Donbses is 45 percent ethnically Russian and over 90 percent of the Ukrainians Living there claim
Russian as their first Language.
337Linda J. Cook points out this fallacy in C00K91, and cites a number of sources which adhere to the
view f the Soviet Work@: as a conservative, anti-reform political mess; Timothy J. Cotton, "Approaches to
the Politics of Systemic Economic Reform in the Soviet Union," Soviet Economy, Vot. 3, No. 2, April-June,
1987, pp. 166-169; Gait Lapidus, "Social Trends," in Robert F. Byrnes, ed., After Brezhnev: Sources of
Soviet Conduct in the 1980's, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 188-190.
"
3 2See SOLC92, p. 32 for the Rukh view of the miners and see KRAW90, (Btue and Yetlotw), pp. 14-15 for a
discussion of the speech of the miner's representative at the Rukh Founding Conference in Falt 1989 which
indicates that in 1969 the miners resisted joining Rukh became they feared this would threaten the
independence of the strike committees. The fact that Adam Nichnik, a teading figure in the Polish
oppouition and advisor to Solidarity, was present at Rukh's founding conference must also have sat well with
the miners.
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political organization had sprung up it the coal fields. The Ukrainian
pro-reform movement appeared to be gaining support in leaps and bounds.
b. The outbreak of the strikes demonstrated the CPU's
increasing loss of control over the political and economic sectors in the
Republic. The ease and efficiency with which the miners circumvented the
local Party, Soviets, and other organs of the CPU's political and economic
influence in the Donbas indicated that the CPU's monopoly on political
power, already under fire since the March 1989 elections of People's
Deputies was now even more tenuous.39 Even more significant was that
the Donbas strike committees which, in accordance the strike settlement
were to have been disbanded on 23 August, remained through the Fall. 3 40
This indicated that the miners' initial hesitancy to get involved in
politics31 had vanished. As one miner explained, their intent was to
"maintain these committees that have been elected by the miners until the
elections to the local bodies of power are held.... We hope to have a
real impact on [the elections] in this way.... ,342
The miners were not the only ones with hopes of being able to
influence the upcoming elections.
3In an obvious understatement of the situation the first secretary of the Ukrainian comImist Party
central Committee S K Gurenko, in November 1990 admitted that as a result of the actions taken by both
miners and the center to resolve the strikes, "CInmaiists, positions in the workers' movements are now
weakened."(O1IN90, p. 29). First Secretary of the CPU, Hurenko, in a series of articles printed in
Radianska Ukraine (14, is, 18 June 1991) Inented that the CPU did not get involved in the miner's strike
white their demands were only economic. He claimed that the CPU had toSt "authority mong the workers" when
the workers movements allied thmelves with RIukh or the URP. (See "the Communist Party of Ukraine in
Crisis," Ukrainian Reworter, Vol. 1, No. 14, August 1991, p. 2.
3
4The decision to not dissolve the strike committees was actively encouraged by opposition forces such
as the Ukrainian People's Democratic League. (See "To the Donbeass Miners, To the Miners of the Donetsk
Regionl,- Soviet Ukrainian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1989, p. 28)
31See KRA9OO, (Blue and Yellow), p. 15.
"342ftd Ukriiny, 27 August 1989 as translated in Soviet Ukrainian Affairs, VoL. 3, No. 2, 1989, p. 40.
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C. BIRTH OF THE POPULAR FRONT
The idea of organizing pro-reform forces under the banner of a popular
front was not intended to create a second party to the CPSU but to harness
the forces of opposition under the CPSU. The idea was that the front
would fulfill some of the roles of the opposition, namely to critique and
monitor the government and ensure efficient operation, but not threaten
the supremacy of the CPSU. 343  In essence, the idea of a popular front
had emerged as a means of bringing anti-Party sentiment back under the
wing of the CPSU. The concept was first made public in 1988 by the Moscow
Jurist Boris Kurashvili of the institute of State and Law. His proposal
printed in Sovestskaya Nolodezh in April 1988, was to create a "popular
front in support of Perestroika" to combine all socially active groups
(both Party and non-Party) under one umbrella to act, not as a counter to
the CPSU but as an opposition party within the CPSU. This popular front
should, he insisted, combine all groups even if they are opposed to one
another. 3" Based on this description, Tolz argues that this proposal
was clearly intended to reign in the growing number of opposition
movements and place them under control of the CPSU, a move which a
majority of them were not opposed to. By the Popular Front design, those
groups who refused to come under this umbrella would be a minority and







1. The Baltic Example
No republic embraced the popular front idea more strongly than
the Baltic republics where the fronts rapidly became very successful and
received support from the republican Communist leadership. The Baltic
states took the lead in pressing for reform and mass movements formed in
the Spring of 1988 to back demands for national emancipation. On 13
April, the first front. the Estonia Popular Front in Support of
Restructuring, was established. Lithuania and Latvia soon followed.
Beginning in September 1988, members of the Baltic Popular Fronts
began to enter the ruling bodies of the republican Communist governments.
This was primarily because the fronts appeared non-threatening. Demands
for sovereignty and national rights both culturally and economically were
initially couched in Marxist-Leninist terms and although they clled for
resurrection of religious and native cultures, these demands remained
within the boundaries of Perestroika and with a stated policy of remaining
true to the original popular front idea. The demands for secession,
although voiced by some delegates, were not included in the initial
official programs of the fronts. Within months, however, the fronts
became more radical as pressure from below overtook these cautions,
conciliatory initial steps. By the end of 1989, the fronts began to split
from the Communist Party and in 1989 and 1990 they proved their viability
by wining elections for popular support. The republican Communist Parties
at first resisted but eventually, beginning in Lithuanian, adopted the
popular front program as its own.
In the beginning, the legal status of these front organizations
was untenable in most republics because the 1989 all-Union law on
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voluntary associations had not ye. been adopted."' Lithuania became the
first republic to legalize parties other than the Communist Party of
Lithuania by a 7 December 1989 constitutional amendment legalizing a
multi-party system. 347 Acts such as this ushered in a new political era
for the Soviet Union; the number of informal groups doubled from 1988 to
60,00OUO and most of these groups chailenged the CPSU in some way.349
2. No Popular Front For Ukraine
The Baltic Popular Fronts, on the basis of their success, became
models for the other republics, including Ukraine. Politically Ukraine
was very different than the Baltics and the popular front concept,
al.hough strongly influencing the opposition in Ukraine, was strongly
suppressed by the CPU. When the 8 May issue of the Ukrainian cultural
magazine Kul'tura is zhyttia suggested that the Estonian Popular Front
idea be implemented in Ukraine the idea was quietly suppressed and the
idea was not mentioned again in the press for some time. 350  In June, a
group in Kiev attempted to start a Popular Union to Promote Restructuring
but were prevented from doing so by the authorities. However, in L'viv
where national consciousness is higher, unofficial groups nmanaged to
mobilize a number of citizens around interest in the upcoming 19th Party
Congress and on 16 June, several thousand protestors gathered to criticize
the undemocratic selection of local delegates to the Party Congress. On
34ToLz, "The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System", p. 11.
347"Amends Articles, Six, Seven," Daily Pecort: Soviet Union, 8 December 1989, p. 50.
348"Demokratiya ne terpit demagogii," Prevdh, 10 February 1989. Cited in Tolz, "The USSR's Emerging
multiparty System", p. 11.
34eTolz, "The USSR's Emerging MlN tiparty System", p. 11.
3 N See NANA89, p. 297.
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21 June, a similar rally in L'viv drew an estimated 50,000 people.
Clearly, the events in the Baltics were having an influence, albeit muted,
in Ukraine.
While members of the Baltic fronts were being elected by popular
vote to positions of power, in Ukraine and Byelorussla, informal groups
.were being severely repressed. The republican press was still strongly
controlled by the Ukrainian Communist Party and the attacks against the
opposition reminded one of the Brezhnev, rather than the Gorbachev, era.
In large part because of this, a formal opposition movement in Ukraine,
The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova (Perestroika) or more
simply Rukh, would not formally emerge until Fall 1989 nearly one and a
half years behind the Baltic states.
351
3. A Ukrainian Popular Movement
In spite of repression, Ukraine was moving toward the popular
front idea. By the spring of 1989, in addition to the "officially
sanctioned" Writer's Union, a number of other political, cultural, or
religious groups had appeared on the scene. Some older organizations,
namely the Ukrainian Helsinki Organization (UHU), remained and served as
a magnet to attract smaller socio-political groups. Others, such as the
Ukrainian People's Democratic League (UPDL) which issued their program on
12 February 1989, sought to pull together smaller groups under one
umbrella. The UPDL itself, in April became part of the UHU. Their
3 1 The tater deveLopment of a formal opposition in Ukraine can be attributed to a nuiber of factors.
For one, Ukraine was a mJch larger republic both physically and in term of population. Ukraine also
suffered from what appeared to be a serious rift between the more nationalistic Western and the heavily
Russified Eastern regions. Ukraine also did not share the strong sense of independence shared by the Baltic
republics because Ukraine had no recent tradition of independence. In addition Ukraine (with the exception
of Western Ukraine) had suffered 27 years longer under the communist yoke. Third, Ukraine did not share the
western recognition that kept the BaLtics in a higher profile poLiticaL status. The most significant factor
remains, however, the simple fact that Ukraine was seen by Gorbachev as too important to Let go.
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program included among the usual calls for free speech, freedom of
religion, economic autonomy, a call for Ukrainian sovereignty and
independence and for making Ukraine a nuclear-free zone. 352  These goals
were shared by yet another spin-off of the UHU, the Ukrainian Christian-
Democratic Front, which advocated restructuring Ukraine politically,
economically, culturally, and environmentally along christian lines.353
Among these myriad organizations there were normal, friendly relations,
but great potential for loss of coordinated action. These organizations
also had very few links to the Communist Party because of their radically
anti-Party stances.
a. The Birth of Rukh
The roots of Rukh, the ideas and early leadership, can be
traced to the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which despite its name (later
changed to the Ukrainian Republican Party), was overtly politically and
encompassed a great deal more than a strict focus on human rights. The
UHU had tried unsuccessfully to begin a popular front in Ukraine in 1988.
When , early in that year the UHU emerged to offer an alternative to the
CPU and on 4 August 1988, thousands of people gathered in L'viv to ratify
the program of the Democratic Front for Perebudova. The meeting was
forcibly broken up and the effort was pushed once again underground. 3 '
A year later, initiative groups from the Kiev Branch of the
Writer's Union of Ukraine and the Schevchenko Institute of Literature of
"3%PLWA, Vot. 2, No. 4-5, ApriL-May 1989, Press release no. 56, "Ukrainian Opposition Party Issues
Prograue."
353UPA, Vot.2 , No. 1, January 1989, "Interview with founding mber of 'Ukrainian Christian-Democratic
Front', News release No. 25.
3CHOR89, p. 41.
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the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR35s met on 31 January 1989
and drafted a program for an organization which they envisioned as forming
the focus for national reform efforts. They were moved to such an action
by the increasingly powerful anti-reform Party bureaucracy in Ukraine and
a realization that something had to be done to not only unify opposition
forces, but to also forge links with the CPU. In essence, learning from
the success of the popular fronts in the Baltics, they were forming the
beginning of a popular front in Ukraine. They named this organization the
Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova (perestroika) or Rukh (which
literally means movement in Ukrainian). The movement was met with
immediate hostility and the initiative group's program was attacked in the
press even before it was printed. 3•
b. The Development of Rukh
On 30 October 1988, a third attempt was launched at a
meeting of writers in Kiev where an initiative group for a popular
movement was formed and after which, over several months, a program was
drafted. On 16 February 1989, one of Ukraine's most pro-reform journals,
Literaturna Ukraina published Rukh's program. This document proclaimed
the main goal of the movement "to assist the Communist Party in the
creation and functioning of the democratic mechanism and the promotion of
societal development." It was self described as "a new coalition of
Communists and non-Party members", "a unifying link between the programme
"MThe Shevchenko Ukrainian Languae Society was formaLly founded in February 1989, ted by the respected
poet Omytro Pavlychko. Its goal was to Lead a c~aqign to define the status of the Ukrainian Language in
the UkSSR.
3WFor a detailed anatysis of the earLy origins of Rukh see UPA0189.
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of restructuring proposed by the Party and the initiative by the broad
masses of people.' Rukh's broad role was clearly stated,
to become the real spokesman for all the vital and social interests
of the Ukrainian people (narod) and people of different nationalities
living in Ukraine. It is to maintain ties with Ukrainians li ;ng in
other fraternal republics as well as with Ukrainians abroad.
Although the Rukh program appeared in many ways similar to
those of the Baltic states, Rukh activists attempted to make a
differentiation if for no other reason that at this time, the Baltic
fronts were quite radical and threatening to their local Communist
Parties. The very name of the popular movement in Ukraine indicates a
difference between Baltic style activism and that found in Ukraine. Rukh
is not labeled a popular front but a movement. This conscious and careful
choice of the word movement rather than front was made to reflect the
conglomerate structure of Rukh. Rukh, being a movement, is composed of
many different "member-groups," and many individual platforms ranging from
preservation of the ecology to preservation of the Ukrainian language.
35
As a result, New York Times reporter Bill Keller labeled Rukh as "The
great swap-meet of opposition politics...."359
c. The Rukh Program
The key concerns of the Rukh program were clearly outlined
in the following order: 1) The "grave" economic and environmental
situation in Ukraine and the USSR; 2) The retardation of glasnost in
Ukraine; 3) The need for a law-based state which recognized human and
3 7 PROG89, p. 20.
3"VPA0189, p. 4. and see also "Programe of the PopuLar Movemnt of Ukraine for Perebudova," Soviet
Ukrainian Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1988, pp. 20-23.
3
5i00 Keller, "Hazard Sign for Soviets As the Ukraine Wavers," New York Times, 26 Narch 1990, p. AS.
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individual rights; 4) Sovereignty (as opposed to independence) for
Ukraine.3" Special care was taken towards the issue of both nationalism
and nationalities. Rukh assured the CPU it had no intent to become a
"nationalist" organization in the Soviet use of the word and at the same
time assured non-Ukrainians in Ukraine that they were welcome and would be
included within the scope of the movement.
Although the ideas of economics, social rights, and civil
society were mentioned, actual proposals were quite vague. 3 61  For
example, in the area of economics the program only said that they felt the
heart of the problem lay in the repression of the peasant and that there
should be more information available on the republican contribution to the
all-Union fund. 362 However, the national question, language, and culture
were addressed at length and in depth with several concrete proposals put
forth.
The fact that the first program of Rukh was primarily
focused on the ideas of culture, language and the restoration of a civil
society is not surprising considering the roots of Rukh in the literary
elites of Ukraine. The focus on what Rukh's founders called the
"humanization of Society""3 pervaded all aspects of their initial
program. However, quite significantly, considering the literary elite's
31
'PROG89, p. 20.
1 ALthough detaiLs were scarce in some areas, others seemed to suffer from too many of them, for
example consider this foLLowing from the Ecotogical section of the progrem; The Movement betieves there can
be no democratization mAd htasnist, [gLasnost] without the fuLl disctosure of detailed information of the





previously limited vocalization of language issues, Rukh was demonstrating
a distinct politization of the opposition in Ukraine.
d. Rukh Gains Nomntu
Over the Summer and Autumn of 1989 Rukh began to gain
momentum through founding conferences for regional and city Rukh
organizations. The first such founding conference was held in Kiev on 1
July and over 442 delegates, representing over 200 different organiza-
tions, were in attendance. On the next day, 20,000 Rukh supporters
gathered in Kiev to consummate the conference. Similar events occurred
throughout Ukraine despite the efforts of local authorities who tried to
interfere and, in some cases, even made arrests of Rukh activists. It was
obvious that the scale of mobilization had exceeded the CPU's ability to
suppress it.
From 8-10 September 1989 Rukh held its founding conference
with 1109 deputies and some 280,000 members in attendance. Also in
attendance was Leonid Kravchuk, the CPU CC Chairman of Ideology, and
representatives from other Republics. Half the delegates came from
Western Ukraine and 20 percent of the total delegation were members of the
Communist Party.3A While the program presented during this congress did
not differ greatly from that published earlier in the year, there was more
opportunity for debate and the Ivan Drach was named chairman of Rukh.365
3"See PAN191 for a sociotogicat breakdown of the founding congress of Rukh.
3M6 See Soviet Ukrainian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3-4 for coLptete coversge of the speeches given and the
final resolutions.
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Once again the program stayed well within the limits of
Leninist principles on the nationalities question which Gorbachev had
established earlier as the limits of glasnost and political perestroika;
The activities of the Movement are in the interest of humanity,
peace, and progress. The Movement recognizes the leading role of the
Party in a socialist society.... The Movement cooperates with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union through the communists in its
ranks who are implementing the resolutions of the 27th Party Congress
and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.
The main goal of the Movement is to assist the Communist Party in the
creation and functioning of theSdemocratic mechanism and the
promotion of societal development.
However, quite significantly, and indicativa of the rapid pace of
political development within Ukraine during the summer of 1989, the 9
September 1989 Program presented as its main goal;
the construction of a democratic and humane society in Ukraine, one
which will truly be a government by the people, for the good of the
people, one that will ensure conditions necessary for a dignified
life of the individual, as well as the rebirth and development of the
Ukrainian nation in all its aspects, safeguarding the national and
cultural needs of all ethnic groups in the republic, the creation of
a sovereign Ukrainian state, which will build its relation withJ he
other republics of the USSR on the basis of a new Union Treaty.
The original program of Rukh published in late 1988 said nothing at all
about such a redefining of Ukraine's relationship with the center.3
4. The CPU Reacts To Rukh
After their founding congress, Rukh was severely criticized in
what Harasymiw implies was a Party-organized media campaign. The basic
30"Progruune of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova," Soviet Ukrainian Affairs, Vol. 2., No.
4, Winter 1988, p. 20.
367 PROG896, p. 44.
36See OPrograme of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova," Soviet Ukrainian Affairs, Vol 2.,
No. 4, Winter 1988, pp. 20-23.
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idea of the assault was to show that Rukh was not necessary and that it
represented nationalist extremist goals.•
Rukh was potentially very important even at this early stage
because it was the only "unofficial" organization in Ukraine at this time
which linked the Party to the opposition. However, the CPU bungled the
birth of Rukh and all but severed these links before Rukh had taken its
first steps.
Anatolli Pohribnyi, one of the founders of Rukh, describes the
idea of creating a popular movement for Ukraine as "an honest Party
initiative" in response to Gorbachev's appeals for initiatives from below
to make Perestroika possible. The initiative group for Rukh was formed by
members of the Writers Union and suddenly, as Pohribnyi describes it,
"something barbaric" happened. The Party, Shcherbytsky and his regime,
turned on the group and denounced them as nationalists and extremists.
370
An interview with Pavlo Movchan on 24 June 1989 sheds more light
on these early relations between Rukh and the CPU. 37 1 Movchan describes
how he and Victor Teren, attending a meeting of writers in Kiev on 30
October 1988, chaired a meeting of 150 writers at which the initiative
group for Rukh was formed. The meeting was specially convened and the
Party organization within the Writer's Union had granted permission for
the meeting to take place and the initiative group to be formed. Party
representatives, Oliinyk, Drach (republican secretary), and Pavlychko




371This interview, Conducted by Roan Sotchanyk is included in SOLC92, pp. 7-18.
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entire Party committee to the already formed initiative group. When
Movchan protested saying the movement should be a popular, rather that
Party, movement he was outnumbered by those who felt the initiative group
should not distance itself from the Party. On 31 October the Secretaries
of the Writer's Union as well as the secretaries of the Party committee
was called to the CC where the Ideological Secretary Yu. Yel'chenko met
with them. Movchan and other non-Party members were not invited. When
the secretaries returned from the CC meeting they announced that they were
forming their own (Party) initiative group within the Party committee.
When this information got out protests were registered and a
meeting of the Kiev organization of the Writer's Union was called and
there the Party Committee added an amendment to the program declaring the
leading role of the Party in the movement. A previous decision to form a
network of activists across the Republic by including the heads of the
local writers' Unions in the Initiative committee was also revived and
adonted. Kravchuk, then head of the Ideological Department of the CC, was
pi%-'.ent at each of these meetings and gave the proposals his full
support. 3 2
Even before the program was printed on 16 February it came under
attack because, Movchan argues, Kravchuk got cold feet with the sudden
turn of events in the Baltic states which placed the opposition forces in
control. 37 Kravchuk led the assault on Rukh using the argument that
Rukh was intended as an alternative political Party. Despite that he was
told by Rukh founders that the movement was not intended to challenge the
3MSOLC92, pp. 8-9.
373 SOLC92, p. 9.
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Party and that it was only a poplar movement to support perestroika,
Kravchuk was not convinced Also to no avail, advocates of Rukh quoted
CPSU CC secretary and Politburo member Vadim Medvedev who proclaimed the
Popular fronts to be a positive idea. 3 '
In March 1989, having lost control of Rukh, the Party again tried
to derail the movement by convening a round table of Ukraine's creative
intelligentsia to draw up a program for the development of Ukrainian
culture. The group headed ty Kravchuk attempted to meet all the
opposition demands with a cultural program designed to diffuse the
potential for the popular movement to expand as it had in the Baltics.
At the same time a media campaign aimed at discrediting Rukh
began in the Ukrainian press attempting to distort aspects of the program
that concerned linguistic and national problems because the Party knew
that these subjects were the most likely to cause fear among the
public. 37 The distortions in the press began to have their desired
effect--a poll taken in Kiev during the summer of 1989 indicated that
while 90 percent of the respondents supported the idea of a Popular
Movement, 50 percent had doubts and reservations about the "national"
points raised in Rukh's platform.
However, before long, the media blitz against Rukh in the early
months of 1989 ran into the paradox of glasnost namely, that information
put out by the Party condemning a particular idea or program ends up
stimulating people's interest and their searzh for the truth. By 1987
374See V. N•dvdev, "K poenaniyu sotsiaLizm. Otvety no voprosy zhurnate Kowunist," Konmuist, No. 17,
October, 1968, pp. 3-18.
3TS.. the comments of the Ukrainian titerary critic, poet, and transiator, NykoLa Riabchuk in RIA889,
p. 22.
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glasnost had proceeded to such an extent in Ukraine that the non-distorted
draft of Rukh was being made available to the public. Ideological
functionaries sent to various enterprises in Kiev to organize meetings to
slander Rukh376 had the opposite effect of angering people into support-
ing Rukh and denying the Party's charges that Rukh was a group of national
extremists.
In summary, the CPU, initially endorsing the concept of a popular
front, supported Rukh but then seeing the impact of the popular fronts in
the Baltics changed their minds and attempted to snuff it out from the
very beginning. However, because of the progress of glasnost and
demokratizatsiia this was no longer possible. Attempts to discredit Rukh
had the opposite effect and in the process they gave legitimacy to the
Popular movement further complicating the CPU's increasingly complicated
political existence. While it is difficult and not very useful to engage
in speculation about what would have happened if Rukh and the Party had
emerged from 1989 hand in hand, it is certain that the process of breaking
down the CPU would have proceeded at a much slower rate. The polarization
of Rukh and the Party increased the legitimacy of Rukh and accelerated the
demise of the Party.
D. THE COMMUNIST RESPONSE
The long promised Central Committee plenum on the nationalities
question was finally convened on 19 September 198937 amidst rising
nationalist mobilization in the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and
3 7 See SOLC92, p. 17.
3 77 See NAHA89, pp. 332-9 and FMR89 for coverage of the plenm and Gorbachev's speech.
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Armenia. The plenum was a disappointment to reformists from the very
outset as Gorbachev preempted discussion of the nationalities question by
announcing that the 28th Party Congress would be held five months earlier
than planed in October 1990 and that Shcherbytsky, and two others from the
politburo would be retiring. When Gorbachev did finally turn to the
-nationalities question he stunned the audience by beginning with a
historical overview of the current predicament which failed to even
mention the struggles of the non-Russians in 1917 to achieve independence.
Gorbachev denounced the Balts' claims that they were illegally
incorporated into the Union and thus should be allowed to secede. He
referred to secessionists as "adventurers" and lashed out at "nationalist"
and "extremist" groups. In response to the very sensitive language issue,
he declared that "it is expidient to give the Russian language the status
of a common state language across the USSR." 3T
Gorbachev also turned his anger toward the idea of national self-
determination saying that "in present-day conditions the principle [of
national self-determination] is best reflected in self-management."
Gorbachev's concept of self-management was far from even the Leninist
guarantee to secession because it
"presupposes the voluntary association of republics and national
entities in the name of grappling with needs common to all 3And their
organic involvement in the advance of the whole country.
Gorbachev clearly defined the limits of this form of "self-determination"
by saying there would be no secession, no splits in the Party, but there







proposal that "nationalist, chauvinistic, and other extremist
organizations" be subject to legal prohibition. 3W
As described by Nahaylo and Swoboda, Gorbachev's speech was "rather
defensive, and contained a mixture of warnings and appeals to reason" and
that as a whole, the plenum "was historic only in the sense that it was
the first of its kind.'"3
To the non-Russians, the plenum represented a reversal of the gains
from the 19th Party Conference. In fact, "if the non-Russians can be said
to have finally broken through at the 19th Party Conference, then the
plenum was a belated attempt t repair the breach in the imperial
edifice."3 Gorbachev did not side with the hard-liners like Ligachev
or Chebrikov nor did he bow to the demands of the opposition forces. He
did not abandon the idea of demokratizatsiia. In fact, Gorbachev had
stressed the need for democracy; "Radical revolutionary changes cannot be
achieved unless we act consistently, by democratic methods, push ahead
step-by-step, without deviating to any side, without slowing the pace,
without halting."M3a
1. Shcherbytsky Leaves A Weakening CPU
At the CC Plenum on nationalities, the CPU's representative,
Secretary Yelchenko, made reference to the fact that he was in favor of
applying Gorbachev's idea of banning nationalist movements such as Rukh
because, he argued, Rukh's program is a thinly disguised plan for
"°NAHA89, p. 335.
3




separatism. As Yelchenko's comments indicated, Ukraine's Communist
elites were leaning toward the hard-liners who were now on the rise in the
.-enter.
On 28 September 1989, Gorbachev took a significant step toward
diluting the influence of the CPU hard-liners when he flew to Kiev to
remove Shcherbytsky from his post as the first Secretary of the CC of the
CPU. This obvious intervention from the center was the culmination of
Moscow's rising discontent with Shcherbytsky's machine in Ukraine. It was
obvious to Gorbachev tha.t Ukraine's first secretary was not moving at the
same pace as the other republics. For example, in February, Gorbachev
visited Kiev and stopped people on the street admonishing them for not
speaking up for change. They told him they were afraid and he responded
by telling them they must work from below for change while he works from
above.3 5  This is hardly a conversation he would have had in one of the
Baltic states. At the same time he also met with the leaders of the Rukh
initiative who assured him they had no intent to build an alternative
political structure and that they adhered firmly to the ideas of a
Leninist federation. 3W
Meanwhile, Shcherbytsky's silence during the Congress of People's
Deputies made it clear he was still willing to ignore the changes that
were happening all around, and in spite, of him. The miner's strikes
revealed that this strategy was not going to work and the center
3'4See FBAR89, p. 8.
3 01otin Robinson, "Redefining the Marxist Faith,." in MILL89, p. 313.
3SOLC92, p. xvii.
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intervened and eliminated him from the process of resolving a serious
problem in his own republic.
Haraymiw, writing in the fall of 1989, reflected the predominate
view that
Shcherbytsky's anti-nationalism... (serves] as a cover for the status
quo, and... [runs] contrary to the spirit of perestroika, but it ties
in well with Gorbachev's underdeveloped policy on nationalism and
serves to hold the finger in the dike.'
But by Fall 1989, even Gorbachev realized, that if some water does not
flow through the dike, the whole thing could collapse and thus he had
little to lose by removing Shcherbytsky who was hampering perestroika in
Ukraine.
Shcherbytsky's removal brought a sigh of relief from below
because Shcherbytsky's refusal to bring Ukraine into line with centrally
mandated reforms had long been seen as intolerable. Shcherbytsky's
ability to give lip service to reforms while keeping a tight lid on
pressure building from below was described by one Ukrainian critic as
trying to be half-pregnant which of course one cannot do.3
While the Shcherbytsky regime had indeed created a number of its
own problems such as a radicalized Rukh because the CPU did not represent
the desires of Ukrainians (i.e., elites)m9 and the CPU's continued
resistance to perestroika and suppression of democracy from below
387HARA89, p. 37. The First Secretary of the CPU, Hurenko, also admitted after the ouster that there
was same initial linkage between Gorbachev and Shcherbytsky; "Hed he [Shcherbytsky] disappeared from the
political arena imediatety upon the coming to power of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, that would have been
totally incomprehensible. Precisely during the period before his departure, the beginming of Perestroika,
he was, in my view, to a certain extent Mikhail Sergeevich's helper." (SOLC92, p. 155)
3aR IAM, p. 22.
30 See MRP91, p. xix.
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aggravated even the center, a certain part of the CPU's fate was simply
political evolution. The creation of civil society simply would not
tolerate a Shcherbytsky-like regime, just as it would eventually reject
even a Gorbachev-like regime.
2. The Shcherbytsky Phenomenon
In order to understand why Shcherbytsky remained in power so long
and why Ukraine moved so slowly toward reform, we turn to Furtado and
Hechter who themselves sought to explain why Ukraine adopted the strategy
they did toward the nationalist movement-namely to resist and suppress
i t .39
The key to this behavior is, they argue, the level of Republican
elite dependency on the CPSU to gain access to political power. The
Ukrainian leaders were more dependent and thus pursued a path more closely
tied to that of the CPSU than say the Estonians. Ukrainian dependence on
the CPSU was based on "the calculation of relative career chances with the
organization of the CPSU itself." Local leaders, argue Furtado and
Hechter, will take the interests of the center into account if they know
that in so doing, they will be rewarded later by political promotion in
the Republic or even into the central organs. 391 Since the high level
Party positions have long been dominated by Slavs, Estonians and other
non-slavs realized their chances of political reward are limited. As the
Party's control over the periphery began to decline and opposition forces
gained power, local leaders took the rational choice and began to do what
390FURT92, pp. 189-190.
31 See also SUBT90, pp. 513-4 where this argument is also made but compared to a corporate structure
with Moscow as corporate headquarters and the Republican parties as branch offices. The republican elites
perform at the "branch" level with hopes of being promoted to the "headquarters" level.
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was necessary to maintain their power such as forming coalitions with the
opposition forces.
Ukraine's political elites had no incentive to take this step
because their paths upward remained open and if the center had any doubts
about continuing to support them, the CPU could dredge up the old
draconian stories about the dangers of Ukrainian nationalism (i.e., WWII
integral nationalism and Shelest).3 92 As well, even in 198b and 1989
Ukraine remained closer to the center than did the Baltics or Asian
republics.
Shcherbytsky's ouster did not necessarily indicate that Ukraine's
dependency was ended, quite to the contrary, it indicated that they only
needed to realign their behavior with the center. 393 The point at which
this dependency would end would come only when Ukraine's elites recognized
that the rewards offered by the center were less enticing than those
offered by seeking cooperation with the opposition and establishing their
own power in an independent Ukraine.
E. CONCLUSION
In the period of a year, Ukraine's ruling elite had seen an erosion
of their monopoly on power and the birth of Rukh, an organization capable
of exploiting the new possibilities to participate in the Soviet political
system. Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies gave the forces of
opposition a much needed opportunity and granted them legitimacy by
392Subtetny points out that prior to 1980 Shcherbytsky was a "Little Russian (Maloros) per excellence"
and adhered very closely to Moscow's dictat. However, when these efforts failed to bring him promotion into
*rezhnev's apperat, or as SubteLny argues, failed to make possible his true ambition to replace grezhnev,
Shcherbytsky began to tend his own garden in Ukraine to a greater extent. (SUeT9O, pp. 512-3)
=lvashko's short tenure and transfer to Noscow as Gorbachev's right hand lln is the Last exalpe of
such behavior a"ng Ukrainian elites.
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permitting them to wage their battle for power openly, with blessings from
Moscow, and within the formerly sacred grounds of the CPU. The miner's
strike later that summer showed the CPU's lack of control and the ease
with which alternative political powers could be erected to challenge the
CPU. The mishandling of Rukh's birth and the immediate alienation and
radicalization of its leadership placed the Party in a direct confronta-
tion with the opposition. Although the Party tried to utilize its still
considerable monopoly of the media and means of mass communication to sway
the public opinion in their favor, they still found themselves losing
legitimacy and power to the opposition.
Shcherbytsky's ouster was a sharp blow to the conservative CPU and it
was an indication that the center's policy was approaching a more middle
of the road position trying to hold off the hard-liners and the radical
separatists. On one hand, this indicated that Ukraine, finally, could
make up lost time and begin to develop along the lines of the Baltic
states since all the necessary ingredients were now in place. On the
other, Gorbachev, at the CC plenum on the nationalities issue, firmly
indicated that there were strict limits on what he would tolerate from the
opposition. For the time being it all seemed to depended on
Shcherbytsky's successor, Volodymyr Ivashko, who was an unknown quantity.
Ivashko's mere presence at the helm was, however, a signal that things
were finally going to begin to change in Ukraine. The "stagnation of
perestroika," as one opposition leader in Ukraine called it, was coming to
an end. This was a powerful signal to the opposition forces and a serious
blow to the CPU and its hard line Communists who had hoped to hold back
the rising tide of anti-Party democratization. Opposition leaders saw
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Ivashko as "striving to proceed more reasonably" in his dealing with the
opposition forces. 394 Where as Shcherbytsky repressed and harassed the
opposition forces, Ivashko was willing to meet with them in addition to
suppressing and harassing them.
USOLC90C, p. 22.
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VII. THE PARTY WEAKENS
At the precise time when Ukrainian opposition leaders were preparing
to take advantage of Shcherbytsky's removal and the growing pro-reform
sentiment in their country, Gorbachev was beginning to pull in the reins
on reform which seemed to be accelerating out of control throughout most
of the periphery. By December 1989, five republics had openly defied
Moscow and expressed their intent to achieve sovereignty; four had
rejected their incorporation in the Union as illegal; and three had begun
referendums on secession. The Balts were not alone in the struggle to
exploit the contradictions of Soviet ideology and federal struggle and
demand national self-determination. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and
Moldavia, like the Baltic States, were well on their way toward being
overtaken by the anti-Communist, pro-autonomy forces. Islam was gaining
new recognition in the Asian republics and Uzbekistan was experiencing a
burgeoning nationalist movement. In the slavic core of the Union cracks
were beginning to appear. In Ukraine Rukh was gaining force, and in
Russia the autonomous republics in Russia were demanding an upgrades
political equal to that of the republics and Russians themselves were
beginning to mobilize against the state.
On 20 December the periphery began to separate from the center; the
Lithuanian Communist Party passed a resolution calling for its indepen-
dence from the CPSU. Gorbachev's reaction was swift and unambiguous - the
Party was to maintain the leading role and the Union was insoluble. As
Gorbachev explained to the Congress of People's Deputies, "today, to
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exercise self-determination through secession is to blow apart the Union,
to pit people against one another an to sow discord, bloodshed and
death.39
This chapter details the path taken by Ukraine's Communist elites in
this charged atmosphere and analyzes the erosion of the CPU's political
-power by the combined pressures from the center and the Ukrainian national
opposition. Unlike the experiences of 1988-1989, in 1990 the CPU's
monopoly on power was not eroded by a number of distinct events but rather
by a continuous process of political change. This is not to say there
were not important turning points in the process but that the process
proceeded much more rapidly and more smoothly than it had previously. The
key point, and major theme of this chapter, is that the vast majority of
this political change in 1990 occurred within the system as opposed to
outside the system as in the years before.
The events of 1989, namely the elections which gave the opposition
access to political power, the miner's strikes which weakened the CPU, and
the empowerment of opposition forces through the organization of Rukh
greatly accelerated political change. As a result, and this chapter will
show, during 1990 a gradual merger of the moderates on both opposition and
Communist sides of Ukraine's parliament and the attenuation of the CPU's
power made the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet a two-party parliament making way
for the July Declaration of Sovereignty and a serious challenge to the
Union Treaty.
NSWAHA89. p. 345. in this speech Gorbachev also revealed his Russian bias by speaking of the
centuries of unification in which the Russians had played man outstanding rote." The Russians, he
argued, had done this to help the other peoples and had suffered as a result and "wre not to blame for
what has happened" to the non-Russians.
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A. SIGNS OF CHANGE
Political change began to accelerate as the post-Shcherbytsky
government in Ukraine adopted a more open attitude toward the opposition
forces. The first example of this came in November 1989 when
intentionally or not, the CPU politburo granted a victory to Rukh and the
ecological groups such as Zelenyi svit (Green World) 39 by removing the
controversial Health Minister A. Romanenko who had come under attack by
the opposition for his mishandling of the Chornobyl incident and for
spearheading the subsequent coverup. 397 His replacement, Yu. Spizhenko,
who had formerly strictly adhered to the Party line on Chornobyl, quickly
began to cooperate with Ukrainian and Western agencies investigating the
long term impact of Chornobyl. As a result, the April-May 1990
anniversary of the Chornobyl accident was marked by an increased honesty
and openness about the true impact of the accident. Although the true
story was still not told, the signal to the ecological and opposition
groups in Ukraine was clear - glasnost had finally arrived in Ukraine.
Another significant concession came from the CPU in February 1990 when
the Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution "concerning the Ecological
Situation in Ukraine and Measures for Its Radical Improvement". Although
this was a vague and ineffective declaration, it's existence indicated
that the CPU had realized the importance of the issue. To be honest, the
CPU's motives were not entirely honorable. They undoubtedly hoped raising
"Formed in Oct 1989.
7See MARP9ON and 1ARP92 for more information on Rommnenko and his handting of the Chornobyt
incident.
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the issue would help gain popular support and undermine the opposition
platform prior to the elections to the Supreme Soviet scheduled for March.
Not surprisingly the CPU's benevolent attitudes did not extend to the
campaign to elect new delegates to the Supreme Soviet. In fact, the CPU's
old strong-arm tactics were quite visible perhaps as a desperate counter
to Moscow's actions on Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution which
guarantees the monopoly of the Party. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum
held in early March became a show-down between conservative hard-line
Communists and their more moderate comrades. One important issue raised
was Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution and a great deal of discussion
ensued on the need for the Party to cooperate (i.e., acknowledge) other
"sociopolitical organizations." To both Rukh and the CPU this was seen as
a signal that the monopoly of the Party was coming to an end. 3•
B. ELECTIONS TO PARLIAMENT
The elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in March 1990 were
preceded by lengthy debate over electoral laws and procedure. The primary
issue was whether "public organizations" such as the CPU, Komsomol, and
the like should be given fixed numbers of deputies regardless of the
election outcome as had been done in the March 1989 elections to the USSR
Supreme Soviet. The final law adopted by the Supreme Soviet abolished





During the March 1990 elections, the Communists opposed the
coalition called the Democratic Block (DB) which was an alliance of 40
informal groups which had been formed in November 1989 in order to
coordinate opposition efforts. The appearance of the Democratic Block
made it clear that for the first time, there was a danger to the Party
aparatchiks who had for so long held their offices and they were not
willing to surrender their posts to an opposition candidate without a
struggle. As part of this, Party authorities employed "creative"
electoral practices and delayed the registration of candidates from the
Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society and Zelenyi svit (Green World) and
delayed the official registration of Rukh for nearly 6 months.
The CPU's anti-opposition strategy was two fold; first they would
secure nominations for as many Communists as they could and second, they
would prevent as many opposition candidates from being nominated as
possible. Party workers became very active in organizing nominating
meetings at large factories and enterprises where the majority of people
could be compelled to vote for the Communist candidate. The CPU was able
to secure nominations for 40 to 50 percent of all candidates in this
manner. 3" The tactics used against the opposition were no less
effective. For one, the CPU had power over the opposition nomination
meetings because the law stated that permission from the local authorities
is required to hold meeting of 200 or more which is the number of people
necessary to obtain a nomination. Electoral data indicates that more
times than not, the authorities denied such a permit to opposition groups
3 %,IHA9O, p. 22.
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desiring to hold such a nomination meeting. The CPU was also able to
disqualify every one of the Zelenyi svit and Rukh candidates because these
organizations were not legally registered.4'0
However, the aggressive methods utilized by the Party to
discourage opposition candidates backfired according to Rukh secretary
Mykhailo Horyn, who said the constant harassment by the authorities forced
his movement to take more aggressive and radical approaches toward
opposition politics.' 0 1 This became important because the opposition was
still able to gain access to the nomination process by securing
nominations from Ukraine's cultural unions40 2 and at the organization and
enterprise level. The intellectual elites which formed the Democratic
Bloc's pool of candidates also had a powerful appeal among those who
rejected the current government. For example, V. Yavorivs'kyi, a
prominent Rukh leader, was nominated in the city of Kirovograd with which
he had no connection simply because the residents put his name up for
nomination in order to see his communist counterpart defeated.4' 3  The
Democratic Bloc candidates also had great support in Western Ukraine as
could be expected.
2. Election Results
In spite of election "abnormalities", the Bloc secured 108 of 450
seats in the Supreme Soviet giving the Democratic Block 30 percent of the
seats in the Supreme Soviet despite the fact that nearly one half of the
'IMA90O, p. 22.
40 1NARP90F, p. 18.
4
*%ihatisko notes that 40 percent of the march 1990 candidates were intellectual elites while
workers formed only 10 percent of the total. (See MIHA90S, p. 22)
MINHA906, p. 22.
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seats were not contested. This meant in practice that the Democratic
Block, in alliance with independents, controlled 160-180 seats while the
CPU controlled 260-290. No Democratic Block candidates were elected into
the presidium. The Democratic Block delegates formed a parliamentary
union called the Narodna Rada (from the name of the 1918 parliament) to
coordinate their activities within the parliament.
After the 4 March electoral success Rukh formally declared itself
a political party with a program of independence for Ukraine and several
of its top members turned in their Party membership cards. By April,
Rukh's top leadership no longer claimed Party membership indicating that
either there were serious splits in the CPU leadership or that Rukh's
leaders figured the CPU was so discredited that it was no longer a viable
political vehicle for achieving their goals.4'0  As it turned out,
predictions of a Party split were premature, but the specter of a
discredited Party loomed large.
The CPU, although maintaining a majority in the Supreme Soviet,
suffered significant internal damage as a result of these elections. "For
the Communists, the elections were a devastating revelation; in nearly
every case, when people had a choice between traditional Communists and an
outsider, the voted for the outsider."m4 In addition there was other
hidden damage: 1) The opposition candidates did remarkably well
considering the hurdles they had to overcome and the CPU was rapidly
running out of hurdles to set in front of them. Every time the
opposition, now operating inside the system, increased their strength the
"MRP90E, p. 18.
"**avid Remick, "Soviet Democrats on the Defensive," Washington Post, 24 Decemr 1990, p. A6.
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more difficult it was to keep them under control. 2) The "dirty*
campaign run by the Communists made it possible for opposition forces to
challenge the validity of the elections as was done later in 1990. 3)
The forces of opposition emerged heros having overcome Communist trickery
which only enhanced their standing with the public. Many, after the March
elections to the Supreme Soviet, concluded that "All Ukraine now
comprehends that the majority of Ukrainians are now represented by the
minority in parliament.'406 4) The opposition, operating in the
parliamentary minority, was placed on the defensive immediately. Rukh's
decision, shortly after the elections to declare itself a political party
is an indication of this move to the offensive.
In spite of the damage to the CPU, they remained in power and
even maintained a significant majority in parliament. The closer the
opposition encroached on the sources of Party power, the harder the Party
fought back. As expressed by a member of the Lithuanian Parliament,
We democrats have discovered to our great pain that the powers that
be were prepared to bend, but they would not break when it came to
their own intere(s: the preservation of their own economic and
political power.'
C. THE CPU COOPTS THE OPPOSITION PROGRAM
In late March 1990 when Rukh organized mass rallies in support of
Lithuania in opposition to Central Committee warnings and signaled their
intent to place their efforts behind the goal of independence rather than
sovereignty, the CPU began a two point offensive. The first line of
attack was on the opposition itself. The CPU moved to legally strip 60
'MNRP90P, p. 23.
4 7 David Remnick, "Soviet Democrats on the Defensive," Washington Post, 24 December 1990, p. AID.
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opposition deputies of their parliamentary immunity for their participa-
tion in the rallies and they exploited the shift in emphasis toward
independence by slandering the opposition claiming they were adventurists
wanting to follow Lithuania's dangerous path.4'm
The CPU's second line of attack was to coopt the Rukh program as
outlined in their November 1989 program in hopes of undermining support
for Rukh and increasing their own credibility. The first signs of this
approach came in March during the CPU Central Committee plenum at which
the Party repeated its call for economic and political sovereignty within
the bounds of a new Union Treaty which had originally been made a part of
the Party platform in November 198949 in preparation for the March 1990
elections. This time around, however, state sovereignty was broadened to
include economic, cultural and scientific relations with foreign countries
and even diplomatic relations with states outside the USSR. Ivashko spoke
of a Ukraine in a new Union which would allow two tiered relationships.
On one level there would be relations between the republic and the center
and on the other between republics themselves.41
0
A plenum of the CPU on 3 April 1990 attempted to "hijack the popular
causes championed by 'Rukh..." by passing a resolution calling for the
sovereignty of Ukraine.4 11  "In short, the Party... [began] to adopt a
political mien while trying to cast its political opponents in the role of
0This attack an Rukh went to such an extent that the Communist daily pubtications failed to even
analyze events in Lithuania concentrating only on using them as a Lever against Rukh and western
Ukrainian secessionists. (NIHA90A, p. 18)
4'This program was printed in Radvans'ka Ukrianina, 3 December 1989.
410See SOLC9O, p. 18 for more on Ivashko's speech.
411NIHA90O, p. 18.
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nationalist extremists."412  This sovereignty program was formally
ratified by the CPU at their 19-23 June 1990 Party Congress.' 13 This
sudden move to coopt the opposition platform was so complete that it led
Roman Solchanyk to conclude that "at the risk of sounding overly
facetious, it might be suggested that the next logical step is for the
Communist Party of Ukraine to apply for membership in Rukh."4'14 In
essence this process began in the late Spring and early Summer of I990 as
the forces of the CPU and the opposition began to merge.
D. TOWARD A MERGING OF FORCES
Although the first session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet (May-
August) was characterized by near continual confrontation between the
opposition minority under the umbrella of the Democratic Block and the
Party majority known as the group of 239, a process of merging was
beginning. This merging of forces was occurring not only at the level of
political platforms but was also manifested in the voting pa.terns in the
Supreme Soviet. The reason for this merger were both external and
internal. The primary external factor was the revocation of Article 6 of
the USSR constitution which weakened the power of the CPU. The internal
factors were 1) a move of deputies from the communist to the opposition
side of the parliament; 2) the realization that the minority in parliament
actually represented the majority of Ukrainians; 3) the growing






supported by increasing economic problems, rising discontent of the
populace, and a renewal of the coal miners' strike in Eastern Ukraine, and
5) the growth of a "reform" element within the CPU.
There were growing indications that a common ground was being formed
in the new Supreme Soviet on the basis of the sovereignty issue. In June
1990, Radio Kiev reported results of a poll taken among parliamentarians
indicating that 50% of the Supreme Soviet membership favored Ukraine
becoming a sovereign republic within a new Union and 38% favored Ukraine's
independence within a confederation and 10 percent supported secession
from the union.
Further evidence of this drawing together could be seen in July 1990.
The process by which Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty was approved in
a vote of 355 to 4 in favor illustrates that opposition and Communist
Party delegates were voting together. On the 23rd of July, the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet voted to replace the outgoing Chairman, Ivashko, with
Kravchuk and 140 deputies voted for the opposition candidate indicating
that in addition to their own 88 votes, the Narodna Rada managed to
attract 52 votes from the other side of the isle.' 16 This is explained
partially by the fact that in July 1990 the faction of the CPU known as
the Democratic Platform of the CPU contained 30 permanent members who had
come over to the side of the Democratic Bloc in Parliament.4 17  This
sudden merging of forces broke the powerful communist bloc in parliament
and allowed significant legislation to take place in the Summer of 1990.
41sbLC90, p. 18.
4 16SUT90., p. 6.
"
41 MARP90, p. 23.
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The most significant of these legislative actions were the Declaration of
Sovereignty and the Law on Economic Independence.
1. The Declaration of Sovereignty
The new Supreme Soviet session had as a working draft for the
Declaration of Sovereignty, a revision of a draft originally drawn up
earlier in 1990 by the outgoing Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Valentyna
Shevchenko. When the parliamentary commission on state sovereignty,
headed by M. Shul'ha, the secretary for inter-nationality relations in the
Central Committee of the CPU, released its revised draft of the
declaration it was attacked by the more conservative elements of the
Supreme Soviet as being a recipe for secession from the USSR while
opposition deputies charged that the Shul'ha draft didn't go far
enough.
This stalemate was broken when the RSFSR led the way by approving
their declaration of sovereignty on 8 June.4 19 This external impetus was
supplemented by internal factors; namely Ivashko's decision to take 63
conservative Communist deputies from the Supreme Soviet with him to the
two-week long CPSU Congress in Moscow. On 7 July , under pressure from
Narodna Rada, opposition leader V. Chernovil recalled these deputies to
Kiev to vote on the declaration. The majority of them refused to return
and quickly news reached Kiev that Ivashko had resigned from the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet to become Gorbachev's deputy in the CPSU. The realization
that Ivashko and the others that remained in Moscow with him cared more
"41NIN 0F, p. 19.
419The RSFSR Detaration n Sovereignty was voted into effect on 11 JAme 1990. See NIKA90F aid
SNUT91.
185
about their own career advancement than the fate of Ukraine angered many
Conservative deputies and they vented their frustration by voting for the
Sovereignty resolution on 16 July.4'
The resolution called for independence, self-determination,
authority over external relations, revival of culture and protection of
-the environment. The largest section of the declaration concerned
economic sovereignty which claimed Ukraine's resources for Ukraine. The
highly symbolic issue of the abbreviation "UkSSR" was hotly contested and
the opposition forces compromised by leaving it in the title but referring
to the republic as "Ukraine" in the text. The article on citizenship was
also a compromise with the opposition deputies demanding exclusive
citizenship to Ukraine only but having to settle for dual citizenship in
Ukraine as well as the USSR. The resolution's final sentence was also the
object of much debate because the opposition deputies wanted to omit any
mention of the union treaty while the hardliners demanded that the
Ukraine's sovereignty be based on this yet-to-be-signed treaty. The final
compromise read "the principle of the Declaration of Sovereignty of
Ukraine will be used to lay the basis of a Union treaty."421
Overall, this resolution was a victory over the more conservative
forces in parliament even if it was very idealistic. As Mihalisko
summarized the declaration; it can "be faulted for lack of realism, but
that would be missing the point. It was meant to be taken as a statement
of Ukraine's firm intention to govern its own destiny."422 The inclusion
4QNINA9F, p. 19.
4 1 MIHA90F, p. 19.
4224IHA9F, p. 18.
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of an article in the declaration which called for Ukraine to create its
own armed forces supported this view.
2. The Law on Economic Independence
In addition to the 16 July Declaration of State Sovereignty, the
parliamentary coalition of opposition and Communist forces produced the 3
August decree "Concerning the Economic Independence of the Ukrainian SSR"
and the accompanying "Law Concerning the Economic Independence of the
Ukrainian SSR." In spite of the retention of the outdated name "Ukrainian
SSR" the later two of these legislative items represented more of a real
victory for the opposition than does the declaration of sovereignty.
The economic declaration and the accompanying law were more "a
statement of intent than a real blueprint" for major reform. The law
establishes the principles of economic independence for Ukraine and
outlines regulations for its economy and society. The issues of financial
policy, budget, credit and the monetary system were addressed in addition
to regulations on property rights, taxation, and price policy. The
overall intent was to transfer Ukraine to a free market while simultane-
ously protecting workers and those loosing jobs as a result of the
reforms. Relations with "other states" were also stipulated. Unlike the
Declaration of Sovereignty, this law clearly asserts that Ukraine
maintains control over all her resources.'•
The merging of Communist and opposition forces during the first
session of the Supreme Soviet had given rise to a very productive summer's
legislation. However, the outlook for the second session which was to
begin in October was less certain. Opposition forces wished to keep their
'UARP9OJ, p. 16.
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momentum while the hard-line Communists were beginning to be spooked by
the rapid erosion of their power.
E. CRISIS: UKRAINE'S OCTOBER SUPREME SOVIET SESSION
The October Supreme Soviet session was being convened against a
background of an opposition assault on the Communist government and the
current make-up of the parliament over the issues of Ukraine's economic
performance and participation in the Union Treaty.
1. Background to the Session
Pressure was being applied from the center following Gorbachev's
April agreement known as the nine plus one plan and there were high hopes
that Ukraine would validate the Union Treaty during the Fall session of
the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet scheduled to open on 1 October. It seemed,
at first glance, that this would not be difficult; the Supreme Soviet was
still dominated by the Group of 239, the Communist block, led by Party
First Secretary Hurenko, and they came out strongly in support of the
Union Treaty and strongly rejected an opposition-sponsored declaration of
sovereignty. However, the opposition forces both inside and outside the
political system had declared that they would not agree to any union
treaty before a new Ukrainian constitution had been approved. In this
struggle, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Vitalii Masol became
a symbol of the Party's indifference to the demands of Ukrainians and he
rapidly became the focus of opposition wrath.
Masol's comments to the press in September on the "difficult"
situation in Ukraine did little to endear him to the opposition'.42  His
'Pravde UkrAiny, 25 September, 1990 as cited in NARP90K, p. 16.
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comments reflected, as Marples commented, that "his thinking not only lags
far behind that of the Ukrainian population as far as radical reforms are
concerned but is also alien to the current economic views in Moscow."'4
Masol placed blame for Ukraine's falling economic production on the self-
centeredness of youth who are violating the constitution (i.e., evading
the draft) and stirring up religious and national hostilities. Strikes
and lack of worker discipline, he claimed, have cost Ukraine to date this
year 1 billion, 10 million rubles. He went on to claim that the failure
of the harvest which left 2/3 of the potato, vegetable, and sugar beet
crops unharvested was a deliberate political plot by the farmers who are
under the influence of opposition agitators. In detailing the housing
shortage and energy crisis, he said the problem was that workers were too
occupied with political matters to carry out their work effectively. In
reference to the increasing number of Ukrainians rallying behind the
opposition flag, he warned, "Don't let yourselves be deceived by political
gamblers." 426
In the wake of Masol's comments, the battle lines began to be
drawn even before the doors of the parliamentary hall were opened. On the
eve of the Supreme Soviet's first session, the Ukrainian Republican Party
(URP) held a press conference and declared their goals to include the
dissolution and banning of the CPU and secession of the republic from the
Union. URP spokesman Chernovil also warned that a republic-wide
demonstration and political warning strike was to be held on 30 September
"MARP9OK, p. 16.
428Pravda Ukrainy, 25 September, 1990 as cited in NARP9OK, p. 16.
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and 1 October. '7 Rukh and its associate organizations joined the fray
and warned that they would carry out mass demonstrations in Kiev on the
eve of the session.
2. The CPU Responds
In response to the growing threats of unrest from the URP and
Rukh, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in a major concession, declared
on 29 September, that until a new constitution is adopted it "considers
the conclusion of a Union Treaty premature." But this concession went
relatively unnoticed in the excitement of the pending showdown of hard-
liners and reformers and the concession failed to defuse the situation.
On 30 September, protestors holding blue and yellow flags and banners
reading "No to the Union Treaty" and "Freedom for Ukraine" gathered on
October Revolution Square' 28 in front of the parliament building. The
rally before the parliament, consisting of 100,000 to 120,000 people, was
claimed by Izvestia to be the largest mass demonstration in Kiev since the
end of WWII. Among the demands of the crowd were the resignations of
certain leaders (namely Masol and even Kravchuk), new elections to the
Supreme Soviet, the depolitization of state institutions, Army, Security
organs, the MVD, and so on. The opposition forces of Narodna rada and
others issued a strike call throughout the republic that day. Although
the call went unheeded in most parts of the republic, on the morning of 1
October, thousands of supporters did appear in front of the parliament in
support of the opposition forces.
"2'Prvfd, 20 September, p. 2.
428Later renimed "Independece PMlza."
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At the same time, the Ukrainian Student's Union established a
tent city on the square to highlight their demands for nationalization of
CPU property and the Young Communists' League as well as new elections to
the Supreme Soviet.'4
2
The Communist reaction was one of surprise quickly supplanted by
fear. Even Mihalisko, writing for Radio Liberty about the opening session
of the parliament, wrote at this time that, "Indeed, there is reason to
believe that Ukraine's Communists were genuinely haunted by the specter of
being ousted from power as a consequence of the mass protests scheduled
for October 1."430 Even before the session's opening day, the Communists
had reportedly held a secret meeting to draw up plans to oppose the
declaration of sovereignty and from their statements, Mihalisko, notes "it
was clear that they feared events in the republic had got so out of hand
that an anti-Communist uprising was a realistic possibility."431 Public
indifference to the Supreme Soviet's attempts to defuse the situation by
agreeing to postpone approval of the Union treaty until Ukraine's new
constitution was in place no doubt added to the Party's concerns.4 32
On 30 September 1990, when Kiev was awash with protestors
demanding new parliamentary elections, economic improvements, and autonomy
from the center, a hostile interview with Masol was published in Pravda
Ukrainy in which he called for continued centralization of Ukraine's major
industries and price controls to avoid anarchy. These were hardly the
4a S. Tsikora, "A Difficult Monday," Izvestia, 1 October, 1990, pp. 1-2 trans• . in CDSP, Vol XLIl,





words Ukrainians wanted to hear. In addressing issues of sovereignty and
autonomy from the center, he urged Ukraine to sign grain agreements with
Russian, Byelorussia, and Uzbekistan, proposed a move toward light, rather
than heavy industry, in the future. He also warned it was not likely that
the transfer of all enterprises from All-Union to Ukrainian control would
be completed by the target date in 1991. Even if it was, he asserted
there probably would be little impact on the falling standard of living.
In addition, he warned against the idea of trading Ukrainian goods on the
world market because "our standards are simply not high enough." Farmers,
he told the paper, have "no great desire" for privatization and private
enterprises have little promise.' 33
3. The Session Opens
Obviously, Masol's interview did little to help the situation.
On the opening day of Parliament and the next, outside the parliament
hall, Ukrainian students began a hunger strike in the tent city they had
set up in the square in front of the parliament. Their demands for the
resignation of the Ukrainian Prime Minister Masol, the nationalization of
all Party and Komsomol property, the dissolution of the present parliament
and multi-party elections, and the right for Ukrainian conscripts to serve
in Ukraine were added to the demands of the opposition forces in
parliament. Over the next two weeks the student strike spread and tens of
thousands of University students, teachers, and high-school students.
Ukrainian students skipped classes and held demonstrations in what was one
of the "largest acts of student rebellion in Soviet history."43 4 The
'Purvda Ukraim, 29 Septeuber 199, as cited in NARP9OK, p. 17.
'"NINA9VD, p. 18.
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students came from diverse regions of Ukraine; KharKiv, Lviv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil. They were protected
by uniformed students of the Kiev Marine school.' 35
The situation inside the parliament hall was just as chaotic.
The opening session quickly devolved into chaos with opposition deputy
Konev demanding the resignation of Masol, Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, and Kravchuk as head of the republic. The session was shortly
adjourned until the next day.
The second day of the Supreme Soviet was less hectic but was
interrupted by altercations between pro'estors and police and the
announcement that 123 students had begun a hunger strike in front of the
parliament. During the second secession, it was also revealed that the
Union-wide strike had failed. It had been supported by only 31
enterprises with less that 10,000 employees total.436 Despite this, the
opposition receive support from across the isle on the issue of economics
and sovereignty.
4W"An October RevoLution," The Ukrainian Weekly, VoL. LVIII, No. 43, 28 October 1990, p. 6. See
also "An October RevoLution: Hunger strike Leaders Reflect on Growing Student Influence in Ukraine,"
The Ukrainian WeekLy, Vol. LVIII, No. 47, 25 November 1990, pp. 9-11 which portrays the students
unhappiness with not only the CPU but also the Lack of support receive initially from the Naroo'na Rada,
Rukh, and other opposition groups. The view that RIukh was heavily involved in the strike was also
presented. According to Pravda Ukrainy, Rukh and the Ukrainian RepubLican Party distributed LeafLets
encouraging students to support their comrades starving themselves on the parliament steps by asking
them to "break off your studies, declare strikes, hold rallies, and adopt resolutions in support of the
hunger strikers' demands." According to the same report money was also coltected to support such
activities. It was also mentioned that some PeopLe's Deputies from the People's Council (a parLia-
mentary group comprised of parties opposed to the CPU which includes Rukh) actually joined the student
strike. Pravda Ukrainy reported that I. Orach a'nd N. Goryn of Rukh admitted involvement in organizing
the student strike. ("Let's Look Truth in the Eye," Pravda Ukrainy, 25 Oct 1990, p. 2, as excerpted
in "Pravda Lays Blame for Kiev Hunger Strike," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 42, No. 43,
21 Nov 1990, p. 8)
46S. Tsikora, "In Search of Stabilization Measures," Izvestia, 3 October 1990, p. 2 transL. in
CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 40, p. 10. The turn out in support of the strike was very smaLL considering that
25 million Ukrainians report to work every day.
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The CPU, represented by Masol was clearly advocating the "go
slow" approach and his refusal to directly address the Union Treaty issue
in the press cast doubts on his ability to represent Ukraine's "true"
d,'sires in negotiations with Moscow on the issue of sovereignty. His
ideas on economic reforms were outmoded and by laying the blame for
economic shortcomings on the lack of worker discipline sounded
condescending. He clearly had no solutions to offer and no visible
loyalty to Ukraine. Accordingly, when Masol presented his economic plan
to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in early October, they were rejected by
both opposition and Communist candidates alike.
4. Opposition Victory
In a startling victory for the opposition, on 17 October the
Supreme Soviet bowed to the opposition demands and approved a modified
declaration of sovereignty, a decree on Ukraine's economic independence,
a referendum in 1991 to decide the question of new elections to the
Supreme Soviet and the resignation of the Republic's Prime Minister. On
23 October, the Supreme Soviet voted 254 to 83 to accept Masol's
resignation. Masol denounced the vote as "moral terrorism." He was
succeeded temporarily by V. Fokin, chairman of the Committee on the
Economy, and an ally of Kravchuk.4 37
The ouster of Masol and the approval of opposition demands for
new elections and economic independence provided the Narodna Rada and the
non-parliamentary opposition groups such as the student groups with
4 7"Pertimment Accepts Masol Resignetion," The Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. LVIII, No. 43, 28 October
1990, p. 1. Fokin was elected to the post of Prime Ninster on 14 November 1990.
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increased credibility and confidence. Rukh capitalized on this turn for
the better and took the offensive.
F. RUKH DECLARES WAR ON THE CPU
The radicalization of Rukh, a non-political body, proceeded at a rapid
pace in 1990 as its delegates gained legitimacy and power through parlia-
mentary successes. The Inevitability of Rukh becoming a political Party
was evident to its leadership early in 1990. A statement appeared in the
8 March 1990 edition of Literaturna Ukraina signed by a number of Rukh's
leadership who were at this time still CPU members (Drach, Pavlychko, V.
Yavorovs'kyi, V. Donchyk, and others). They argued for transforming Rukh
into a political body and called for true independence of Ukraine.
However, during the fourth session of Rukh's leadership body, the Grand
Council, this appeal was rejected. At the same time, the battle lines
began to be drawn between Rukh and the Party by the announcement that the
top leadership of Rukh, Drach and Pavlychko, were leaving the CPU. The
other's were soon expelled.4'
1. Rukh's Second Congress
During Rukh's second congress, held in Kiev from 25-28 October
1990439, Rukh's transformation into a political party was completed and
a new direction for Rukh was approved by the body. This congress was "not
the euphoric event that the inaugural Rukh conclave was, It was, instead
- as benefits a maturing political and public organization - a goal-
43
asoLC92, p. xvii.
'3See Ukrainian Revorter, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1991, p. 5 for a beak down of the delegates
attending the conference. This dta my be coqwered to simiLar data for the inaugurat conference in
19M9 (Set PAN191).
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oriented meeting.0"° The goals were made clear by a large banner
hanging outside the Ukraina Palace"' where the congress convened; "From
perebudova to independence." The word "perestroika" was dropped from
Rukh's official name and "the renewal of independent statehood for
Ukraine" was declared as the primary goal." 2
A measure of Rukh's development was that unlike Rukh's first
congress, over 200 guests representing foreign countries attended,
including a 50 person delegation from the US. As well, in comparison with
last year's congress when 20% of the membership claimed CPSU membership,
only 2% did so this year." 3 In response to assertions in 1989 that Rukh
did not have broad based support among the populace"', great emphasis
was placed on diversity among the delegates in hopes of forestalling
fragmentation of the opposition. As Ivan Drach stressed in his opening
address, the congress is a "conference of consolidation for all democratic
forces."" 5  In reality this meant that
among the delegates and guests present at the congress were represen-
tatives of all facets of the Ukrainian nation: from Donbas miners to
soldiers' mothers, from strike committees to student associations,
from Green World to the Ukrainian Language Society, from the
Ukrainian Republican Party to anarcho-syndicalists. Fourty-five
"440"Eukh Moves Forward," The Ukrainian Weektv, VoL. LVIII, No. 45, 11 November 1990, p. 6.
"441Ironically the Ukrianina Palace is where CPU form are held.
"442 SOLC92, p. xvii see also, "Ivan Orach Addresses Rukh Assemly," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1,
No. 1, January 1991, p. 4 and see also SOLC90, p. 23.
"43See PANI91, and Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1991, p. 5.
4"Paniotto's study of Rukh's 1989 inaugural congress showed that based on demographic character-
istics (education, occupation, age, etc.) Rukh delegates represent only 7-8 percent of the Ukrainian
population. As well, he discovered that; "there are significant differences between the min concerns
of Rukh and those of the general population: for Rukh meyers they are poLitics and nationat culture,
for the population, economy and ecology." Although these discrepancies appear to have lessened
slightly since the study in Late 1989, they do indicate a representation problem.
"
5H ADZ90, p. 3.
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political and public organizationa6active in Ukraine today sent their
representatives to the congress.
In line with this theme, the Rukh program was changed to allow "all
democratic forces, all political parties or public organizations that work
toward completely independent statehood of Ukraine' to join its ranks." 7
2. CPU Reaction
In an analysis of the congress from the Communist view point,
there was a remarkable change from the condemnations of a year ago.
Although the CPU central Committee attacked the congress, " from
Communists outside the parliament there emerged more moderate statements.
In addition, although Rukh had initially masked its true intent, i.e.
taking political power, because of the repressive regime in 1989, at the
1990 congress finally was able to emerge in its true form. As a result,
at the congress, the CPU and the Democratic forces were considered to be
now equal in force."9 An article printed in -,ý consecutive issues of
Rabochaya Tribuna conceded this fact and warned,
Let us not oversimplify matters: Rukh is a serious political force,
and it has to be recognized within the republic. Its is essential to
find here currents of dialogue, to seek points of contact together,
and to act and not attempt to "bend" them and make them just another
MS.Rukh Moves Forward," The Ukrainian Weekly, Vot. LVIII, No. 45, 11 November 1990, p. 6.
"
7
"lukh Moves Forward," The Ukrainian Weekly, Vot. LVIII, No. 45, 11 November 1990, p. 6.
4" See for example, ODIN9OA. The statement also referred to Rukh's restructuring as an
anticommunist organization opposed to the 'current regime.'" The article went on to discuss the
implications of this turn; "In practical terms, this could mark the beginning of an open confrontation
between the welL-organized Ukrainian Coummnist Party, more than 3 million strong, and Rukh, which has
5 million memers but no smoothly working mechanism of operation." Pravda took an even more
reactionary approach toward Rukh "They need undivided power, and right now. As has been stated in
parliant, their aim is to smash the lest communist regime in Europe. And for this purpose all means
wilt serve, as the saying goes." And it concluded; "The current actions of a certain segment of the
Leaders of Iukh and the Peoples' Council very much smack of a noose that they are preparing to slip
around the neck of democracy." The same report decried the flocking of yotug people to the image of
*andurs aid the OUN-UIA which the report credited with "having left in its wake thousands of graves,
orphans, and innocent people."
"RELO0OA, p. 56.
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structure accountable to the apparatus, as was the case a year ago.
We should give serious thought to the very small parties hatched out
in the Rukh nest which can, apparently, bring to clamorous mass
meetings thousands and thousands of people. Packed squares are
listening to them. Not all the speakers are, after all, calling for
... (secession]. We are all--opposition and ruling party--faced with
the transition to the market. The longer we fail to hear one
another, the more quickly we will move toward a deepening of the
confrontation, and the longer it goes on, the more palpable will be
the costs. The opposition 5may not understand this. But we
Communists are duty bound to.' 0
There was a suggestive hint in the article that Rukh's attack on the CPU
was solely based on the fact that the CPU was controlled by forces outside
the republic (i.e., the CPSU) and that if the CPU were to become
"separatist" then Rukh's stance would, allegedly, be different.' 5'
Rukh's new path was forcing the CPU to evolve more quickly than
it would hav eon its own. In an interview with Radio Liberty in October,
Kravchuk declared that Rukh's decision to declare war on the CPU was "a
crucial mistake" because it could only lead to confrontation. But he was
also forced to admit that if Rukh had not perused its confrontational
policies, "we would not have come so far so fast."45
2
Rukh's stepped up attacks on the Party came at the same time the
CPU was beginning to weaken from within. The extent of internal decay in
the Party was growing and it would be critical in bringing about change of
the CPu1.
WUELONA, p. 56.
451 EL090A, p. 56.
'5INAHA90A, p. 15.
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6. THE CPU WEAKENS
The year 1990 was not a good one for the CPU. In this year alone, the
First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee admitted to a loss of
180,000 people from the party,453 with Solchanyk putting the figure at
220,000.454 In addition he also admitted, "I do not think this process
has ended yet. There are many cases where Communists do not pay their
membership dues, and thereby, also in effect, terminate their Party
membership." 455
In addition, the CPU was increasingly loosing power to the opposition
forces in the parliament and loosing credibility among the population.
There were several attempts to analyze this weakening of the CPU and one
in particular, in discussing the fallout from the disastrous (for the CPU)
Fall of 1990 and the failure of the Communist Party to gain even a
majority in the Western Oblasts, concluded that the reasons were twofold.
First, the program of the opposition was based on the ideas of the 19th
All-Union Party Conference and thus the potential CPU program had been
coopted. Second, "the perestroika people from the apparatus looked very
unconvincing because they had used up their credit of trust allocated to
them even before the elections."456  While correct, this list is
incomplete. One must also include in addition to the obvious rise of the
aODIN9O, p. 28.
4'USOLC91A, p. 13. Sotchanyk also cites an incoming level of meiIers at only 38,000. For an idea
of the ALL-Union situation: in the months of July and August 1990, the CPSU as a whole, lost 311,000
P Itrs and in the previous six months a total of 371,000 meaIers resigned from the CPSU. (See The




opposition discussed above, the following; internal CPU decay, poor
handling of the opposition, and a loss of credibility with the population.
1. The Handling of the Opposition
If there was one consistent theme throughout 1990 in terms of
Party-opposition relationships, it would have to be the negative approach
the Party took toward the opposition. This approach, an anachronistic
hold over from the bygone era of Shcherbytsky, simply radicalized the
opposition and politicized their supporters.
a. Attacks on the Opposition
The attacks on the opposition became increasingly severe as
the year wore on especially after the events surrounding the opening of
the second session of the Supreme Soviet in which the Party suffered
humiliating losses and after the student strike frightened the CPU. The
Party's attempt to respond to the opposition reflected a lack of both
clear direction and thinking. For example, at the critical moment when
the opposition forces were massing outside the Parliament, a special
Ukrainian Party Plenum was convened on 28 September to address the issue.
Hurenko railed against the opposition groups which recently emerged from
their democratic "camouflage" and were now "concentrating their efforts on
the seizure of power by any means, not excluding violence." These
attempts to discredit the opposition forces were presented to the republic
in an address titled "Let Us be Vigilant: They are Leading Us to
Grief.'4 57  A few days later on 1 October 1990 when the Supreme Soviet
Session opened both Rukh and Narodna Rada assembled (at some cost)
thousands of supporters from Kiev and other Oblasts. The Communists
46'rfvA, 28 September I990 as cited in M[1A9O, p. 17.
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responded by bringing their supporters into the streets - dressed in the
much despised uniforms of the militia and special security teams
[Omonovtsy]45.
b. Alienation of the Opposition
For some, the October fiasco was the last straw. For
example, the final break between the literary-cultural elites and the CPU
occurred as a result of events in October 1990. After the student strike,
the "Patriarch of the Ukrainian literary scene", Oles Honchar, resigned
from the Party in response to how they treated the student hunger
strikers.459  His decision to exit the Party signaled the end of
Ukraine's literary elites efforts to work within the Party.
The Party's reliance on strong-arm tactics did little to
endear them to the population. For example, there was significant public
outcry after 17 November, when prominent democratic opposition leader
Stepan Khmara was stripped of his parliamentary immunity and arrested in
the Supreme Soviet after an alleged attack on an NVD officer during
Revolution day on 7 November."° Drawing parallels between this
incident and the well publicized arrests and trials of Daniel and
Sinyavsky in 1965, deputies of the Narodna Rada called the arrest a
"planned provocation.. .with the goal of compromising one of the leaders of
'MBEL090, p. 57.
%•Jkrsini2n Retorter, Vol. 1, No. 17, s$tweer 1991. p. 4.
Se.O$ "Stepn Khmera is Arreted, The Ukrainian W@*kl , Vol. LVIII, No. 47, 25 November 1990,
p. 1, 11.
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the democratic movement in Ukraine and removing hi. from political
activity..461
After the Khmara, incident the Supreme Soviet adopted a
decree restricting demonstrations and public meetings "2 and began what
became known as the November assault. This program of CPU leadership-
directed repression consisted of five prongs: I) use of law enforcement
bodies to repress opposition; 2) government pressure on independent trade
unions; 3) portrayal of Western Ukrainians as extreme nationalists in the
media and via the Party apparat 4) dispersal of CPU finances to prevent
their loss in the transfer to a market economy; and 5) acts to discredit
the opposition leadership. The media was hampered by closing of printing
presses, paper shortages, closing of television programs, and firing of
reporters who took an anti-Party line. A number of radical deputies
(Khmara, Ratushnyi and others) were brought in for questioning or
arrested. Leaders of the Solidarity Free Trade Unions of Ukraine were
harassed.463
On another front, the Party attempted to play up to what
they assumed was a fundamental unity between the Ukrainians and the
Russians (read: the Union). In early November, a well coordinated pro-
union press campaign organized by the CPU and executed by their press
organ, Pravda Ukrainy was underway. The campaign started, ostensibly to
81'Khnmra Declare& Nunger Strike," The Ukrainian Weekty, Vol. LVIII, No. 48, 2 December 1990, p.
4.
40SLC91, p. 24.
4 OViachesLav Pikhobschek, "The 'Contras' go on the Offensive," Ukrainian Revorter, Vol. 1, No.
4, February 1991, p. 1. In addition see a secret Komomot document printed in the Ukrainian Republican
Party paper Nezatezhnist which outlines a program for Komsomol aebers to follow to bring youth back
into the party fold. ("Secret Komomol Document Outtines Counter Offensive," Ukrainian Recorter, Vol.
1, No. 4, February 1991, p. 4)
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protest the destruction of a statue of Lenin in Western Ukraine and was
widened to advocate a continued close union between Russia and Ukraine.
In an article by a middle school director in Kiev published in the
Ministry of Educations official organ, Radianska Osvita, Russophobia was
blamed for creating the idea of Great Russian chauvinism. Additionally
the historic, common roots of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians were
stressed as was the magnanimous role the Russians have played in the
development of Ukraine.•
In reality, the CPU was floundering and lashing out blindly
at the opposition in a desperate struggle to gain control over a process
it neither liked nor understood. This struggle was also being carried out
within the CPU which had ominous indications for the future of the Party.
2. Internal Decay
The most obvious symbol of the internal problems of the CPU was
the Masol fiasco in September 1990 when "essentially Masol became a symbol
of the Communist-led government's inability to preside over the transition
to sovereignty. "46 As the vote to accept his resignation shows, he was
rejected by the CPU as well as Narodna Rada. It was clear that the CPU
was far from united on ideas for the future.
a. Dissention in the Party
A number of Party members became disillusioned over the
Party's trajectory. For example, Pavylychko, a Party member and founder
of Rukh cites the Lithuanian Crisis in early 1990 as his final cue to




belief that we can create a foundation for Ukrainian national life through
the Party--as the Lithuanians initially thought--is mistaken.""
There were increasing numbers of those in the Party who
began to think along different lines. While these "reformers" did not
reject the ideology or the power of the Party they were cognizant that
changes were happening and that they too needed to change, first Secretary
of the CPU Central Committee, Gurenko acknowledged this;
I am not calling for a return to the old methods. That would be not
only senseless, but frankly impossible. Life is changing, and
whether we like it or not, in, say, the economic sphere, market
relations are increasingly becoming a reality even today. Here
diktat 42f any kind is inconceivable, and that includes party
diktat.
However, there was a substantial core of the Party which
clung to the old methods and refused to accept change. A good example of
this appeared in an interview with a correspondent from Rabochnaya hazeta
V. Y. Ostrozhinskiy, politburo member and secretary of the CPU Central
Committee. In the interview he gave his views on the challenge to the CPU
and revealed the level of inflexible thinking still existent in the CPU
leadership after the tumultuous events of 1990."a In response to calls
for the CPU to be outlawed, he had this to say; "To raise the question of
carving out a healthy, vital organ, to use medical terminology, is, if
not absurd, then at least unusually stupid.. .this is a dangerous
provocation." (italics added) In general to ideas about the opposition's
calls to depoliticize institutions and the like, he responded;
*%RP9•P, p. 22.
'i. Odinets, "At Life's Front Line," Pravda, 2nd ad., 27 November 1990, pp. 1-2, transt. in
"Gurenko Revives Political Situation,* FBIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 December 1990, pp. 27-28.
4
"Oepotitization: Let us Clear the Air," Rabochave Gazeta, trans. "Communist Party Official
on Depotiticization,- FOIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 December 1990, pp. 29-32.
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In my view, it is wrong to speak of depolitization. It is either an
illusion or a deliberate political deception. In such a politicized
society as ours, depolitization is unthinkable in general. The labor
colleaives and the Army will always be the object of political
life.
He accused the "republicans' of engaging in "political
blackmail", "outright treachery", "hooliganism", and 'pogroms.' These
opposition forces are deliberately exploiting the workers by playing up to
their self-interests, he argued, "it is sad, but many people, when they
enter hastily created social associations, do not yet understand that they
are being manipulated for certain political interests." In response to
the future political structure in Ukraine he declared that he is in favor
of political pluralism, but that "it is impossible to formally reduce it
exclusively to a multiparty situation." He criticized the focus on
parties and the fact that local soviets, trade unions, and All-Union
Leninist Communist Youth Leagues are not considered in the political
fabric of Ukraine because "it is here that the masses really engage in the
government of the society." In an appeal for help from the press,
increasingly radicalized by glasnost, he added "Much--I emphasize this
especially-can be done by journalists to protect the civil rights of
Communists. In these questions, too, we need glasnost, efficiency,
honesty, and comradely support." In closing, he appealed to those who
were considering joining the growing number of those Communists who had
turned in their cards;
I appeal to all who are confused: Do not give in to outbursts of
emotion, do not be in a hurry to make a decisions about leaving the
CPSU! Remember that only solidarity and joint efforts of Party
members and all healthy forces of the society can rectify that
40"potitization: Let us Clear the Air," Rabochaym Unzete, transL. "Coamwnist Party Official
on DepoLiticization,- FOIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 Deember 1990, pp. 29-32.
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difficult situation in which our state has found itself. The people
and history will give you your due in full measure.47
b. The CPI Fractures
Under these internal tensions and external pressures, the
CPU fractured. The roots of the rift go back to July 1990 when the group
of 22 deputies, calling themselves the Democratic Platform of the CPU,
broke away from the Party and renamed itself the Ukrainian Party of
Democratic Agreement. Their motivation reportedly was disillusionment.
They no longer believed real reform could happen inside the CPSU. On 1-2
December 1990 this group re-formed, creating the largest opposition party
to date. During the group's founding congress in December, it changed its
name again to The Ukrainian Party of Democratic Renewal (UPDR) and
announced that it had a membership of 2,340 members representing all but
two oblasts (Trans-Carpathia and Zhytomyr). One quarter of their members
were still Party members. The UPDR platform expressed support for other
democratic parties, condemned the CPU's November offensive on the
opposition, denounced the Union Treaty, and came out in favor of
disassembling the USSR and relying on the Declaration of Sovereignty as a
new basis for existence.471
The UPDR had the potential to become a very powerful player
in the struggle against the CPU because it was tied into the Party system.
According to various reports, every fifth member was a deputy at some
level of government and since "these are people with a lot of intellectual
baggage" their impact may be magnified. Its major impact will most likely
"4"Oepolitizetion: Let us Clear the Air," Rabocheye Gazeta, transt. "Communist Party Official
an DeoLiticization," FBIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 Deceaber 1990, pp. 29-32.
4 7 1
"Reformist Commuaists Launch Searate PartyN Ukrainian Remorter, Vol. 1, No. 4, February 1991,
p. 2.
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be felt in the urban centers in Eastern Ukraine because of its primarily
Russian nature.'•
c. The Failure of Party Leadership
In 1990, the CPU won the March elections but lost the fight.
Following the elections, the Communists held a majority of seats it,
Supreme Soviet and yet, the Communist Group of 239, failed to produce an
effective or dynamic leader to spar with those of the opposition, who, as
the communists lamented, "were far ahead on points, at least in the eyes
of the unsophisticated voters."'4
7 3
There were even more fundamental problems affecting the
CPU's performance throughout the republic. Namely that the CPU was no
longer a political party but had become, as Gorbachev had said, "a nucleus
of the command administrative system." This meant in practical terms that
"When the system started to come apart at the seams, the nucleus had
virtually no political fighters capable of breaking out of the comfort of
their offices and engaging, as Lenin would have said, in a real
fight."4'7  This in turn led to another problem, "the inability of the
functionary in Party uniform to engage in rigorous political actions."
47
This in turn led to a loss of vision.
It was exactly the lack of ideas for the future which was
crippling the CPU from within. At the crucial turning point when the
47"Reformist Communists Launch Separate Party," Ukrainian Reporter, Vul. 1, No. 4, 4 February
1991, p. 2. One report remrking on the Russian-ness of the congress noted that -one gets the feeting









Party stood on the brink of paralysis at the opening of the Second Session
of the Supreme Soviet, the Party was incapable of understanding what
needed to be done. As described by a group of Communist journalists
present at the 28 September Central Committee Plenum to address the
problem, the Supreme Soviet condemned the opposition, called for Party
unity and the need to enhance the primary role of Party organizations.
Yet this speech by Central Committee First Secretary, Gurenko
had everything except the main thing - there was no strong and
specific idea around which it would be possible to rally the more
than three millon-strong Party organization, nor was there a program
for extracting the republic from its deep economic and political
crisis.416
The lack of such a program was exacerbating a condition of
declining public support for the CPU. Ironically, as the political
situation in Ukraine developed, the CPU found itself with fewer and fewer
means of regaining its credibility.
3. Loss of Credibility
A great deal the CPU's loss of credibility stemmed from being out
of touch, or more to the point, refusing to recognized the public
sentiment increasingly in favor of independence. For example, a poll by
the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev
reported on 3 December 1990 that 38 percent of Kievites supported complete
independence from the USSR, 40 percent supported an independent Ukraine
within a confederation of Sovereign republics, and 18.5 percent favored
sovereignty within a Soviet federation. The CPU, with its
"s
7 ELO9OB, p. 58.
4'"Opposition Leads in Opinion Polls,"Ukrainion Reoorter, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991, p. 3. The September
poll was conducted by The Central Ukrainian oepartment of the ALL-Union Centre of Public Opinion
Studies. These results were said to be higher than a September poll showing only 25 percent of
Kievites favored complete independence.
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conservative stance on Ukraine's future, was simply not able to gain the
confidence of the population which felt this way.
The results of a public opinion poll taken by 421 residents of
Kiev and 878 others (presumably from other regions of the country)
published on 31 March 1990 in Radyans'ka Ukraina indicated that in the
eyes of the public the Party was expiring. The data from this poll,
summarized by David Marples for Radio Liberty, indicates that among the
population surveyed (75% with higher education, 70% Party Members, 6.6%
Workers, and 2.6% peasants), 56.8 percent thought the February 1990
Central Committee of the CPSU Plenum was ineffectual in terms of helping
the social problems in Ukraine.
In answer to the future of the CPSU, 37.3 percent said it must
stand as vanguard alongside other parties, 30.1 percent felt it should be
a "political club", and only 12 percent supported its continued one-party
status. Nearly 75 percent of those surveyed felt that democratic
centralism was not in accord with the needs of society today. In response
to questions about the future of the CPU in the CPSU, the results were
mixed with 36.7 percent advocating a CPU independent of the CPSU, 28.7
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advocating a confederative arrangement, and 24.5 saying the CPU should
remain within the CPSU.471
Although this last poll was far from a perfect reflection of
public opinion, Marples drew some tentative conclusions from the data.
Most basically he found that "the position of the Communist Party in
Ukraine, long an obstacle to democratic reform, is becoming more and more
insecure.' 7
a. The CPU and the Lack of Power in the Periphery
The root of the CPU's insecurity lay in the fact that the
CPU had few instruments of power or control with which to entice support
from the populace. For example the Supreme Soviet convened a meeting in
early spring 1990, to adopt a resolution on closing Chernobyl by 1995 in
response to growing public pressure exerted though ecological
organizations such as Zelenyi svit.48° Having adopted the resolution,
however, the Supreme Soviet found itself unable to act because they lacked
jurisdiction over the atomic energy stations in Ukraine. The Supreme
Soviet resorted instead, to making a formal proposal to the central
4711MARP90, p. 22. In contrast to this survey see that conducted by Miller, Reisinger, and Hesti
in May and June 1990 (prior to the newly elected Supreme Soviet beginning work). Their survey
consisted of 1,800 Soviet citizens (600 each in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. The cities poLLed in
Ukraine were Kiev, Kharkhov, and Uzhgorod each in central, eastern, and western Ukraine respectively.
The survey's aim was to measure the popular support for the Communist institutions in these RepubLics.
Next to Russians Living in Lithuania, Ukrainians living in Ukraine showed the second highest level of
support to the central leadership with only 18 percent of those surveyed agreeing that their republican
Leaders better represented their interests then the Leaders in Moscow. Ukrainians also held the
highest regard for the Communist Party of all the other nationalities potted. Significantly,
Ukrainians gave higher marks to the USSR Supreme Soviet than to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and
generaLly gave poor marks toward locat-level soviets. This Last trend may well have been because the
recently elected Ukrainian Suprme Soviet had not yet begun to act. The survey results on the
respondents preference of "freedom" otL order indicated that 61 percent of Ukrainian s in Ukraine valued
order over "freedom." In addition, fourty percent of them said that reform were progressing too
quickly. (MILL9), p. 103.) Overall, MiLer, Reisinger, and Nesti conclude that there is a "tendency
for Ukrainian to be more supportive and conservative than Russians." (MILL9O, p. 105)
47NMARP96, p. 22.
4MAtso contributing to public outrage is the fact that 8-9 percent of the energy produced in
Ukraine is sent beyond Ukraine's borders and thus appears as exploitation at Ukraine's expense.
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Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry in Moscow for aid for environmental
clean-up and asked for centralized capital input for other projects.48 1
Economic reform plans drawn up in 1989 by Leonid Abalkin
also reflected the pervasiveness of central control in Ukraine. The
section of the plan concerning prices noted that certain prices would
remain at state-determined levels while others would be "freed'. This
clearly indicated that Moscow-controlled industry in Ukraine is not
subject to republican jurisdiction.'8W
b. Economic Crisis and Reform Undermines Support for the CPU
The diminishing ability of the CPU to provide the population
with economic improvement also undermined their ability to win support.
This attenuation of power was primarily due to the collapsing Ukrainian
economy for which the CPU was blamed while the opposition remained
untainted. Attempts by the CPU to reform the economy and gain control
over shortages and rising prices were bungled and caused a large public
outcry against the Party. The most obvious example of economic reforms
gone awry occurred on I November, when the Ukrainian government introduced
a coupon system for a 6-month trial period. Under this system, coupons
would be issued monthly for the purchase of food and non-food items as
well as "goods of technical importance." A "consumer book" would be
issued to each citizen needed to redeem the coupons. The motive for this
drastic measure was to solve the problems of empty store shelves and the
growing black market. However, this decree which effected every person
living in Ukraine was drafted on 22 October with little or no discussion
4
•I ARP90E, p. 18 mAd ARP9I, p. 170-71.
48in 1990, only 5 percent of the resources in Ukraine are controlled by the RepihWic.
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in parliament. The three chief engineers of the plan held a press
conference on 29 October to explain although the measures were unpopular,
they were necessary to prevent growing demand and falling production from
leading to widespread speculation. Fokin remarked that the long-term
solution was to introduce a Ukrainian currency but in the meantime the
coupon system would have to do.
There was an immediate outcry from the Supreme Soviet saying
the measure had been enacted secretly and without them even being aware of
its existence until the press conference. Robitnycha haseta,
describing the measure as coming "like a thundercloud in a clear sky" said
it was being implemented in "the worst tradition of the period of
stagnation." The paper's editors argued that had the government sought
the approval of the people, they would likely have received it but as it
was, this announcement was further undermining the already low public
confidence in the Government.4 8'
Ukraine Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman V. B. Grin'ev, who
heard about the measures indirectly and not through parliament, declared
that because of its sweeping embrace, it should be discussed along with
the other reforms currently under consideration. According to Grin'ev's
statement, some oblasts even went so far as to vote against enacting the
degree as ordered by Kiev. 485
63MARP9g, p. 10.
4'Robit Sch aseta, 1 November, 1990 as cited in KARP9OM, p. 10.
48 WARIP9ON, p. 10.
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c. The CPU'S Ecological Problem
To make things worse, Ukraine's economic collapse was
inextricably linked to the Chernobyl clean up which continued to drag down
the Ukrainian economy and constantly reminded Ukrainians of the state
energy policies which led to Chernobyl's construction and mishandling.
The major reconstruction work to house and facilitate evacuees had taken
a large portion of the republican budget and in addition, in 1989, 500,000
hectares of agricultural land were restricted or closed to use due to the
fallout which meant decreasing income from agriculture. In 1990, over 3
billion rubles was allocated to cover the costs of decontamination, new
evacuations, provision of decontaminated food, and medical services from
1991-1995.4s6
Entering 1990, Ukraine was also facing energy shortages due
to increasing demand outstripping production. But once again, the CPU was
caught in a vise. In order to alleviate the crisis, additional atomic
energy stations had to be brought on line, but the public outcry against
these projects was threatening to destabilize the political arena.
On 2 August the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared a 5 year
moratorium on the construction of new atomic energy stations and expansion
of existing ones in Ukraine. The declaration was a mixed blessing for the
CPU. On one hand it provided credibility to the 16 July declaration of
Sovereignty and demonstrated to Moscow that Ukraine was capable of
conducting independent domestic policy in an area traditionally run only
by the Center. On the other hand, the declaration represented a victory
for the opposition. After all, the declaration was the culmination of
'"*WPM2, p. 25.
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numerous protests and strikes organized and prompted by Rukh and Zelenyi
svit against the ecological and human dangers posed by these plants. The
moratorium also meant that Ukraine's domestic energy production capability
would be halted at present levels or even decreased.
The moratorium was a another victory for the opposition
which had been for the past few years protesting the construction of new
sites and the expansion or continued use of others."' 7  In 1989, the
Crimea station was closed when local residents threatened a large-scale
strike. In 1990 the Khmelnitsky station was targeted for protest and in
addition to mass protests, the cement factory which supplied materials for
the plant construction went on strike and 15 local residents went on a
hunger strike to protest the project.'48
In August, in an unexpected reversal, the director of
Chernobyl bowed to public pressure and agreed that the plant should be
closed but only after careful study of how and when. He bitterly
complained that the decommission of Chornobyl would create a shortfall of
energy production but that such reasoning had been ignored by the
publ ic.489
48TUkraine appealed for a moratorium on atomic energy stations as early at the 19th Party
Conference in June 1988.
MARP901t, p. 20.
'The director's Letter appeared in the 7 August 1990 issue of Radvans'ka Ukraine and is discussed
in NARP9OR, p. 20. NarpLes points out that by FalL 1990 only four power stations were operating and
of those one was under siege by protestors. Nuclear energy conprises 22 percent of the energy unused
in Ukraine and was expected to rise to 60 percent by 2000. Hydroelectric stations are operating a peak
capacity and the coal fired pants are at risk due to the collapse of Ukraine's coat industry.
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H. THE CPU ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN CONTROL
The CPU's weaknesses were not unrecognized by the leadership as
reflected in a speech by Kravchuk at the CPU Central Committee Plenum held
on the eve of the 2nd session of the Ukrainian legislature;49
The people will support us if we offer them concrete deeds. At
present this means the economy and finding solutions to social
issues .... If this occurs we will push into second place all those
about whom the political speculation is now rife....
What do people want? They say this; Just make one tangible good move
We spend all our time talking, but in reality we are doing
nothing ....
... Since 10 September, long before the session, opposition deputies
have been working energetically in the Supreme Soviet and have drafts
for all documents. Up to now we have been unable to meet. Moreover,
on 1 October the opposition organized a demonstration while our
deputies from the Communist Part; again gathered here, taking refuge
from the traffic conditions ....
While Kravchuk seemed to know what to had to be done, the CPU was dragging
its feet. Steps taken to secure economic and political autonomy were
steps in the right direction but they were only taken in 1990 under
pressure from the opposition.
Under assault from within as well as from the opposition forces
outside parliament, the CPU was gradually beginning a process of
distancing themselves from the center. This was a strategy which would
appeal to the opposition as well as to most of those in the CPU who saw
that a future bound to the CPSU would bring only trouble. Beginning in
1990 there were a series of steps taken by the CPU (some under pressure
from the opposition and others on their own initiative) to separate itself
from Moscow.
40Interstingty, none of this speech was ever printed in the Repubtic newspapers.
BIELO9OB, p. 57.
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The first of the CPU demands for increased autonomy from Moscow came
in late February 1990 as the Supreme Soviet stepped up its demands that
the Third Department of the USSR Ministry of Health transfer its facil-
ities located in Ukraine to the Ukraine Ministry of Health.492 This step
was quickly followed by bolder steps.
1. Ukraine Seeks Legitimacy Abroad
By Fall, Ukraine was beginning to act autonomously and on October
13-14 Ukraine took the first steps toward operating as a politically
independent entity. Kravchuk and Polish Foreign Minster, Skubiszewski
signed an agreement on diplomatic, consular, and trading representation of
Ukraine in Poland. Also in this same month, Ukraine and Byelorussia
signed a mutual agreement on trade, economic, and technical cooperation
and development.
On 2 November 1990 Prime Minister Fokin reported to the Ukrainian
parliament that the best course of action for Ukraine was "the Ukraine's
complete economic and political independence and transition to a market
economy with profound constitutional changes." In the same address, he
emphasized that Ukraine should enter the IMF and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development.494 The next day the Supreme Soviet
approved this plan for "complete economic and political independence."49
The gist of the program which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet was "that
44%RP9I, p. 170. Narpies, Links this decision to the demands of Zetenyi svit and its teader
Shcherbsk.
'4 A•RP90T, p. 14.
44"Ukraine Adopts PLan for Economic Independence," FBIS-SOV-90-214, 5 Novmber 1990, p. 97.
40"Newsbriefs from Ukraine," The Ukrainion Weekly, Vot. LVIII, No. 48, 2 Decemer 1990, p. 2.
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the major economic-control levers are not ceded to the central government
but remain in the hands of the republican government."496
On 19 November, Izvestia reported that Yeltsin had flown to Kiev
to sign a "treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the Russian SFSR
and the Ukrainian SSR" which established the basis for economic and
political relations without a single mention of the Union Treaty or the
Soviet Constitution.497  This agreement was *intended to establish the
republics' real sovereignty and eliminate totalitarian structures, which
are outdated."4" The agreement confirmed the inviolability of the
currenL state borders of Russian and Ukraine.
Shortly after this agreement was signed, Ukraine turned to the
West. In November, Ukraine sent delegates to the Paris summit of the CSCE
to declare Ukraine's intent to join the organization and the rest of
Europe under the mandate of the 16 July Declaration of Sovereignty.4'
2. The CPU Distances Itself From the Center
By the end of 1990 Kiev's measures to distance itself from the
center seemed to be paying off. There had been no negative repercussions
as a result of the Declaration of Sovereignty nor from the Decree on
Economic Sovereignty. In fact, by December, when Gorbachev stood alone
after reformists Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from
406S. Tsikora, "New Chairman of Ukraine SSR Council of Ministers Means to Form Governemtn of
National Accord," Izvestis, 15 November 1990, p. 2, transL. CDSP, VoL. XLII, No. 46, p. 23.
4 7S. Tsikora, "Treaty on ReLations Between Russia and the Ukraine," Izvestiya, 19 November 1990,
p.1 transL. mSP, Vol. XLII, No. 17, p. 21.
45
"Ukraine, Russia Sign Pact as Equal, Sovereign States," The Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. LVIII, No.
48, 2 Decaber 1990, p. 1, 14. Pravda Ukrainy, 21 November 1990, p. 1, TransL. "Treaty Between RSFSR,
Ukrainian SSR," FBIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 Decaber 1990, pp. 23-25.
4 See the 25 November 1990 issue of The Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. LVIII, No. 47 for several articles
an Ukraine's participation in the CSCE summit.
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his administration and KGB head Krychkov was warning of intervention by
foreign agents and suggesting that bloodshed might be necessary to bring
the situation the periphery under control, Kiev's moves seemed even more
timely.
There were even undercurrents of autonomy in CPU and CPSU
relations after Lithuania's Communist Party declared itself independent of
the CPSU early in 1990 and Popov and Sobchak, the mayors of Moscow and
Leningrad respectively, quit the Party and declared they would make their
cities islands of free enterprise. In Ukraine, such revolutionary ideas
were slower in developing but they were beginning to become visible.
S. I. Gurenko, First Secretary of the CPU Central Committee, in
speaking about the offensive by nationalist in Western Ukraine against the
Communist structure there stressed that despite the gravity of the
situation there, "We are not looking for protection from Moscow -
Ukraine's communists are capable of defending themselves."'50
However, the extent of the CPU's separation from the CPSU was in
doubt. As Hurenko stated,
the Communist Party of Ukraine is now organizationally, financially,
and as regards cadres, completely independent of the leading organs
of the CPSU... [after the second phase of the CPSU Congress] our Party
will be formed as a completely independent Party."
However he then adds,
I want to state at the outset, however, that its ideological
principles and organizational structure will coincide with those of
the CPSU.... What I can say is that we will not have r fundamental
differences with the Statute and Program of the CPSU.
mN. Odinets, "At Life's Front Line," Pravda, 2nd ed., 27 November 1990, pp. 1-2, tranut. in
"Gurenko Revives Potiticat Situstion," FBIS-SOV-90-242-S, 17 Deember 1990, pp. 27-28.
01SOLC92, p. 153.
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Whether this conservative view would dominate over those in the
Party who seemed to realize that their future lay in an autonomous
existence was uncertain. But it was clear that the weakened CPU needed
some way to back up what political power they had left with improvements
in economic reality.
I. CONCLUSION
One would naturally expect that the forces of the opposition,
persecuted and outlawed for 70 years, would lack in political expertise.
But one would not readily assume that the Communist Party, the original
revolutionaries of 1917 and the masters of power brokering, would lack
such experience but this was exactly the problem. This was compounded by
what one Communist writer called "a progressive attenuation of power and
will ..102
The opposition was aggressive and having gained legitimacy by the 1990
elections to the national parliament, soon showed themselves more politi-
cally adept than the CPU which was handicapped by a weakness induced by 70
years of unopposed rule. In short, the CPU was ill prepared to carry on
in what emerged in 1990 as a two party system.
This inherent inability to adjust to the new political realities in
Ukraine, which were in large part introduced by the CPU itself, was
revealed in a interview by Roman Solchanyk in November 1990 with the first
Secretary of the CPU, Hurenko. Hurenko described the political changes in
Ukraine [loss of Party monopoly] with the preface that
these. changes occurred not because of other forces but on the
initiative of the Communist Party. The fact is that perestroika in
"%SEL090. p. 57.
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the political sphere began with the renunciation by the CPSU and,
consequently by the Ukrainian Communist Party, of their monopoly in
the political and ideological spheres. That's tho first thing.
Therefore, these changes were not a surprise for us.
In reality the CPU leadership was genuinely taken aback by the changes
which occurred unexpectedly and they were desperately trying to regain
control and resented their inability to do so. The CPU felt genuine
resentment that they were being cast in the role of the villain. In
speaking about the new political parties and their programs Hurenko
strongly criticized them because they
base their programs above all on criticism of the Ukrainian Communist
Party for both its past and present activities and their direct their
practical efforts towards the quickest possible elimination of the
Communist Party from the political arena. From our standpoint, this
does not promote50 constructive solution of the problem, and it
irritates people. 5
Although Hurenko cited this push to get rid of the CPU as hampering
the genuine transformation of some former CPU leaders who still held Party
posts, it was clear during 1990 that this process had already begun
regardless of anti-Communist pressures. The primary motivation for the
softening of the conservative Party forces was a struggle for public
support which began to get fierce by late 1990. By this point, both the
Party and the democratic forces had achieved a roughly equivalent level of
political power thanks to the power of public support. As Rukh Deputy
Koniev explained at Rukh's second congress, the real problem then became
in gaining and keeping the peoples' faith. The latter is most




for the people, all our work will have been in vain; for once the trust of
the people is lost, it is too difficult to regain it."s0
The "softening" of the CPU was also related to an increasing distant
relationship between the center and the peripheral governments. Ukraine's
moves toward increased autonomy and declaration of sovereignty clearly
indicated that the center's tight grip on Ukrdine was slipping. Even the
traditionally close relationship between the CPU and the CPSU was
beginning to be strained. By the end of 1990, it was clear that Ukraine
was intent on redefining its relationship with the center but how this
would be done was not yet clear.
The opposition forces gained in strength in 1990 by building on their
March electoral sucress which gave them seats in the Supreme Soviet.
Despite their minority status, they managed find common ground with at
least the moderate Communist deputies and by using mass demonstrations
they applied pressure to the conservativ- --s.
The following statistics from public opinion polls conducted by the
Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences indicate the
shift in political support for the vario.s political parties in Ukraine
during 1990. In comparing the percentage of respondents supporting each
party between January and July 1990 the following is noted; Support for
Rukh grew from 27 to 46 percent. The Greens maintained a constant 13
percent support, support for the nationalists (those advocating secession)
grew from 3 to 7 percp-' while support for the CPU was cut in half over
this time period from 20 to 10 percent. The study also noted that while
55Fottow-up an Rukh Congress: Excerpts of PrincipLe Addresses," The Ukrainian Weekty, VoL.
LVIII, No. 46, 18 November 1990, p. 9.
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Rukh was supported by the working class, the CPU could only expect support
from pensioners and the Greens from the intelligentsia.
Perhaps even more importantly, the study pointed out that between
January and June 1990 an evident wradicalizing" trend appeared among the
population as shown by the percent of those polled with no political
preferences which had dropped from 20 to 9 percent. 5°6 The combination
of an increasingly politicized population and the faCt that Rukh seemed to
be more in line with public preferences than the CPU, provided serious
food for thought for the Party. In all likelihood, next year's elections
to the Supreme Soviet would result in a much different parliamentary
composition.
The CPU, faced with a loss of support and power, was now in a critical
position. The Ukrainian political system was effectively a two-party
system in rapid transition. Now it remained to be seen if the CPU could
change in time to prevent its own collapse.
"s"Opposition Leeds in opinion PoLts,"Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991, p. 3.
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VIII. THE END OF THE CPU
During the second stage of the CPSU's 28th Party Congress, convened
on 13 and 14 December 1990, the CPSU demonstrated that despite signs to
the contrary during 1990, it was still very much alive and hostile to the
democratic forces. This renewed strength and turn to the right became
more pronounced in early 1991 with the Soviet Army's intervention in
Lithuania providing a warning to all would-be secessionists that the Union
was not going to dissolve so readily.
On the eve of the January 1991 CPSU Plenum, Leningrad's Party leader,
Gidaspov, published a strongly anti-reform article in Pravda50 7 sending
a signal to conservative forces throughout the Union to launch an anti-
perestroika campaign. Gidaspov decried the turn of perestroika away from
the economy toward society and he attacked Gorbachev for continuing to
weaken the Party. He advocated the resurgence of the Party into political




This theme carried into the January CPSU CC plenum where Gorbachev let
hardliners such as Ivashko, Szasokhov, and Shenin speak for the Communist
leadership. The Party was granted control over the economy once again
which, to a great extent, reversed the last two years of liberal reforms.
The Central Committee of the CPSU was reinstated as overseer of Party
organizations. The previously vacant office of Propaganda Secretary was
W7 Pravda, 12 January 1991.
5'*RAHR91, p. 2.
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filled and Gorbachev's foreign policy was denounced as having abandoned
the Marxist class struggle approach in favor of universal human
values.
50 9
This apparent recovery of the CPSU and its strike back at the
reformers was felt at all levels. In Ukraine, at the 15 Feb 1991 Central
Committee plenum it was evident that Party First Secretary Hurenko
intended to follow Moscow's example and begin an offensive against the
democratic forces in Ukraine. He stressed the Party's strengthened role
in economics and over the Party as a whole. He also lashed out at Rukh
for joining forces with other democratic movements beyond Ukraine's
borders and engaging in mconspiracies".
510
This chapter focuses on the role of Ukraine's Communist elites as the
CPU attempted to recover from their setbacks of 1990 and renewed attacks
on the democratic forces. During this time, the center of political
change in Ukraine shifted away from Rukh, which had served as the center
of political developments in 1990, toward the CPU. As Rukh's second
congress in October 1990 had shown, Rukh was unable to unite all sectors
and regions of Ukraine and now, with an increasingly conservative mood in
Moscow, the CPU began to take center stage.
The main argument put forth in this chapter is that during 1991 the
process of deconstruction which had begun in 1990 continued as did the
merging of moderate Communists with democratic forces. In following the
events of 1991, it is becomes clear that although the attempted August
coup in Moscow was the final blow to the CPU, the CPU would have imploded
'*RAHR91, pp. 2-3.
510So SOLC91A for a fuLLer difcussion of the CPU PLenum.
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and collapsed in 1991 on its own. This is illustrated in the following
pages which examine the CPU's renewed offensive against the opposition,
the changing composition of parliament, the results of the March
referendum, Ukraine's position on the Union Treaty and the August coup.
A. THE CPU OFFENSIVE AND THE INTERFRONT
During early 1991 all eyes were turned toward Lithuania where Soviet
military units intervened in an attempt to prevent secession of the
republic. Ukraine's Communists were watching especially closely. They
were interested in the methods used by the Communist Party of Lithuanian
(CPL) to fend off the opposition forces. One of the key methods which the
CPL and other Baltic Parties used extensively and which the CPU found
attractive was the international front or interfront. These movements
were designed as counters to the popular fronts and their purpose was to
exploit the ethnocentrism of the Baltic popular fronts. 511  The
interfront platform was anti-secessionist and anti-nationalist, however
hopes of undermining popular support for the opposition by playing up the
ethnic issue was of limited value.
They [Interfronts] are supported mostly by Russian-speaking workers
at all-Union enterprises in the area, not by representatives of
Russian intelligentsia in the Baltics, who generally support the
popular fronts. The obvious link between the "internationalist"
movements and conservative party officials and even neo-Stalinists in
the Russian Federation further discredits these organizations.A
Because of these shortcomings, Interfronts in Ukraine appeared much later
than in the Baltics.
"
11TOLZ9, pp. 20-21.
5 12 T0LZ90, pp. 20-21.
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Even as late as mid-December 1990, experts were saying the formation
of interfronts in Ukraine would be impossible because of 1) opinion polls
giving the CPU only 10 percent support and 2) Rukh's extraordinarily open
and fair policy toward minorities within Ukraine. 513  However, atabout
this time, Roman Solchanyk reported the formation of an intermovement in
the Donbas region. This region, typically dominated by Russians or
heavily Russified Ukrainians, seemed the perfect spot for such a movement.
The fledgling front held its founding meeting on 7 November 1990 and
proclaimed its goals as 1) to defend the Union Treaty and 2) to preserve
a single all-Union economic structure. 514 Ukrainian intermovement
spokesman, USSR People's Deputy Oleksiy Mykolayovych Boyko, expressed his
concern over the "growing nationalist itch" in Ukraine which was
manifested in the economic policies being made in Kiev.
51M
The Intermovement envisioned two possible plans for Donbas autonomy;
formation of an autonomous region within Ukraine or secession from Ukraine
all together. However, from the start it did not appear that the Donbas
group was effectively united.51 6 The transfer of control over Ukraine's
m'KUZ190C, p. 6.
144 lnterestingly, the Ukrainian intermovemant stressed economic concerns more so then their
Baltic cousins who concentrated on the secession issue. This reflects the primary interests of the
populace in areas such as the Donbas which were largely economic. The predominance of economic
interests in this region is interesting because the Donets'k oblast at the center of the Donbeas
region was ranked fourth from the top among Ukrainian oblasts in 1980 on the basis of its economic
indicators which on the surface defies those that argue economic well-being implies political
contentment. However, the interfront, as mentioned above, is a largely Russian organization. That
is, the interfront as an organization is not protesting the status quo but what they perceive to be
a threat to it from Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev. Thus, the nature of the struggle is to preserve
the stability of yesteryear. One cannot neglect the ethnic aspects of this phenomenon but this type
of cou•tersction to a nationalist agenda which threatens those who live well under the old system
the hand of economics Loos Large.
515SOLC90B, p. 1.
516A meeting of Local USSR people's deputies of the region on 10 November 1990 failed to cast
significant support towerd "oyko. SOLC9ON, p. 1.
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coal mines from Moscow to Kiev in January 1991 also undermined the
viability of the interfront by refocusing miner's hopes for the future on
Ukraine rather than the center and further discrediting the idea that the
Center, or the Union, was willing to help those in the Donbas. This
organization eventually collapsed.
Solchanyk also reported an intermovement being formed in southern
Ukraine known as Novorossiya. This organization sought "special state
status" for what was once Novorossiya which encompasses the Odessa,
Mykolayiv, Kherson, Dniperopetrovsk, and Crimean Oblasts as well as a
portion of the Onister Region of Moldavia. 517  These movements utilized
the issue of establishing Ukrainian as the national language as their
rallying point hoping it would play up on interethnic tensions. This
issue caused intermovement type activities as early as 1989 although no
formal intermovement was established until November 1990518 and even
then, unlike in the Baltics, the ethnic issue didn't create any
significant support and all of these groups eventually went the way of the
Donbas group and collapsed.
Interfronts, as an anti-opposition device employed by Ukraine's
Communists, failed because of the success of Rukh and other opposition
organizations in politicizing the Ukrainian populace and convincing them
that a brighter future lay in a path away from Communism. As public
opinion polls mentioned below indicate, during 1990, the rising anti-
Communist sentiment was high among Ukraine's Russian population as well as
51 COLCH90, p. 10. Other snalysts at this time identified the Kherson and Nikoleev Oblasts as
regions with secessionist movements. (KUZi90C, p. 6)
518COLC#90, p. 10.
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among Ukrainians and thus the level of popular support for an interfront
in Ukraine was limited.
The failure of the interfront was one indication of the quickly
decreasing influence and power of the CPU. The composition of the
Ukrainian parliament was another.
B. THE COMPOSITION OF THE UKRAINIAN SUPREME SOVIET
In Pravda on 4 February 1991, First Secretary of the CPU, Hurenko
described the political situation in Ukraine as one consisting "of only
two parties-the Communists and the anti-Communists." In such a situation,
he complained, "Political disagreements develop into direct confrontation
over anything."519  This situation grew more common as opposition
delegates began to gain growing influence in the parliament.
1. Influence in Parliament
Opposition deputies in the Supreme Soviet were in the minority
after the March elections with only 125 seats to the Communist's 308.
However, they held a disproportionate numbers of seats in Supreme Soviet
committees which gave them (6) seats in the 27-member presidium
responsible for conducting the Supreme Soviet business when the Supreme
Soviet as a whole is not convened. This gave opposition forces greater
influence than their numbers would at first indicate. Opposition forces
were also aided by the fact that the CPU deputies were often distracted.
The CPU's delegates were primarily Party and state bureaucrats or
collective farm chairmen or enterprise managers and as a result, these
5t 3TranaL. in "Are the Communists Sprit in Ukraine," Ukrainian Recorter, Vot. 1, No. 6, March
1991, p. 4.
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deputies were often too busy with other business to be attentive to the
business of the Supreme Soviet or its presidium.520
2. The CPU Fractures
The opposition in the Supreme Soviet after March was gathered
under the umbrella of the Narodna Rada or People's Council. This group
was composed of three parties; the Party of Democratic Revival (37
Members); the Democratic Party of Ukraine (23 Members); and the Republican
Party (20 Members). The first two groups were pragmatic groups intent on
pushing the CPU toward reform or taking power themselves if need be. 521
After the split of the Democratic platform in summer 1990, the
remaining CPU was split between a center faction which wanted to rule
Ukraine independently and a right faction which adhered to the Pro-Moscow,
all-Union platform. 52 Kravchuk led the centrists along with Prime
Minister Fokin. Their main base of support was among factory directors
who stood to gain from privatization of all-Union enterprises and the
transfer of authority over them to the republic.
The "right" was lead by the CPU leadership in the Central
Committee. After the November 1990 assault on republic autonomy, the
center switched its efforts from sparing with the parliamentary opposition
to sparing with the right wing within its own party.
Ironically, it was Moscow's decision to send troops into Vilnius
to put down the secessionist government which began this process of
internal struggle in the Party.
50ILS91, p. 6.
521WILS91, p. 6.
"50"Are the Coimunists Sptit in Ukrain?,w Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 6, Narch 1991, p. 3.
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C. CRISIS IN LITHUAIIA AND PARTY SPLIT IN UKRAINE
When Soviet troops intervened in Lithuania in January 1991, there were
republic-wide demonstrations in Ukraine in support of the Lithuanians.
The event also triggered a response from the CPU and the Supreme Soviet.
The Central Committee of the CPU adopted a resolution condemning the
"-"provocative campaign, conducted by national-separatists and extremist
forces..." and sent a telegram to Lithuanian Communists stating "we
solidarise with all those who today are countering the pressure from
aggressive anti-communists, derisory, ruining tendencies and
actions .... 523
Meanwhile, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, although predominately
Communist, issued a resolution condemning the Army's intervention in
Lithuania. Their protest read like those sent by Rukh, and the Ukrainian
Republican Party (URP);
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR...supports
legally elected state executive organs of the republics and beholds
that any violent actions against national statehood on the part of
political parties, public and other groupings are unlawful...consider
inadmissible the use of military force on the territory of any
Republic for solving of the internal and inter-ethnic jonflict
without approval of the legitimate Republic's authorities.
For the first time in the history of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the
Communist dominated Supreme Soviet had taken a position at variance with
the Central Committee.
It is likely that the Supreme Soviet deputies were moved to condemn
the actions taken by the center in Lithuania because they realized that if
523"kraine and the Baltic RepubLics," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 3, 3 February 1991, p.
2.
W4 "Ukraine and the Baltic RepubLics," Ukrainian Reporter, Vat. 1, No. 3, 3 February 1991, p.
2.
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military intervention were to occur in Ukraine they would loose their
posts and in any case, a pro-center position would have been extremely
unpopular.
The Ukrainian Reporter, reported in early March 1991 that following
the Lithuanian showdown, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk joined
the "patriotic Communists" in condemning the military intervention
indicating that he, like a growing number of others, were placing national
interests before all-Union ones.55
This interplay between national and union interests were to quickly
come into the open over the debate surrounding the March 17 referendum on
the fate of the union.
D. KRAVCHUK RECEIVES A POPULAR MANDATE
One of the most important events in 1991 was the March 17 referendum
on preservation of the Union. The referendum was agreed to in 1990 with
the aim of querying the Soviet people whether they consider it necessary
to preserve a Soviet Union of equal sovereign states. Gorbachev's intent,
in calling the referendum was to gain a popular mandate for himself in
order to strengthen his position vice the conservatives.
1. The Referendum Meets with Resistance in Ukraine
The referendum immediately placed Ukraine's Communists in an
awkward position. On one hand the referendum was soliciting support for
a renewed union and thus conflicted directly with Ukraine's declaration of
sovereignty which Ukraine's Communists had supported in July 1990. On the
M"The Union Referudcm and Ukraine," Ukrainian Reworter, Vol. 1, No. 6, March 1991, pp. 1-2.
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other hand, the CPU was still the "reliable and militant unit of the CPSU"
and thus must obey the commands of Gorbachev. 52'
The opposition found itself in no such quandary and in February,
Rukh issued a statement declaring the 17 March referendum to be illegal
because it is being undertaken prior to the adoption of the new Ukrainian
constitution. 527  Rukh also demanded a republican question be added with
the question "Do you favor a union of Soviet sovereign nation states in
which every nationality can decide its own fate?" These opposing views
placed the issues at a stalemate in the Supreme Soviet.
The centrists broke the stalemate between the Narodna Rada and
the Communist right by proposing a compromise which allowed the referendum
to be carried out while simultaneously addressing the pertinent issue of
Ukraine's future status in the union more directly. The compromise was
the addition of a second, republican question; "Do you agree that Ukraine
should be part of a Union of Soviet sovereign states on the principles of
the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine?"
2. The Referendum Results
Having settled the wording of the referendum, the ballots were
printed and the polls opened. The conduct of the referendum suffered from
a number of violations including harassment of opposition members, distri-
bution of anti-referendum materials, confiscation of those materials as
well as discrepancies during the actual balloting such as printing both
Union and Republic referendum ballots on the same color paper. In
mgkrhinian Eaorter, Vol. 1, No. 6, March 1991, p. 1.
807Chronicle of Events," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 4, 4 February 1991, p. 8.
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addition, ballot boxes were stuffed and ballots were issued without proof
of identity.
52
However, in spite, or because of, these discrepancies, the 17
March referendum turned in an 80.8 percent vote in favor of the republican
question and a 70.5 percent vote in favor of the union question. On a
more detailed level, the results were regionally diverse. Western Ukraine
came out strongly against the Union question and only marginally in favor
of the republican question (about 30% on the average). Eastern Ukraine
favored both questions equally while central Ukraine was slightly more in
favor of the republican question. Southern Ukraine followed suit and
threw slightly more support behind the republican question. 5 29
Kravchuk wasted no time proclaiming a victory for Ukraine;
It is an historical fact that the people of Ukraine.. .came out not
only in support of the union, but in support of a special kind of
union, a union with a certain content-a union of sovereign states
based on the Declaration of Sovereignty of Ukraine.... We have the
task of building a new union treaty wq~ch will take into account the
interest of the people of Ukraine....
Clearly, Kravchuk, ignoring the union question, took the referendum
results as a popular mandate to continue his policy of moving toward
independence but "in such a way so as not to result in the appearance of
tanks in the Khreshchatyk (Kiev's central boulevard).'w53 Narodna Rada
concurred, but favored a more direct approach to independence. 53 2
'See "Referendua Chronic(e,w Ukrainian Reworter, Vol. 1, No. 6, March 1991, p. 2.
"'eSee -Referen&1- Results Ana•yzed,- Ukrainian Revorter, 1, April, 1991, 2.
S°Refermndiu Results Analyzed: Democratic Groups Report Widespread Violations," Ukrainian
Revorter, Vol. 1, No. 7, April 1991, p. 2.
WI"Referen.Lu Results Analyzed: Democratic Groups Report Widespread Violations," Ukrainian
Revrter, Vol. 1, No. 7, April 1991, p. 2.
5a2See the statements by opposition deputies in marts Kotomayets, "Over 80 Percent Vote for
Ukraine's Sovereignty," The Ukrainian Weeky, VoL. LIX, No. 12, 24 March 1991, pp. 9, 11.
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The CPU leadership also claimed victory in the referendum citing
the 70 percent support for the Union vote as an indication that the effort
by "certain political forces" to claim the referendum was illegal and to
boycott it failed.' 33  However, as Moroz indicated, the rightist
Communist deputies interpreted the mandate in their own way; *These
referendum results give us the opportunity to go to the next step - the
Union Treaty." 
53
The Union Treaty was to provide the second major confrontation
over which the Communists would be further split between right and center.
E. THE UNION TREATY
Although the Supreme Soviet had agreed not to sign a Union Treaty
until a new Ukrainian constitution5 35 was in place, in early 1991
Gorbachev began to apply pressure to the republics to sign.536 If the
republics do not voluntarily sign, warned Gorbachev, they will have to
live under the conditions of the 1922 treaty signed with each government
whose territory was occupied by the Red Army, or they will have to go
through the "law on secession" procedure which is deliberately so involved
and difficult that it is virtually impossible to secede. The Union Treaty
&w3Robitnycha Hazeta, S April 1991, as trans. in "The Communist Party of Ukraine in Crisis,"
Ukrainian Recorter, VoL. 1, No. 14, August 1991, p. 1.
N4Marts Kotlmayets, "Over 80 Percent Vote for Ukraine's Sovereignty," The Ukrainien. Weekly,
Vot. LIX, No. 12, 24 March 1991, pp. 9, 11.
'3Work began on the Ukrainian constitution In October 1990 but due to serious conflicts over
matter such as the name of the repubihc, the form of legislative administration, the office of
president, the role of the Prosecutor's office and the Soviets, prevented its quick adoption. 0n 21
Nay the Ukrainian Spraeue Soviet began to consider parts of the constitution and voting on them.
The task is to be completed by June 1991. See SOLC91F.
"538It seems that Gorbachev may have deliberately plnued Kiev as the site for his S July
meeting with German Chancellor Kohl to discuss western aid for the USSR prior to attending the
London G7 conference In an effort to put pressure on Ukraine to sign the treaty.
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was immediately seen by the republics as a means of reviving the old
Union.
If Ukraine were to sign the treaty, it would mean having to go
back on a number of promises made in the 16 July 1990 Declaration of
Sovereignty and as a result, the idea of signing the Union Treaty was very
unpopular. The right-wing CPU leadership in the Central Committae,
however, sipported signing the treaty as per Gorbachev's requ•it.
On 27 June, in a surprising vote, the Supreme Soviet agreed to
table the Union treaty537 until September despite pressure from both the
center and the opposition. Although Gorbachev wanted the signed treaty to
prove to the G7 in London that the USSR was now a stable country the
opposition threatened further strikes by students and the URP reminiscent
of 1990 if the treaty was signed. 53
In order to have passed the 27 June proposal to table the treaty,
a majority of the Supreme Soviet's Communist is well as democratic
deputies had to have voted together. This was direct evidence that there
was no small amount of isle-crossing among the Communist delegates. As
Kravchuk had pointed out a day earlier, the group of 239 "no longer
exists, in essence, it has liquidated itself." 539 This vote was to
53 This treat was already a modified versions of the one provided by Gorbachev earlier. This
revised draft was published on 9 March 1991, See SHEE91A for detaiLs.
5Saee SOLC91B for details on the strike threat. As concerns renewed student strikes, there
are those in Ukraine who argued that another student strike would have been unlikely because of the
increasir; pessivism of Ukraine's youth. Myrostav Marynovych, a former political prisoner active in
youth organizations in Ukraine describes the youth of Ukraine in 1991 "extremely passive". In
addition, "They react to untruths, they mistrus: everyone, and as a result they want to be Left
atone." He cited the Kiev student strike of fall 1990 as a rare exception. (LEW91U, p. 3)
530ln an interview printed in Trud, 26 June, 1991.
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become the definitive demarkation paint between imperial (right-wing) and
sovereign (centrist) Communists.
Once again, Kravchuk emerged on the side of the sovereign forces
supporting the idea of Ukrainian independence. While his motives may have
been murky, Solchanyk suggests that
the bottom line is that the direct presidential elections in Ukraine
are scheduled for December 1. It is unlikely that Kravchuk, as the
leading candidate, would want to face voters confropaing him with a
copy of the new Union Treaty bearing his signature.
Ironically, by August, the imperial Communists were demanding that the
Union Treaty be signed by 10 October which would have put Kravchuk in a
horrible bind but the August coup solved the dilemma for him.
F. THE ATTEMPTED AUGUST COUP
The attempted August coup d'etat in which Gorbachev was ousted and a
Committee for State Salvation took power from 18 to 20 August was viewed
by many as a last ditch attempt to maintain territorial integrity of USSR
before the Union Treaty signed it into history.
5 41
1. Response to the Coup
Ukraine's political response to the August coup consisted of
three distinct variations; 1) The opposition immediately condemned the
coup and pledged support for Boris Yeltsin who was leading the campaign
against the coup in Moscow; 2) The leadership of the CPU supported the
coup d'etat; 31 The centrists or sovereign Communists "dithered" until
the coup failej and then they joined the opposition in condemning it.
0SOLC91B, p. 24.
51As MaLta argues, this was reaLLy not a coup, :t was a "act of the Soviet goverfiunt." The
executors of the coup were Soviet Leaders, appointed by Gorbachev. The difference was that
Gorbachev refused to go along - hardly a real coup. (MALI92, p. 90)
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The opposition's response to the coup was immediate. On the
morning of 19 August the Narodna Rada organized itself as the coordinating
center for democratic opposition forces and they formed a new presidium in
the Supreme Soviet which was to function as the "legal, executive arm of
authority in Ukraine." Rukh took over the daily operation of the Narodna
Rada. 5'2  The Narodna Rada refused to recognize the legality of the
Committee's decrees and appealed to wall citizens of Ukraine, all those in
positions of authority, all serving soldiers and law enforcement officials
to ignore any of the actions of the putchists and to follow solely the
Ukrainian constitution and its laws."
5 43
Kravchuk refused to bow to opposition demands to both force the
presidium to issue a clear statement of support for Yeltsin and to convene
an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet. Kravchuk called for
"balance" and for Ukrainians to "keep a normal rhythm to life." 5" While
Kravchuk reportedly told Yeltsin on the morning of 19 August over the
phone that he would never support the coup, he appeared on the Moscow news
show Vremya and showed support for the coup. Kravchuk claims that his
responses were heavily edited to come out in favor of the coup. There
were also claims that Kravchuk made a deal with the military commander,
General Varrenikov, who Moscow had sent to Kiev to impose, if necessary,
martial law in Ukraine. The deal may have been that Kravchuk would call
5d2"Faited Coup D'Etat Leads to Dectaration of Ukrainian Independence," Ukrainian Resorter,
Vol. 1, No. 15, August 1991, p. 1.
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"Failed Coup D'Etat Leads to Declaration of Ukrainian Independence," Ukrainian Retorter,
Vol. 1, No. 15, August 1991, p. 1. See this issue of Ukrainian Reaorter as waet as the next (no.
16) for transtations of primary documents on the opposition reaction to the coup.
s5,Faited Coup D'Etat Leads to Dactaration of Ukrainian Independence,- Ukrainian Rewrter,
Vol. 1, No. 15, August 1991, p. 1.
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for calm and prevent mass protests allowing the military to focus its
efforts on the Baltics and Russia."s
2. Legal Action is Taken
On 20 August, the Supreme Soviet met in an extraordinary session
and the presidium finally issued a weak condemnation of the coup signed by
15 of 25 members including members of the Narodna Rada and sovereign
Communists led by Kravchuk.
On 24 August the Narodna Rada placed a declaration of
iniependence on the agenda of the extraordinary session of the Supreme
Soviet.'" In a vote of 346 of 450 (only 400 deputies were present) the
Supreme Soviet adopted the declaration which read;
In view of the deadly threat posed to our country on the night of
August 18-19...and expression of a thousand-year old tradition of
statehoog, the Supreme Soviet solemnly proclaims the independence of
Ukraine.
On the same day the Supreme Soviet also adopted recommendations
to take control of all-union institutions on Ukrainian territory (KGB,
Army, MVD, enterprises etc.) and to form a Ukrainian army/national guard.
At this time Kravchuk resigned from the Supreme Soviet of the CPU, the
politburo of the CPU and from the CPSU.
The opposition demand that the CPU be outlawed was rejected on
24 August but after obtaining secret documents implicating the CPU in
supporting the coup and cooperating in the establishment of martial law in
sC"Fai ted Coup D'Etat Leads to DecLarstion of Ukrainian Independeie," Ukrainian Reporter,
Vot. 1, No. 15, August 1991. p. 1. In preparation for mrtiat taw in Kiev the Kiev Army Commander
depLoyed 12 divisions, including 4 tank divisions near Kiev.
5
"This extraordinary congress was catted thanks to the efforts of the Narogne Reds.
'
7
,FaiLed Coup D'Etat Leads to Dectaration of Ukrainian lndqedm ce,n Ukrainian Resorter,
vol. 1, No. 15, August 1991, p. 1.
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Ukraine,s"' the presidium of the Supreme Soviet voted, on 30 August, in
favor of banning the CPU.%' Kravchuk resigned from this illegal
organization the following day.
3. Kravchuk's Role
Solchanyk concludes from his detailed study of Kravchuk's
behavior during the coup that
the Ukrainian leader hesitated to take a decisive stand against the
plotters in Moscow. Further, there are indications that even when he
did act more resol•tely, he did so as a result of pressure from the
democratic forces.
Solchanyk gives the example of Kravchuk's 21 August phone call to Anatolii
Luk'yanov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet during which he denounced
the coup and said Ukraine was not going to abide by the Committee's
decrees. Apparently just prior to this call, a representative of Narodna
Rada called and demanded Kravchuk call Moscow and unequivocally denounce
the coup. Similarly it was Narodna Rada which did all the leg work to
convene the extraordinary session on the 24th of August. As Yeltsin's
deputy, Ruslan Khasbulatov said, it was the Narodna Rada which from the
start took the uncompromising stand against the coup and saved Ukraine's
honor. 551
As for the CPU, the August coup was the final discrediting act
of the Party. Wilson describes the August Coup as a major factor in
5See for exampte "Secret 'Telegram no. 47' Shows Commnist Support for Junta," Ukrainian
Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 18, October 1991, p. 2.
5OThe decree titled "On the Prevention of Activity of the Comssnist Party of Ukraine" is dated
7 September and appeared in the 11 September issue of RobitnYcha Hazeta and issue mber 37, 1991 of
Visti z Ukrainy.
55 0SOLi91E, p. 50.
5 1 SOLC91E, p. 50.
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Ukraine's state-building because it induced a "post-coup implosion of the
Communist Party of Ukraine" and *put a greater distance between the new
system and the old Communist Party Soviet structures than could
conceivably have been hoped for prior to August.- 552 Clearly the state-
building process would have continued on its own but the coup greatly
accelerated the process and led directly to the 24 August 1991 declaration
of independence. The August declaration was significantly different in
tone and scope than the 16 July 1990 Proclamation of Sovereignty and led
to the 11 October 1991 decision to hold a referendum on independence in
December 1991.
6. THE POST-COUP CPU
On 6 September, Oleksander Moroz, leader of the former "group of 239"
announced the group's self-dissolution in accordance with the Supreme
Soviet decree on banning the CPU. This was really a formality because the
group of 239 had ceased to exist as a comprehensive group in June. Moroz
blamed the CPSU for the failure of the CPU because while "existing
structures had not allowed for the practical possibilities of reforming
the Party from below" and reform from above had not happened because the
correct leadership to do so had not come forward.553
On 6 September it was announced that the CPU was no longer a viable
political force in Ukraine after more than 70 years of near absolute
power. However, Communist deputies remained in parliament and in
government. Now they were simply without a Party unless they belong to
5 %iLS91, p. 6.
"
3
-Aither the Communist earty of Ukraine," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 18, October 1991,
p. 1.
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one of the new parties being formed in the ruble of the CPU. These spin-
off parties were of two types; those attempting to reestablish Communist
control and those formed from former CPU members but with goals other than
reasserting Communism.
1. Parties of Former Communists with Comunist Goals
An example of the first type of CPU spin-off party was revealed
in an 11 September interview in Radyanska Ukraina, in which Moroz
announced that members of the former group of 239 were planning on
becoming more involved in the workings of the Supreme Soviet with the aim
to "create within it a strong center." Moroz also announced that a new
Party was being formed to fill the vacuum left by the now-illegal CPU.
This party, he said, is for "those healthy forces who were in the
Communist Party of Ukraine and who wanted to see her differently", 5
In a later interview on 5 October, Moroz elaborated, saying the party was
a "progressive, democratic" organization to uphold the ideals of "social
justice". He announced the inaugural congress for this "Party for Social
Progress: would be held at the end of October with 10-15 delegates
attending from each oblast.555  The UDP protested Moroz's attempts to
launch a "Party of Left Inclination" which,they claimed, was just a new
name for the old CPU. The UDP also, accused former communists of
involvement in the separatist movements in the Donbas, Sub-Carpathia and
Odessa region.
sea ither the Communist Party of Ukraine," Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 18, October 1991,
p. 1.
55Interview in Redianska Ukrainia cited in 'Whither the Communist Party of Ukraine," Ukrainia
Reoorter, VoL. 1, No. 18, October 1991, p. 1.
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There were other examples of this first type of spin-off party.
For example, the paper Vechirnyi Donetsk on 16 September called for the
establishment of an new Ukrainian Communist Party and the initiative
conmittee, led by former first secretary of the Donetsk city Party spoke
out against the dismantling of the USSR. 55' In the Rivne region, the
inaugural congress of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the USSR, led by V.
Zhyrinsky was announced in September. The party, composed solely of
former CPU members, was very pro-CPSU and opposed the break up of the USSR
and the rise of Ukrainian nationalism. 557
2. Parties of Former Communists with Non-Communist Goals
The other side of the coin was shown by the crei on of another
spin-off party in Donetsk at about the same time. The 14 September issue
of Radmnaska Ukraina announced that the inaugural congress for the
Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine was just held. This party was
organized primarily by former CPU members from the "economic community"
(i.e. enterprise managers, businessmen, economists, and the creative
intelligentsia) and one of their primary goals was to encourage foreign
investment in Ukraine. 5" It is hardly surprising that this type of
party would form since the vast majority of Ukraine's "economic community"
were members of the CPU. However, it was unlikely that this type of spin-
MCited in "Whither the Communist Party of Ukraine," Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 18,
October 1991, p. 1.




wahither the Communist Party of Ukraine," Ukrainian Reporter, VoL. 1, No. 18, October 1991,
p. 1.
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off party would have attempted to reinstate Communist control because it
was not in their best interests to do so.
It is far from clear what impact these spin-off parties will have
in the long run but they were not significant players in the December
presidential elections. It is very likely these parties (especially those
of the first type) will continue to appeal to the hard-line, rightist
communists which were removed from power only by force. The parties of
the second type may lose their attraction as these members of the
"economic community' become integrated in to other political or economic
organizations. Both types of spin-off partes have the potential for
wielding significant clout because they can count among their members
hardened politicians and officials in important posts.
H. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CPU?
To answer the question of what happened to the CPU in 1991 we have to
turn to a number of different ways of analyzing the events because there
were a number of different things happening simultaneously in Ukraine -
political struggle, economic collapse, and social unrest. Toward this two
different analyses will be undertake to answer this question.
1. Occupational Motivation
Although w have Rlready analyzed the structure of the Supreme
Soviet, it is worth while to examine it again in light of the events of
Spring and Summer 1991 but looking at the make up of the Communist body in
a different way.
Lets examine the make up of the Communist bloc in the Supreme
Soviet by occupation. To this end, Andrew Wilson describes the Communist
bloc in the Supreme Soviet as being composed of two groups; the state and
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Party bureaucrats and the collective fanr chairmen and enterprise
managers. 559 These groups were initially bound together by the presence
of the opposition in the Supreme Soviet after the March 1990 elections but
they began to split in the Spring of 1991. The causes of this split,
which played into the hands of the opposition, were economic reforms such
as a Ukrainian bank, control of enterprises on Ukrainian territory, and
the like which appealed to the latter bloc but not the former-sm
The collective farm chairmen and the enterprise managers also
sought an alliance with the Supreme Soviet centrists (sovereign
Communists) in an effort to gain more voting power over the state and
bureaucratic block. The referendum on Ukrainian sovereignty and the
renewed miner's strikes, both in March 1991, helped cement this alliance.
This joining of forces around the "economic bloc" effectively reduced the
hardline communist bloc "the group of 239" to 150-200 deputies according
to Wilson.
5 61
During the August coup d'etat, the bureaucratic group attempted
to administer the coup while the "economic bloc" tried to distance
themselves from the economic collapse of the union by voting with the
opposition. Wilson, noted that this later alliance may have been only
5NA study done by Dominique Arel breaks the occupational background of both communist and
Narodna Reds deputies down even further (Table 1) indicating that the bloc can be broken into three
broad groupings; Cainnd-Administrative Class, InteLligentsia, and other (including workers,
peasants, military). The Cmimnd-administrative class form the core (85%) of the group of 239.
Looking at this class then Arel's data indicates that 592 of then are what Wilson calls Bureaucrats




tactical since the desires of the "economic bloc" and the Narodna Reds did
not necessarily coincide.s"
2. Balance of Power
In addition to the analysis offered by studying the "occupational
motivations" of the deputies there is a balance of power approach to
examining why the Ukraine's Communist elites acted the way they did. In
this approach the three parliamentary groupings, Sovereign (centrist)
communists, imperialist (Right-Wing) communists, and the Narodna Rada, are
considered in competition for political power. The behavior of each group
is motivated by the desire to either hold on to or gain the political
power to implement their program. This balance is examined over the
course of the Spring and Summer in a series of segments which explore a
particular aspect of political power in the CPU. A beginning point is
late 1990/early 1991 with the centrist Communist group attempting to gain
power over the then dominate conservative CPU.
a. The Centrists Gain Strength
Having put the opposition on the defensive at the end of
1990, Rukh argued that the centrists then sought support from outside the
republic to strengthen their position vis-a-vis Moscow and the imperial
Communists in the CPU. This was done for example, via the Ukrainian-RSFSR
treaty in November, and discussions in February with Russia, Ukraine,
Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan about a joint treaty. 5 63  In line with this,
Kravchuk and Fokin, and the deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Hryniov
2%ILS91, p. 7.
M'Are the Comminists Split in Ukraine", Ukrainian Reworter, Vot. 1, No. 6, Narch 1991, p. 3.
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continually attacked the Union Treaty which would have strengthened the
rightists in the CPU.
In the post-coup environment, Kravchuk's pursuit of
continued close relations with Russia cast him in the image of a shrewd
advocate of Ukrainian interest and strengthened his position as a truly
pro-Ukrainian leader.
b. The Opposition Reaches Out
In early March, Rukh's Council of Experts in the Kiev branch
was recommending that Rukh unite moderate democratic forces and work
together with the centrist Communists in order to offset the rightist in
the CPU and Supreme Soviet. They also recommended that Rukh undertake
"propagandistic work to inform the public" that the current repression in
Ukraine is the work of the right-wing of the CPU and encourage cooperation
with the centrists. The report added that opposition leaders should not
be afraid to support the "autonomy of certain regions, even as free
economic zones, which would increase their popularity in those areas."
This was an obvious reference to the Crimea where the imperialists in the
CPU were attempting to establish a free economic zone to win over the
largely Russian population of Crimea. The opposition was also advised to
support Kravchuk's four-republic agreement as a "counter-weight to the
center"s"
c. Away Fro= oscow
In order to keep the support of the opposition and the very
verbal populace (i.e., students), the Centrists were continually trying to
5Trenrt. in "Are the Cainfsts Split in Ukraine," Ukrainian Reorter, Vot. 1, No. 6, March
1991, p. 4.
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distance Ukraine from the center. This, in turn, forced the imperial
Communists to fight back and to openly oppose very popular independence-
building measures.
This distancing fromMoscow was both political and economic.
Politically greater separation was signaled by the Supreme Soviet's
refusal to consider the Union Treaty any early than 1 September and then
only to sign it after the new Ukrainian constitution was in place.
Economic separation began in January 1991 with Prime
Minister Fokin, himself a former coal miner, demanding that the Ukrainian
coal industry be brought back under republican control and that prices for
Ukrainian coal be doubled. Moscow conceded on both requests thinking, no
doubt, that this was a much better deal for them than it was for Ukraine.
Now the burden of resolving the miner's strikes and finding the money to
invest in the mining fields would rest on Ukraine and not Moscow.
However, the Ukrainian government, unlike Moscow, by this point had come
out in support of sovereignty which gave them a measure of trust among the
miners.6 5
The transfer of control over economic enterprises continued
in June of 1991. On 6 June, the Supreme Soviet approved a resolution
transferring jurisdiction over Union enterprises in Ukraine to the
republic. Although this was interpreted as an attempt to grab these
enterprises from the center, the intent in the Supreme Soviet was to
prevent the center from continuing to privatize these properties without
=,Coat Miners mnd PubLic Discontent in Ukraine," Ukrainian Revorter, vot. 1, No. 6, March
1991, p. 5.
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Republican approval .5" Then, after heated debate in the Supreme Soviet
on 26 June, the Supreme Soviet adopted a law on taxation which abolished
the right of the center to impose taxes in the republic. On 9 July,
Gorbachev approved this plan by which Ukraine would be allowed to
determine how much revenue to turn over to the central government.5
7
Any attempts by the imperial Communists to counter these
economic moves would have been countered by the "economic bloc" within the
group of 239 because their self-interests were being best served by the
shifting of power to the centrists and the opposition. The group of 239
also began to find their ability to shift power in any direction was being
slowly undermined from below.
d. Attenuation of Power in the CPU
The CPU weakness was not at the center but at the local
levels where the CPU was continually being eroded. At the local level
either the CPU leadership was more influenced by Ukrainian nationalism or
they were simply more susceptible to attack by the opposition. If the
later is true then it is logical that if the local leadership wished to
preserve its position of power then capitulation to the opposition would
be the best choice. If the former is true, there is no capitulation but
only a merging of forces.
The newspaper Radianskyj Prapor, the organ of the Konotopska
city CPU in the Suny Oblast, revealed, on 21 May, a typical crisis at the
local level of the Party. The first secretary of the city CPU admitted at
"EEconomic Reform of Political Manoeuvering?," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 13, July 1991,
p. 5. IN spite of these reform, in July in the Donbas 67 percent of the enterprises were still
under central control. (See Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 13, July 1991, p. 6.
W"Eco.cmic Reform of Political Manoeuvering?, Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 13, July 1991,
p. 5.
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the City's plenum, that the CPU was to blame for the falling standard of
living and other adverse influences on the city residents. He cited a
loss of public credibility and internal discipline as weakening the Party.
In 1990, the city CPU expelled 769 people or 11.6% of its membership for
lack of discipline and another 86 for violation of CPSU statutes. Party
careerists were leaving the Party and Party factory cells were closing
down. The speakers addressing the plenum argued that in order to improve
party discipline the Party had to go on the offensive, but against who?
they asked.5"
Also appropriate, is the question with whom to go on an
offensive with because the balance of power was shifting away from the
imperial Communists because of desertions within the party.
e. "Lack of party discipline"
In mid June, an open letter signed by leading members n" the
Ternopil Oblast Party organizations was published in Ternopil Vechirnyj
(15 June 1991).M This was the most open critique of the CPSU and CPU
to date representing an increasingly fractured Party menmbership. The
letter, signed the "Initiative Group 91" and by members of the Party
apparat, secretaries of primary Party organizations, leaders of regional
Soviets of People's Deputies, of industrial and agricultural enterprises,
youth groups and the intelligentsia, called for the CPU to separate itself
from the CPSU.
'AS transt. in "The Commit Party of Ukraine in Crisis," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No.
14, August 1991, p. 1.
"'TransL. :n "ApoeaL to CoIunl$ts of Ternopit," Ukrainian Reporter, VoL. 1, No. l4, August
1991, pp. 3-4.
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The letter cited the deep economic crisis, the social chaos,
the threat of famine, poverty, and unemployment, the authors write, loom
over Ukraine and
in this extreme situation the CPSU, the former 'leading and guiding
force', has proven itself unable to defend the people. Its central
committee is a tool in the hands of the President attempting to
safeguard the rotten structures of the empire under a carefully
disguised slogan of a 'renewed union of sovereign states.'
Furthermore, the letter continues,
The central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) has become
the humble servant of the 'elder brother'. So far it has been unable
to honestly admit to its criminal policies before the people. This had
led our people into material and spiritual qgverty whilst it has force
Ukraine into the state of a humble servant.
"The Party," argues the letter, "is an obstacle to the
independence of Ukraine." The solution, the authors argue, is for
the thinkers of the Party to denounce the anti-national past of the
Communist Party of Ukraine and its current intentions. In view of
the fact that the Kremlin is fully in support of saving the unitary
state of a 'renewed' kind, we call for the split of the Communist
Party of Ukraine from the CPSU, for its complete independence and for
its transformation into a Socio-Democratic parliamentary party. 1
The authors revealed their intent to hold a referendum in
August in Ternopil oblast to gather popular support for this demand. They
appealed to their fellow Communists in other oblasts to follow suit and
revealed the fundamental contradiction that has existed in the Ukrainian
communist elites;
We turn to those who have not lost the last drop of national con-
sciousness, to the hearts and minds of members of elected bodies of
primary party organizations. We do not have the right to go against
the people. Practice has shown that senior party function-aries are
"
570Transt. in "Appeal to Caomunists of Ternopit," Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 14, August
1991, pp. 3-4.
571Tranms. in "Appear to Communists of Ternopit," Ukrainian Reporter, Vot. 1, No. 14, August
1991, pp. 3-4.
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mainly concerned about their own well being. At any moment tku may
betray the Party masses, as they have done on many occasions.
This letter may help explain why the CPU lost more than one
million members in the past few years and why the exodus continued in
Iggl.57 It was clear that the balance of power was shifting away from
the imperialist Communist bloc but to where is it going? This letter
would indicate that it was going to the side of the centrists, or in the
worst case to the opposition. But somewhat perplexing is the fact that
Party members who resign tend not to join other party affiliations. For
example, after the split of the Democratic Platform (now the PDRU) in June
1990, its membership, at 2,117 members is inadequate to qualify it for
official registration. 574 Thus, in this case, the power shifted away
from the CPU but it did not appear to manifest itself in either the
opposition or centrist camps.
In summarizing the balance of power analysis, it is clear
that the political power of the CPU's right-wing was consistently
transferred to the center or to the opposition both wittingly and
unwittingly. Attempts to alter the balance of power in favor of the
right-wing were put to an end when the CPU was banned after the coup and
Ukraine's Communist Party assumed the role of the opposition.
57Transt. in "Appeal to Comunasts of Ternopllt,w Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 14, August
1991, pp. 3-4.
573This figure appeared in Vechirnyi Kiev, 17 June 1991 and was cited in "The Coam-usit Party
of Ukraine in Crisis," Ukrainian Reporter, Vol. 1, No. 14, August 1991, p. 1.
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Although the year 1991 began with a Communist offensive against the
democratic forces with abrasive rhetoric and abortive attempts to
establish interfronts, it ended with the defeat of the Communists. This
is not to say that this process of deconstructing the CPU occurred in a
year, because in fact, it began in 1989. However, the year 1991 was
important because during this year the cracks in the CPU were widened by
events in Lithuania and by the issue of the Union Treaty. The Party's
inability to muster support for an interfront and decreasing Party loyalty
in parliament spelled the end of the CPU.
The "sovereign" bloc of the CPU had carefully built, in merging
efforts with the democratic forces, a basis for independence and had
aligned themselves more closely to the popular sentiment than had been the
case the year before. As a result, when the August Coup occurred and the
CPU was abolished, Kravchuk's apparat was easily and successfully able to
fill the void.
The last nails were placed in the USSR's coffin in December 1991 when
Kravchuk was elected as Ukraine's first freely elected president since
1918 and the referendum returned a 90.3% vote for independence.
57
Although the CPU was abolished and a freely elected president was at the
helm, the deconstruction of the CPU between 1990 and 1991 had not been
complete. During this period and even after the August coup, the
Communist elite was divided into two groups; those that changed their
political views and those that did not. To be sure, this process of
5Soo JaroaLaw Martyniuk, "Ukrainimn Independence and Territorial Integrity," Radio Liberty
Reports, 1 Aprit 1992 for detaiLed anaLysis of the referendum and eLection resuLts.
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converting those who still cling to Communism is still continuing and will
for some time, but the point is that not every Ukrainian Communist was a
fervent believer nor was every one willing to abandon his beliefs. Those
that have broken with their pasts, such as Kravchuk, will find their
talents in need. Those who have not changed may later make the
transformation, or may never. Their numbers are probably small and in a
true democracy would not be destabilizing. In independent Ukraine,
however, their numbers are undetermined and their access to power is still
great.
This cloud of doubt hanging over Ukraine's governing bodies extends
to Kravchuk himself who represents those former Communists who did not
break with the Party until the very end but who appear to be genuine
"nationalists." In speaking of this type of person using Kravchuk as an
example, Rukh deputy Skoryk said, "That, in a moment of some danger, which
can come from one knows not where, to await heroic action from such a
person is futile. One cannot count on this. And one should keep this in
mind." But she then adds, "on the other hand, is the given moment really
one which demands heroics or is it a moment where super diplomacy is





By September 1991 it was already clear that the transformation of
Ukraine's Communist elites was complete. Led by a desire to maintain
political power and pushed by their Ukrainian national consciousness,
Ukraine's Communist Party elites distanced themselves from the center to
rally behind Ukrainian independence. This desire to achieve autonomy from
the center was nothing new and in fact, during the seven decades of Soviet
rule, the Ukrainian republican leadership had proven itself to be quite
prone to "nationalist tendencies." Despite this, the extent to which
these tendencie-s wqre realized in 1991 took the Soviet government and
Western experts by surprise.
While the tendency for Ukraine's Communist leaders to agitate for
increased autonomy was a historical fact, the widening of national demands
to include the independence of Ukraine from Russia was, from Moscow's
point of view, inconceivable. By almost any measure, after 74 years of
intense Russification, Ukraine was among the most assimilated of the
Soviet nations. The Ukrainian language was a phenomenon of the deep
countryside and Ukrainian culture was becoming indistinguishable from
Russian. The number of Ukrainian language publications could be counted
on two hands and the percentage of Russians and russified Ukrainians in
Ukraine was continuing to climb. Ukraine was also sharing a doubly
"privileged" position of being the largest non-Russian Slavic population
and being the most important non-Russian republic. Ukraine was considered
so deeply connected to Russia historically, culturally, linguistically and
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economically that the December 1991 referendum, in which more than 90
percent of the Ukraine population (Russians included) voted for
independence, came as a great shock to Russia.
In the West, Ukrainian independence was equally unanticipated
primarily because of an analytical focus which excluded or marginalized
the study of Ukrainian Communist elites and their allegiance to the
center. The basis of this study has been to examine Communist elite
reliability in the Soviet socio-political environment and tie it to a
number of cultural factors such as Ukrainian nationalism, the desire to
rule in one's own land, and the decline of ideology. While it is true
that people, leaders as well as others, are not predictable, as this study
shows, there are certainly indications of potential behavior which are
useful tools for the analyst.
A. THE STUDY OF ELITE BEHAVIOR
Ukraine's elites operated with a divided loyalty which placed them
between two opposing political and ideological poles; Ukraine and Soviet.
The reason Ukriane's Communist Party elites supported and eventually led
the move to independence was that, wanting to preserve their political
power, they chose between these loyalties. The path they chose to
preserve their power, separation from the USSR and more precisely from
Russia, was determined in great extent by their environment. The major
social and politcal factors in this environment were the contradictions of
Soviet ideology and the contradictory Soviet federal system.
The Marxist ideology upon which the Soviet state was based left open
the question of how to deal with nationalism and the various approaches
which appeared in the works of Marx and Engels were at best contradictory.
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As a result, when Lenin and Stalin constructed the Soviet Federal system
using this ideology as a basis, the state both extended and denied
recognition and accommodation to the forces of nationalism. The legacy of
this contradiction became clear in 1991. Ironically, in its struggle for
independence, Ukraine only put into action the Soviet Constitution which
guaranteed the right of secession. Also significant is that the current
government is governing with the structure established by Stalin.s'h The
contradictions of ideology and structure created a physical and
ideological space within the Soviet system in which the "Ukrainian fact"
took seed.
By the "Ukrainian fact" we refer to the historically based idea of an
independent Ukrainian nation which brought Ukraine into immediate
confrontation with the Bolsheviks in 1917 and created tensions under the
Soviet system. The idea of a Ukrainian state bolstered by a strong
national myth was never completely submerged in the Soviet system."5
By December 1991 it was clear, that Ukraine was again on the rise.
The people of Ukraine had spoken out against the regime which had imposed
upon them 70 years of cultural, political, and economic deprivation. But
most importantly, the general rejection of the Soviet state and its
ideology and federal structure was supported and echoed by the ruling
elites of Ukraine. Without the support of the CPU, the Ukrainian
opposition would likely have been slower to rise to power, if they ever
5780f course, there has been the notable addition of a RepubLican MiLitary.
57
9it is interesting to note that those states in Eastern Europe which had a strong tradition of
nationaL comunism and had estabLished their independence from Moscow decades ago (Roamnia, ALbania,
Yugoslavia) were the Last to become non-Communist. In the case of Yugoslavia the process is continuing.
Their independenc from Moscow helped insulate them from the generaL collapse of Communim. These exmpLes
my in some ways pertain to Ukraine where the communist apperat CaLbeit under a new nime) is stiLL in power.
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achieved power at all. The transition of the CPU was a gradual process
and a natural by-product of the deconstruction of the Communist state.
S. THE PROCESS OF CONMUNIST DECONSTRUCTION
Although the basic motivations and direction of the Ukrainian national
movement were historically derived, the years 1989-1991 were critical for
its development and success because in these years actions of the center
both encouraged and shaped the Ukrainian opposition. Alexander Motyl
describes the process of reform initiated by Gorbachev as one which, by
its very nature, forced the republican Communist organizations to either
break with Moscow and embrace the republican (and usually nationalist)
program or to die. This dilemma was imposed as a result of Gorbachev
attacks on the Communist bureaucracy begun in 1987. Gorbachev's use of
personnel cuts, governmental streamlining, empowerment of the soviets, and
the use of glasnost placed additional pressure on the system. These
pressures on the CPU were now acting from below, above and from within.
1. Pressures from Below
The creative intelligentsia in the USSR embraced Gorbachev's
liberalizations as did other parts of society. As the negative incentives
for public participation decreased, more and more frequently the Party
came under attack locally. This began, says Motyl a weakening of the
state which prompted increased opposition. 58
The forces of opposition were further strengthened by Gorbachev's
1987 released of political prisoners in an attempt to appeal to the
intelligentsia and forces abroad on a basis of human rights. In Ukraine,
Mo$et NOTY90, pp. 176-178.
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this meant the release of numerous prisoners of conscience who quickly
became quite active in the opposition movement. These "experienced"
members of the opposition were able to instantly fill the role of
opposition leaders based on their proven loyalty to the anti-regime forces
and their contacts within the now-emerging opposition. Thus, claims
Motyl, Gorbachev created both an official and an unofficial opposition.
2. Pressures from Above
Gorbachev had placed the republican party leadership in an
intensely contradictory relationship. On one hand he was pushing economic
and political decentralization which played into the hands of the
republican leadership and encouragednational communist tendencies. On the
other hand, however, he supported and maintained republican leaders, such
as Shcherbytsky who were expected to be, and were, loyal to the center and
responsive to Gorbachev's policies of strengthened federalism. As a
result of this contradiction, the ideological and physical space provided
by the flawed ideological and federal system of the Soviet state was
quickly exploited by Ukrainians once the repressions were lifted after the
retirement of the Ukrainian First secretary Shcherbytsky.
Not surprisingly, based on the history of the Ukrainian Communist
Party, the Party was one of the first to rush into this void, utilizing
Gorbachev's perestroika as a conduit to realize increased autonomy from
the center. At first, the CPU supported and even initiated via its pro-
reform members, means such as Rukh to continue this process. However,
realizing the potential for a mobilized populace to undermine the power of
the Communists, the CPU belatedly tried to intimidate and repress the
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burgeoning opposition forces. Although these policies continued into
1991, the CPU was fighting a loosing battle after 1990."'
3. Pressures frm Within
The mobilization of the population via popular and broad-based
sympathy for environmental and anti-Communist issues began a process which
the CPU could not stop. At this point, the CPU was decisively split into
two factions. The first was the 'sovereign Couunists" (primarily those
with vested economic interests) who conceded power to the opposition
forces and sought to preserve their power by adhering to the pro-reform,
pro-independence line. The second faction was composed of wimperial
Communists" (primarily those who held positions in the government
administration) who sought to restore the stability and absolute power of
yesteryear. The period of 1990 to 1991 was really nothing more than a
contest to see which of these two could gain the most public support. 5U
The increasing polititization of the populace signaled by the miner's and
student's strikes made this struggle even more frantic.
A. The Politics of Power
Superimposed on top of this internal struggle in Ukraine was the
battle for the locus of control. For the most part, the CPU was unanimous
585 This process is not dissimilar to the collapse of Comuism in Eastern Europe. For example, Adom
Przeworski, in describing the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe described the process by which Comnist
Leaders attempted to deal with their increasing toss of power. Using Potla" as a model he describes how Party
apperatchiks are forced to rely on pure repression once protest against the regime becomes widespread. Bkt
after the miners, strikes in sur 1988, GeneraL Jaruzetski understood that repression was not enough and he
compromised with the forces of opposition and forced this decision on the Party. At that point, the Party
bureaucrats attempted to convert their political power into economic power before they Lost even that. (PRZE91,
p. 21)
mThe precarious position of the CPU is well illustrated by the following comnt by Ukrainian Party Leader
Hurenko in late 1990, in response to the question "is it possible to cooperate with Rukh? Or do you feel it
is a hostile force?" He said it could be neither black nor white; Nif I were to say that 'Rukh' is not our
enemy, I would probably be subject to brutal criticism form our CoInists. If I were to day that 'Rukh' is
an enmy, I would be subject to brutal criticism from another side. The situation here Is rather complicated."
(SOLC92, p. 154)
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that Kiev should gain increased autonomy for Moscow on this account. This
became even more obvious when the CPU realized that if it could not
control the "political goods* demanded by the population, its power base
was gone.
This two-fold process of attempting to hold onto power in Ukraine
and also break from tte center came to a climax in August with the
forceful removal of Gorbachev by the conservative Soviet government. The
disgust with the Soviet government and the Communist Party led Ukraine and
the remaining republics to declare their independence. In the period of
two days the desires of the opposition and the majority of the population
converged with those of the sovereign Communists. A new Ukrainian state
was born.
C. THE "NEW" UKRAINE
For all its importance, the August "coup" did not mean the
decommunization process in Ukraine was complete. In fact, at the time of
this writing, it has yet to take palace. The government in Ukraine today
is the very same one which was in place a year ago with very few
exceptions. This immediately leads to questions of the motives and
reliability of this new leadership. To some, such as Malia, the motives
of the current leadership are questionable and Kravchuk's "commitment to
democracy and the market is tenuous and opportunistic."50 The
underlying issue, one which was central to the problem of the CPU from
1989 until 1991, is, as one opposition deputy, siipposed; "In reality no
truthfulness, no real concern for the fate of our people exists among
"3MALi92, p. 92.
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those people - they simply do not want to lose power." To others, the
present government symbolized by Kravchuk, is perfect. In this view,
Kravchuk is the right man for the job because he is a moderate candidate
who is supported by the broad range of public opinion in Ukraine. He is
not a western Ukrainian who would frighten the less Ukrainianized
easterners and he is not a Russian who does not reflect the general
Ukrainian national consciousness.
1. Elite Motives
As far as the process and motives go: Furtado and Hechter seek
to explain why the CPU hardliners stuck to, and the centrists eventually
abandoned, the strategy they did toward the nationalist movement - namely
to resist and suppress it.ms Although their rational choice theory
tends neglect some factors and to marginalize the center's ability to make
decisions on what is best for the system, Furtado and Hechter do provide
a useful theory for analyzing elite motives to not challenge the system.
The key to this behavior is, they argue, the level of Republican
elite dependency on the CPSU to gain access to political power. The
Ukrainian leaders were more dependent and thus pursued a path more closely
tied to that of the CPSU than say the Estonians. Ukrainian dependence on
the CPSU was based on "the calculation of relative career chances with the
organization of the CPSU itself." Local leaders, argue Furtado and
Hechter, will take the interests of the center into account if they know
that in so doing, they will be rewarded later by political promotion in
MiDeputy P. Tatanchuk, as reported in foto2, No 13, 1991 and transt. in "The Communist Party of Ukraine
in Crisis," Ukrainian Recorter, Vol. 1, No. 14, August 1991, p. 1.
65FLMT9, pp. 189-190.
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the Republic or even into the central organs. Since the high level Party
positions have long been dominated by Slavs, Estonians and other non-slavs
realize their chances of political reward were limited. As the Party's
control over the periphery began to decline, local leaders took the
rational choice and began to do what was necessary to maintain their
power. It is just that Ukraine took longer to do this because their
dependency was higher and they began to deviate from the center only when
they realized the center was failing and had no rewards left to offer.
Shcherbytsky's ouster was one indication that the behavior the center was
now rewarding was not that which Shcherbytsky had displayed. In fact,
Ivashko was the last Ukrainian leader to take advantage of the old
nomenclature system when he went to Moscow to be Gorbachev's deputy.
Although, as a result of this process of deconstruction, not all
Ukrainian Communists came over to the side of the opposition, significant
numbers did and their story is in many ways symbolized by that of their
leader, Leonid Kravchuk.
2. Analysis of the Leader
Kravchuk came to prominence in 1988-9 as the ideology secretary
set on destroying Rukh. On 23 July 1990, he replaced Ivashko as Chairman
of the Supreme Soviet and despite expectations quickly asserted his
centrist view of Ukraine's future. This was a view he did not hide;
I am convinced that Ukraine should be a sovereign, full-fledged, and
full-blooded state. I do not hide this from the plenum of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, nor from the
politburo, not from the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
nor at home, nor at th. Supreme Soviet. I see that this approach
does not suit everyone.6
5'Ko2gsomo'skays aravda, 27 ApriL 1991, as cited in SOLC91G, p. 23.
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Kravchuk's first indications that he had changed his views on Rukh and on
the future of Ukraine came in late 1990 when, in his dealing with Moscow,
he asked for a Ukrainian-Russian translator to be present. Along these
lines, Marples noted in early November 1990 that Kravchuk "has of late
adopted the practice of responding to questions only in Ukrainian, even if
the speaker addresses him in Russian."5 7  Symbolically and in his
actions he appeared to be what he says he is but still doubts lingered.
Rukh Council Member Skoryk, speaking about Kravchuk the
presidential candidate, worried that Kravchuk may have other intentions;
To say that this is a man with high moral values, I cannot, because a
person who went into that field [th, Party], who chose to climb up the
rungs of the communist ladder, hao to be ready to act amorally....
[Further] I find it difficult to believe that he is moved by the same
convictions that we are. But in this situation our positions
coincide. 5
It was exacltly, Kravchuk's ability to make his agenda coincide with that
of the opposition which gave his his support. For example, if Kravchuk
had bowed to the Party's intense pressure to sign the Union treaty, he
would have lost every chance of being elected president. He felt the risk
from challenging the ailing CPU was much less than loosing popular
support. Such tactical considerations are difficult to discount.
The only way to address worries about Kravchuk's real motives is
to see indide his head which we cannot, but there are clues to his trans-
formation which may give some insight into his motivations. Kravchuk
traces his disillusion with the party to 1987 when he was asked by a group
of scientists to provide, for their research, documents on the famine of
5 7 HARPMOS, p. 12.
'Z.AIY91S, p. 11.
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the 1930s in which over 7 million Ukrainians died. Against Party wishes,
he did so and in 1990 he facilitated the publication of "The Famine of
1932-33" which detailed Stalin's plan to starve Ukraine into submission.
At this point, Kravchuk says "For the first time in my life - and I was no
longer a young man - I felt the horror. I couldn't believe this had
happened. "59
In an interview with Nahalyo in 1990, he appealed to the
Ukrainian diaspora to read about Ukraine in order to regain their national
consciousness and revealed a bit about his own consciousness;
They [members of the dias&3ra] would understand much more about
Ukraine than they do now [if they would read about Ukriane]. I'm not
just theorizing; I know from my own experience. I have read more
about Ukraipe in the past five years than in all the previous years
of my life.
90
Kravchuk's growth of national consciousness was no doubt eased by the fact
that Ukrainians were building a nation founded not on the basis of an
exclusive ethnic, religious, cultural, or linguistic principle, but one
based on the idea of an economically, politically, and territorial defined
Ukrainian state. It was this vision of a Ukrainian state, non-threatening
and viable, which helped sway the Communist elites to the side of the
independence seeking opposition.
Kravchuk's support for this new Ukrainian state appeared to be
whole hearted and the reason for this is right under our nose. In April
1991 a correspondent from The Christian Science Monitor wrote that
Ukraine's biggest mystery was its leader, Kravchuk. Was he the man who




hierarchy or is he a hidden Ukrainian nationalist jut now beginning to
emerge? Kravchuk himself suggested a third alternative, and one that
would be unheard of in the USSR, he suggested that he is a politician
trying to represent his constituents. 591
Kravchuk is a shrew politician who was successful in shedding the
errand boy subservience of his predecessors and who is now attempting to
preserve his power in Ukraine. Clearly he has to serve his constituents
since that is where the new base of support lies.
D. THE OUTLOOK FOR UKRAINE
The future of the Ukrainian state depends foremost upon its structure,
that is, the nature of the Ukrainian state. It also depends on popular
support for the state, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, and support
from the West.
1. The New State Structure
What happened in the Fall of 1991 was a revolution in every sense
of the word. There was an abrupt and radical discontinuity in the history
of the USSR - Connunism failed. But it was not a revolution in the
ordinary sense of the word. The revolution of 1991 was a strange one,
because as Malia points out, the idea of revolution is usually taken as
the break through of a pre-formed, vital force such as the Third Estate in
18th Century France but in the USSR a far from preformed, vital force
burst through the "outworn shell of power". It was a force fueled by the
desire to be rid of Communism and there was little if any political,
S1 Christian Science Monitor, 2 Aprit 1991.
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economic or ethnic form to lt."2 This is a process which Malta equates
to the German Zusawmenbruch or the Russian smuta which is used to
describe the "time of troubles" between 1604 and 1613 when the Moscovy
Tsardom practically vanished leaving the country without a social or
political system and various internal and external forces intervened
appropriating what they could of the country.
2. Ukrainian National Consciousness and the Path Forward
As socialism weakened in Ukraine, the political and social vacuum
was filled by a rising national consciousness. The remarkable thing about
this consciousness was that it was not centered on the idea of ethno-
nationalism but on the concept of citizenship. The path adopted by the
Ukrainian national movement to unite and mobilize Ukraine was one of two
possible as one of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group's first members, Myroslav
Marynovych explained in the summer of 1991. "There are two options [to
unite the people of Ukraine] - the option of force, which is short-term,
or the option of understanding and love."
5 93
The reasons the path of understanding, love and tolerance, was
chosen are many. For one, the extent to which Russification had proceeded
in Ukraine doomed to failure any ethnically based movement. Take for
example the Mayor of Odessa who revealed in a 1991 interview that "I am
Ukrainian, but my brother is Russian. We registered my eldest son as a
Ukrainian, but our youngest, in memory of his Kuban Cossask roots on his
mother's side - as a Russian." 59' In such situations, the only path
M'AL 192, p. 93.
SNLE91B, p. 3.
0L. KapeLyushnyy, wolhat Kind of Ukraine Can be Seen From Odessa?" Izvestiya (moscow), 25 Sept 1991,
Trans(. in FBIS, Soviet Union, Repubtic Affairs, 4 October 191, p. 97.
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forward is one for the people of Ukraine rather than the Ukrainian people.
As well, Ukraine's historic experience made Ukrainian dissidents
fundamentally different than that of the more commonly known Russian
dissident simply because to a Ukrainian, the Soviet ideology was not only
synonymous with Russian domination but it was alien and threatening.
Ukrainians were threatened with what they feared was national extinction;
a strong call to protest which Russians did not have. Further, the
desire to renew the nation was not so much a glorification of Ukrainianism
as it was a rejection of Russianism. Farmer, makes this point in
describing the nature or Ukrainian nationalism, Ukrainian nationalism is,
writes Farmer, "less the affirmation of parochial ethnicity for its own
sake, than rejection of the official rejection of ethnicity."s9 As a
result Ukrainian dissent developed a slightly different trajectory more
focused on preservation of national identity through individual human
revival with the idea of a territorial defined nation preeminent.
The former political prisoners also carried with them a strong
sense of democracy. Myroslav Marynovych who was among the first to join
the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and received a seven year prison term as a
result, explains the roots of the opposition's credibility. He cites the
political make up of the camps as a critical element of education; the
fact that the camps were composed of representatives from all parts of the
political and ideological spectrum Tsarist monarchists to Bolshevik
imperialists provided the prisoners with a unique education because as
Marynovych describes it, "We were all divided in our ideological
positions, but we set our differences aside to unite in protest .... Camp
W5FARMSO, p. 105.
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was a school of democracy, and in fighting against a regime which at the
time could not lose, we learned to grasp something higher." 59  It is
this democratic experience and this ability to "grasp something higher* in
the political turmoil of the current time that make former political
prisoners able leaders. Their experience is not only very applicable to
the current situation when the political spectrum is wide open, but their
time in the gulag or in exile provides a clearly evident indicator that
they were not part of the former regime but in fact opposed it openly.
The political dissidents symbolize truth and truth was one thing
the Soviet system could not provide. Truth was important because, as
Przeworski explains; "People need some modicum of cognitive consistency:
when their thoughts and their words diverge, life becomes intoler-
able."597  Przeworski argues that it is this search for truth which
placed writers and intellectuals in leadership positions. But there is
more to it than that. The vast majority of popular pro-democracy leaders
in Ukraine are former political prisoners. Imprisonment implies that they
stood up to the corrupt system; that they did not succumb to its
treachery; these people are the only ones in society who have shreds of
credibility as opponents of the regime. The implication was that only
these people can be trusted to lead the nation. However, as it turned out
in the end, these leaders abdicated to Kravchuk, the antithesis of the
political prisoner.
MLEW91B, p. 3.
U7 PRZE91, p. 21.
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3. A Question of Leadership
The reason that Kravchuk came to power instead of a long-time
dissident such as Chornovil was that he was the only person in Ukraine who
could draw support from both Western nationalists and Russified Easterners
and all those in between. While the radical political prisoners such as
Chornovil frightened those Ukrainians who were less struck by the
"Ukrainian fact", Kravchuk represented a more moderate and yet
sufficiently independent position.
In many ways, the future of Ukraine lies in the success of this
new leadership. In this vein, Armstrong notes, that Ukraine's biggest
challenge now is to recruit and train a cadre of competent, practical
civil servants. To this end it is important to utilize those hold-overs
from the Communist era who are flexible enough to accept the new status
quo. A number of temporary Western "experts" will also help. "The
biggest problem is development of a stable, orderly civil society to
complement traditional Ukrainian love of liberty." 598
However, even though Armstrong argues that Ukraine emerged from
the rubble of the Soviet Union as one of the "clusters of national civil
societies"599 the situation is far from stable. As Malia notes, in
Ukraine today, there is little foundation on which to build a civil
society;
Nowhere are there mature political parties with genuine consti-
tuencies in society; rather, there are only numerous coteries of




population, amidst the deepening economic crisis, is increasingly
indifferent to the political process.
It it true Malia neglects to consider the process by which Rukh and the
miner's movement in 1989-90 developed; both of which indicate a more solid
basis for civil society than he indicated. The point remains however,
that the need for public support is an urgent and continuing necessity for
the Ukrainian state.
4. Popular Support
Ukrainian independence was only possible because of the political
mobilization of the populace. However, the mobilization of the masses is
a double edged sword; it can support the current government as well as
turn against it. Once the people have been politically empowered, it is
difficult, without resorting to Soviet methods, to ensure their actions
will be supportive of the current government. However, there are several
reasons why Ukraine's mobilized populace should continue to support the
current regime. 1) Kravchuk is a compromise figure who can appeal to all
aspects of Ukrainian society. 2) The Ukrainian movement is based on the
idea of "Ukraine for Ukrainians" which reduces the potential ethnic,
religious, or cultural tensions. 3) This process of moderation which
began after the miner's lukewarm reception of the Rukh platform in 1989-90
forced Rukh to become more moderate in its demands which were shaped by
its primarily western Ukrainian outlook of fervent nationalism. 4) The
gradual development of the opposition allowed more moderate, central
Ukrainians to rise to power in Rukh and moderate the program to include a
slower paced move toward independence and inclusion of economic planks
"°MAL192, p. 92.
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which would appeal to a greater portion of the populace. 5) The more
moderate tenor of the Ukrainian state also has a calming effect on the
important Ukrainian-Russian relationship which will strengthen the
Ukrainian state and help calm public fears of having to choose between
Russia and Ukraine.
E. UKRAINE AND RUSSIA
The Ukrainian-Russian relationship, central to centuries of Ukrainian
history is also central to contemporary events. In his study of the 1917-
1920 Ukrainian Revolution, Reshetar writes that "the single largest
obstacle to the establishment of an independent Ukraine lay in the
apparent difficulty which Ukrainians have had in severing their ties with
the Russians."6°1 Although today Ukraine has achieved independence from
Russia, the Russia question has not been resolved and in fact the future
of relations between Russia and Ukraine depend on the continued moderation
of Russian nationalism which could tear Ukraine, as well as other former
republics, apart. The recent conflict over the Black sea fleet and more
importantly, over Crimea, indicate the importance of establishing a modus
vivendi with the Russians. This is clearly a process which must be
approached from both sides; the Russians must denounce the idea of little
Russianism which has historically subordinated and denied Ukraine its
sovereign existence and recognize the separateness of the Ukrainian state.
Ukrainians, for their part, must be willing to recognize that their future
lies to a great extent in cooperation vith Russia.6 2 The leadership of
MORESH52, p. 330.
OSee MARP91 for the argument that Ukraine's economic future is quite strongty connected with Russia.
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Ukraine, in the hands of Russified Ukrainians, or at least Ukrainians
familiar with the Russian (Soviet) system, has the best chance of not only
managing Ukrainian-Russian relationships successfully but preventing
potential conflict.
F. AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE
Ukraine has proven cunning enough to realize that the issue of nuclear
weapons was a powerfulinfluence in gaining international recognition and
in 1992 this issue, perhaps more than any other, persuaded the United
States to make an exception to its russo-centric policy and recognize
Ukraine. Once again, Ukraine's leadership and its former ties to the
Soviet state bodes well for international relations. Former Communists
have a certain measure of political credibility in the international
community in comparison to former political prisoners and radical
nationalists and this can only help Ukraine.
Despite the international recognition and the establishment of
diplomatic relations, it is uncertain that the world community truly
realizes the importance of Ukraine. Ukraine was not only the key which
determined the fate of the USSR, but the future political paths taken by
Ukraine and the other key states of the region (Poland and Russia) "are
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